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Summary
This  thesis  offers  a  critical  investigation of  the  Bitcoin  currency  and  the
operation of its technical structure, i.e. blockchain technology. The main objective
of the research is to identify and describe the specific power dynamics performed
by and through this digital  phenomenon. “Power dynamics” are framed in this
work largely in terms of authority and sovereignty.
To structure an exploration of such dynamics, the narrative is overarched
by four different notions of “utopia” —as paradox, ideal, no-place, and imagined
governance— that address the following main questions always underpinned by
the general inquiry on power: What is the Bitcoin Blockchain? Where is it located?
How are power relations performed in it? And how are power relations modified
in  relation  with  previous  institutional  systems?  The  thesis  addresses  distinct
notions of authority in Bitcoin through the observation of its historical, spatial, and
organizational  characteristics.  It  maps  the  techno-political  emergence  of  the
blockchain  system,  the  geographical  distribution  of  Bitcoin’s  infrastructural
network,  and  the  strategies  for  governance  involved  in  its  development  as
software.
Based on the observation of these settings, this thesis argues that Bitcoin
posits a restructuration of power dynamics through the automation of code, in
particular,  through  its  process  of  production.  In  order  to  develop  this
restructuration,  the  power  dynamics  of  the  Bitcoin  blockchain  are  weighted
against authority models of the state’s institutions. The thesis builds upon existing
political theories of Empire (Hardt and Negri), protocol (Galloway), and the Stack
(Bratton) to develop a critical account of Bitcoin’s power dynamics. The work sits
in between the disciplines of Media Theory, Software Studies, Political Theory, and
Digital  Methods,  and  makes  use  of  qualitative  and  quantitative  methods  to
empirically support the former argument.
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Introduction
At the beginning of 2014 Davi Barker, a self-described anarcho-capitalist and
editor  of  the  dailyanarchist.com,  claimed  to  be  momentarily  detained  and
questioned on his departure from Manchester airport (New Hampshire) (Barker
2014). Barker and his colleague, Bill Buppert (host of zerogov.com), were coming
back from the New Hampshire Liberty Forum, a convention hosted by the Free
State Project, described as “an effort to recruit 20,000 liberty-loving people”(‘Free
State Project’ 2017) and which seeks to limit the role of government to  at most
protect people’s rights. Barker was carrying around 100 metal pins, which he was
selling at the convention. Having opted-out of the full body scanner, his luggage
was meticulously inspected by authorities. At the end of this inspection he was
intercepted  again,  this  time  by  two  men  who  at  first  refused  to  identify
themselves. The men asked if he was carrying more than $10,000 and planning to
travel  internationally.  On  his  unwillingness  to  answer,  one  of  the  men  —later
identified as a Transport Security Administration (TSA) agent— told him: “We saw
Bitcoin  in  your  bag  and  need  to  check”.  Bupper,  his  colleague,  replied  to  the
agents:  “You  can’t  see Bitcoin”.  After  a  short,  bewildered moment,  the agents
determined that  Barker  was not  travelling  abroad and he was left to  his  own
devices.
This rather odd and seemingly incidental occurrence, nonetheless opens
out onto many elements regarding the Bitcoin phenomenon that are central to
this study. On closer inspection, Barker’s anecdote brings together in a condensed
way, some of the most pressing questions surrounding this digital cryptocurrency;
questions  concerning  materiality,  ownership,  governance,  territoriality,  and
performance.  Can  bitcoins  be  physically  held?  If  not,  in  what  form  are  they
owned?  How  and  where  are  they  stored?  Can  this  space  be  geographically
located?  Which  authority  resides  over  the  production,  exchange,  and
transportation of  bitcoins?  The awkward interaction with  the airport’s  security
also  signals  an  unclear  situation  between the  digital  object  and  the  TSA  as  a
representative of the US government’s authority. Indeed, Barker’s main concern in
his post about the airport incident is to warn other Bitcoin enthusiasts that the
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government (or at least the TSA) is looking for your bitcoins. Barker belongs to a
diverse group in favour of minimizing state influence. Among this group, Bitcoin is
seen as a technical  replacement for some of the administrative and regulatory
operations of the state. The location of this incident is also significant, as airports
often serve as boundaries for the territorial limits of the nation-state authority.
This thesis critically addresses the types of questions that are manifested
in this  incident of Bitcoins at  the border.  More specifically,  it  interrogates how
different notions of authority, border, governance, law, space, and regulation are
reformulated, or not, by the digital phenomena of the blockchain. I explore this
reformulation partly in its relation to the state; not only because of the common
association of Bitcoin with libertarian politics (Golumbia 2016), but in particular
because the previously listed notions (border, governance, law, regulation, etc.)
are structural parts of the state apparatus. My inquiry goes beyond how Bitcoin as
a currency relates to government issued “fiat” and is not especially interested in
the question of whether or not Bitcoin is a real competitor with state-backed fiat
currency. Instead, this research is more concerned with the power dynamics that
are  reformulated  through  a  technology  such  as  the  blockchain,  which  in  the
specific case of Bitcoin is commonly framed in terms of its economic qualities.1
Thus, while I take into consideration the economic relevance of Bitcoin, I observe
this quality through a prism primarily invested in how the notions of authority and
sovereignty are reformulated by and through blockchain technology.
Bitcoin  is  treated  as  an  elongated  case  study,  and  provides  numerous
entry points into how digital technologies both alter and embody specific forms of
authority and sovereignty. Not only is Bitcoin the first and most known blockchain,
but its history is filled with rich anecdotes (like Barker’s airport scene), political
promises, and, as we shall see, highly suggestive internal contradictions. 
Bitcoin’s very emergence is, to this date, still associated with the myth of
its creator. At the beginning of November in 2008, someone under the pseudonym
of Satoshi  Nakamoto posted a white paper in a cryptographic mailing list.  The
white paper introduced a system that claimed to have solved the double-spending
problem2 for  digital  currencies.  Announced  simply  as  a  payment  system,  the
1 Subsequent iterations of this technology take other forms notoriously e.g. Ethereum’s
“smart contracts”.
2 Bitcoin was not the first attempt towards creating a digital currency, but it was the first
to successfully solve double-spending: how to avoid using the same duplicated digital
file/coin/token to pay to more than one recipient, without resorting to a centralized
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design introduced the idea of authenticating transactions of digital  tokens in a
shared  ledger.  The  specific  proposal,  which  combined  widespread  use
cryptographic  security  keys  with  a  public  ledger,  made  counterfeit  extremely
difficult to achieve. The bigger the network and number of transactions, the more
computationally  demanding  the  authentication  of  transactions  would  become,
and the less likely it would be to counterfeit them. The idea, paired with an early
implementation,3 attracted a small but dedicated group of enthusiasts, and then
grew exponentially (Popper 2015). When the price of the currency, which started
as  fractions  of  cents  per  Bitcoin,  achieved  parity  with  the  US  dollar  (USD)  in
February 2011, an article on Slashdot and a later piece on Forbes helped introduce
Bitcoin into mainstream media (Wallace 2017). By May of the same year, the price
was  close  to  10  USD.  Two  months  later,  the  exchange  market  MtGox4 was
founded,  and  this  turned  out  to  be  one  of  the  most  controversial  events  in
Bitcoin’s history. Speculation on the currency was paired with the proliferation of
other exchange markets, and by the end of that year bitcoin reached 20 USD. This
was the year that the cryptocurrency was first seriously considered as a payment
system; one with the capacity to bypass economic censorship and facilitate illegal
activities. In March 2011, Wikileaks started accepting donations in bitcoins, and
around the same time the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) also experimented
with it. This year also saw the beginning of the Silk Road,5 which used Bitcoin to
facilitate payments. Regular media attention, huge speculations on price, concerns
from numerous financial regulators, its associations with criminal activities, and
general intrigue surrounding the ontological peculiarity of this money-artefact,  all
contributed to the swift growing of Bitcoin from 2010 to 2013. 
It  was  during  this  time  that  I  became  interested  in  Bitcoin.  The  term
started to circulate the world of Free/Libre Open Source Software (FLOSS), which I
followed  as  a  Linux  enthusiast.  Without  fully  understanding  its  technical
specificities,  or  what  a  proposal  of  a  new  type  of  currency  entailed,  I  was
system or third-party.
3 The first version of the code was published only a few months after, in January 2009.
4 MtGox was an important element in the history of Bitcoin. By 2014 it handed 70% of
all  Bitcoin  transactions,  but  filed  for  bankruptcy  in  the  same  year,  after  allegedly
850,000 were stolen from it. A recent investigation (Nilsson 2017) has proved that the
exchange was insolvent since 2011, and the money was lost by different incidents that
include thefts, money laundering, frauds, and mismanagement.
5 A black market that used the TOR project network to hide its website servers. The FBI
shut down the website in 2013, and arrested the alleged founder and operator, Ross
William Ulbricht.
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immediately  puzzled  by  its  apparent  open  nature.  The  idea  of  redistributing
control of a small part of the economy from central institutions to an extended
share  of  stakeholders  was  appealing,  especially  in  the  general  context  of  the
financial crisis of 2008.6 The promise of a new way to circumvent some of the
failures  of  the current  economic  system, and to distribute the performance of
authority in it, generated a lot of excitement.
Like the steam-powered machines of the Industrial Revolution, Bitcoin is a
technological artefact associated with changes in the configuration of the social
landscape.  But,  and  very  much  like  steam,  the  scope  and  form  of  Bitcoin’s
machinery is  clouded by an expanding rhetoric.  What is commonly referred as
steam is a mist of droplets of condensed vapour; steam as the gas state of water is
invisible to the human eye. Likewise, blockchain technology is surrounded by the
vaporous  rhetoric  of  the Blockchain.  Thus,  my  attention  turned  to  the
configuration of the Bitcoin machine, and how relates to the utopian dimensions
that surrounds it. This research is interested in how the machine works, in the
technical underpinning of the blockchain, and what kind of politics is unleashed in
its performance. It tries to make sense of the vapour, out of the steam: what do
the technical conditions of possibility —the material pieces and infrastructure—
tell us about the political metaphors that encircle Bitcoin? And vice versa: What
kind of political  visions fed the assemblage of the machine? The thesis is thus
overarched  by  different  notions  of  “utopia”,  which,  I  argue,  are  manifested  in
different empirical contexts and elements of the Bitcoin blockchain. Specifically, I
consider utopia as: paradox, ideal, no-place, and imagined governance. Different
understandings of authority are highlighted and made comprehensible through
this utopian arch. What I come to argue, however, is that the main characteristic
of Bitcoin is its unique outsourcing of authority, from previous political models, to
the  legitimation  of  computational  performance.  I  push  this  idea  towards  a
theoretical position, and develop a critical account of Bitcoin’s power dynamics,
relying  primarily  on  the  figures  of  Empire  (Hardt  and  Negri  2001),  Protocol
(Galloway 2004), and Stack (Bratton 2016).
The specific literature on Bitcoin has grown substantially in the last few
years. The majority of academic research is dominated by the fields of Computer
6 And in particular because I come from a country where state institutions are normally
associated  with  a  high  level  of  corruption.  Mexico’s  average  in  the  Corruptions
Perception Index from 2102 to 2016 is 32.8/100 (Transparency International 2016).
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Science  and  Economics.  The  literature  can  be  roughly  divided  in  introductory
pieces, struggles for a financial definition, regulatory concerns, insights into the
price variations, forked projects and improvements for the protocol, mining, and
general security of the system. One of the earliest scholarly pieces provides new
schemes  to  incentivize  information  propagation  between  nodes  in  the  Bitcoin
network (Babaioff et al. 2012). It is also common to find studies concerned with
perceived flaws regarding  Bitcoin’s  capacity  for  anonymization,  its  user  privacy
evaluations, or transaction dynamics. Relevant examples include Biryukov et al.
(2014), who unmasks Bitcoin users by linking pseudonyms (or wallet addresses) to
the IP addresses of the origin of the transactions. Concerns around the privacy of
the system are shared by Androulaki  et  al.  (2013),  who build  a simulator  of  a
Bitcoin  network  to  analyse  privacy  provisions.  Meiklejohn  et  al.  (2013)  have
analysed  the  flow  of  payments  until  April  2013,  and  successfully  identified
interactions between major institutions (for example, between MtGox and Satoshi
Dice,  a  gambling  platform).  Many  of  these  studies  are  not  motivated  to  de-
anonymize users in the system, but to warn against expectations that anonymity is
assured (Reid and Harrigan 2013, 3); to improve the protocol with strengthened
anonymity (Saxena, Misra, and Dhar 2014; Androulaki and Karame 2014); or revise
associated  software,  such  as  wallets  (Vasek,  Thornton,  and  Moore  2014;
Verbücheln  2015).  Early  research  is  also  concerned  with  the  categorization of
Bitcoin as money or a different kind of asset, commodity, currency, financials tool,
etc (Surda 2012; Mittal 2012; Selgin 2015; Bergstra and de Leeuw 2013a; Bergstra
and de Leeuw 2013b); with specific concerns of money laundering through this
system (Stokes 2012; Moser, Bohme, and Breuker 2013; Fortuna, Holtz, and Neff
2013); and discussions regarding variations in price (Wandery 2014; Kaminski and
Gloor 2014; Shah and Zhang 2014).
Research on the social characteristics embedded in the production, usage
and effects of the device is comparatively smaller. Examples of research within the
social  sciences  include  the  theorization  of  Bitcoin  infrastructure’s  affordances
(O’Dwyer 2015; DuPont 2017; Maurer, Nelms, and Swartz 2013; Swartz 2017), the
political  demographics  of  its  community  (Smyth  2014a),  and  critiques  of  the
ideologies associated with their communities (Jeong 2013) (Scott 2014). Maurer,
Nelms, and Swartz (2013, 215) picks up on the idea of the railroad system as the
‘rails’  of  money infrastructures to  reflect on contemporary telecommunications
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companies as the pipes of Bitcoin. He argues Bitcoin is a phenomenon where both
the token and the rail  have  collapsed into  one in  the form of  the blockchain.
Together with his colleagues, Maurer also expands on the semiotics on Bitcoin and
its  rethinking  of  privacy,  labor,  and value debates  (Maurer,  Nelms,  and Swartz
2013). Other studies (Smyth 2014a; Smyth 2014b) show that there was a strong
diversity among the people surrounding cryptocurrencies and propose to address
the  blockchain  as  an  entire  cryptocoin  ecosystem,  composed  with  actors  with
different  motivations,  backgrounds  and  reactions,  rather  than  as  a  unified
community. Smyth’s dataset is drawn upon later in this study (Bohr and Bashir
2014) to correlate statistically political positions and roles within the ecosystem
(e.g. correlation of a libertarian stance and programmers).
A smaller set of social research differentiates from previous works through
adopting  a  more  critical  point  of  view  of  blockchains.  Scott  (2014),  who
emphasizes that the digital-anonymous-decentralized-ledger systems are not by
themselves a guarantee of good use, or of the flourishing of community dynamics
within  society.  Blockchain  currencies  can  be  alternatives  to  current  economic
systems, without being progressive or socially desirable (Scott 2016a). Golumbia
(2016)  identifies  a  strong  libertarian  ideology  within  Bitcoin’s  design  and
ecosystem. In the same vein, Jeong (2013) argues against the alleged ‘apolitical’
nature of the project and claims that libertarian and metallist philosophies have
shaped the cryptocurrency. O’Dwyer (2012) introduces a discussion around the
infrastructure of Bitcoin, and argues that its decentralization does not necessarily
correlate with a reduction of the mechanics of domination. She posits that despite
the current centralization of Bitcoin’s  infrastructure by mining pools, the broad
technology of the blockchain still carries the potential of a being a tool for a social
networked operation (O’Dwyer 2015). Likewise, Dupont (n.d.) identifies within the
cryptographic  affordances  of  Bitcoin  a  “new  weapon”  of  the  control  society
(Deleuze 1992), and for the control of economic activity specifically. Swartz (2017)
has argued that the majority of the investment in the blockchain currently relies
on projects that seek to aid taming the complexity of modern finance, but not to
replace it. This last group of authors informs much of what follows and my own
position has benefited from a productive dialogue with them.
While for much of this last body of work the monetary nature of Bitcoin is
an implicit ground, my research is not driven by the economic nature of Bitcoin. I
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focus my attention on the power dynamics working in the design and performance
of the Bitcoin  blockchain,  and only  to  economic  considerations when they are
derived from the former.  There are currently  no full-length monographs which
approach Bitcoin as a digital media object, while also considering the rhetoric that
surrounds  it.  Thus,  this  thesis  offers  an  original  research  position  that  draws
together questions of  materiality,  ownership,  governance, territoriality,  and the
performance  of  the  machine.  This  research  also  identifies  the  inconsistencies
between the “steam” and the “vapour” produced by the Bitcoin machine. 
The recursive readings of “utopia” in each chapter signal Bitcoin’s internal
contradictions: the overlapping notions of  public  and private in the production
process; the struggle between privacy and decentralization on the one hand, and
the free market and competition on the other; the territorial ties with the state
paralleled with the affirmation of  a  sovereign space;  and the circularity  of  the
technical determinism of Bitcoin’s performance and the social construction of its
design.  The  configuration  of  the  technical  object  and  the  political  struggles
embedded  with  it,  shed  light  on  a  broader  momentum  of  the  ubiquitous
computational ontologies of our times. The discussion highlighted by this thesis
reveals  a  state  of  affairs  that  goes  beyond  the  blockchain  as  a  particular
technology, and contributes to contemporary understandings of  the networked
production  of  knowledge  and  value.  The  argument  I  develop  about  the
outsourcing of authority roles to automated non-humans is not unique to Bitcoin,
and  is  shared  with  a  culture  constructed  around  the  myth  of  the  algorithm.
Blockchains adhere to and help perpetuate these cultural myths. 
Chapter Plan
The thesis contains five chapters. Chapter One addresses the key process
of production, mining, and how this relates to a particular computational notion of
authority.  The  chapter  develops  a  theoretical  argument  derived  from Bitcoin’s
technical  function.  It  raises  the  question  of  why  authority  is  a  particularly
complicated issue in Bitcoin due to lack of a clear founder, and due to its open
organizational  model  of  development.  I  argue  that  the  project’s  undefined
hierarchy  opens  up  a  vacuum  of  authority,  which  is  partially  but  not  entirely
fulfilled by different groups of actors, and which is further defined by each group’s
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relation  with  the  figure  of  the  state.  These  relations  can  be  professedly
antagonistic,  alternative  to  already  existing  state  administrative  institutions,  or
seeking validation and incorporation within the existing state apparatus.  These
groups  have  contested  ends,  and  yet  gather  their  not-so-easily  reconcilable
stances under the same banner of blockchain technology. In order to understand
the nuances of these divisions, the chapter distinguishes between the concept of
“decentralization”  and  “public”  in  relation to  blockchain  technology.  A  second
section offers a detailed view on the mining process. This section presents the
computational logic embedded in the production model, and shows how this logic
is materially expressed. I use the correlated notions of “waste” and “abundance”
to explore  how the hardware’s  consumption of  energy,  which is  built  into the
design of Bitcoin’s protocol, relates to the political ideas attached to this design.
At  this  point,  the  production  of  authority  in  Bitcoin  by  computational
means  becomes  a  key  element  of  my  argument  and  the  basis  from  which  I
proceed. I claim that this specific kind of production works beyond its technical
purposes and becomes a tool for legitimation. Accountability in Bitcoin does not
come from an external source, as opposed to current production of fiat money,
which is  legitimized by an external  authority (i.e.  the state,  through central  or
commercial banks). On the contrary, I argue that the legitimacy of the system is
folded within the system itself: due to the particular nature of Bitcoin as open,
distributed, and independent to state and corporations system, its legitimation is
held within its own automated management of the production, and measured by
the  successful  performance  of  automated  validations  in  exchanged
communications.  The  chapter  ends by  stressing  the  coexistence  and  particular
enactment of the public and the private in the production of bitcoins: the system
effectively  produces  private  non-reproducible  tokens  with  the  use  of  a  public
ledger reproduced all along the network. I identify that it is this folded coexistence
what  equally  fuels  dissimilar  political  projects.  The  private  properties  of
production feed both the imaginations of  private,  frictionless exchange for the
liberal-oriented economies on the one hand; and of shared means of production
for cooperative networks, on the other. As I will suggest, the unique production
model in Bitcoin feeds very different political positions.
In Chapter Two, I present the methods deployed throughout the work. I
outline the methodological approach of using digital methods to make sense of
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digital objects. The chapter also clarifies the crucial use of “the political” in this
work. I  delineate both my methodologies and use of the political in relation to
previous literature. In particular, I follow the fields of Media Theory and Science
and Technology Studies, both of which are informed by (or at least compatible
with) a Foucaldian perspective on knowledge. However, this chapter is also used
to clarify where my work diverges from the previous literature. Finally, I stress my
position  on  what  I  consider  to  be  a  critical  issue  regarding  the  use  of  digital
methods: recursivity.
Chapter  Three builds an historical  account  of  the blockchain,  from the
seventies to just before the appearance of Bitcoin. Taking a cue from Tung-Hui Hu
(2016) notion of prehistory, the chapter takes some of the pieces of the Bitcoin
machine and trace their emergence and development. Like Hu, I am interested in
the material  infrastructure embodied in the machine, but also in the extended
metaphor which develops around it.  This  query is also inspired by the field of
Media Archaeology, but does not rely on the medium-specificity of that approach.
While Bitcoin as a digital object catalyses and conjoins these historical threads, the
threads observed along its prehistory are not exclusive to Bitcoin. Furthermore,
the  chapter  observes  the  political  context  or  ideologies  associated  with  these
technological pieces. Specifically, I identify three trajectories joined by two events.
First, a trajectory concerned with secure communications, in which many of the
cryptographic  techniques used by Bitcoin,  directly  or  as a  later  iteration,  were
developed. The second trajectory appends an explicit discourse and political tone
to cryptography. This trajectory identifies a political investment on the democratic
use of cryptographic techniques expressed, which unfolds through an analysis of a
number of manifestos. In the manifestos, code is reformulated as a political praxis,
and in direct  confrontation with the state as the (then) sole executor of  these
technologies (previously existent only in military contexts). Plenty of the concerns
voiced at this time became prevalent, at least rhetorically, in the configuration and
evolution of both the internet and the blockchain. Finally, a third pre-historical
trajectory  starts  to  imagine the use of  cryptography for  the creation of  digital
money or digital payments. It implicitly suggests the possibility of using technology
to replace the institutional strongholds of the nation-state economy.
However, this last trajectory blends the political discourse of privacy with
that of the free exchange of assets, and thus, I shall argue, obfuscates the main
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rationale for antagonism towards the state. That is, while the topics of privacy and
decentralization may coexist  with  free market  and competition,  quite  different
scenarios  can be developed depending on which is  prioritized  as  an end,  and
which as a means. I will later argue (Chapter Five) that this ambiguous merging
explains not only the multiplicity of the projects associated with the blockchain,
but  one  of  the  biggest  controversies  in  Bitcoin’s  development.  The  utopian
envisioning  of  cryptography  technology  presented  in  this  chapter,  offers  an
historical  account  of  the  development  of  blockchain  technology  (and  related
metaphors)  into  dissimilar  political  ends.  It  also  underpins  part  of  the  ideal
execution associated with code.  While  this  chapter  argues that  the Blockchain
does  enhance  the  role  of  code  —and code’s  performativity—  as  an  authority
within  governance  arrangements,  it  also  stresses  the  distance  between  code
performance and the actual achievement of ideal political scenarios.
Chapter Four looks into the spatial configuration of Bitcoin’s network. It
offers an answer to the question of where the blockchain is located and does so
through an empirical analysis  of  the network’s  nodes.  This  exploration offers a
new way of understanding Bitcoin’s geographical characteristics and importantly,
reveals the inadequacy of a territorially-based approach to deal with its spatiality.
This lack suggests the need for a geo-political conception of the blockchain that
exceeds the nation-state and I draw upon Benjamin Bratton’s notion of the Stack
in order to advance such an understanding (Bratton 2016). The chapter opens with
a  commentary  on  power,  framed  as  sovereign  control  within  territorial
boundaries. I then comment on some of the literature regarding the geographical
reconfigurations  allowed  by  the  internet.  Considering  that  all  blockchains  are
underpinned by  the geographical  characteristics  of  the internet,  they inherit  a
great part of its technical and rhetorical reformulation as cyberspace. The promise
of a place unbound by territory became influential during the 90s (this is directly
related to the trajectory of manifestos in Chapter Three), but much of this vision
was eroded as it became clear that the internet was not immune to territorial
control.  The  blockchains  are,  among  other  things,  a  reaction  towards  this
territorial control. They are explicitly designed to not be affected by territory in
terms of performance. The utopian element of the cyberspace as a no-place is
resurrected by both the imaginary and the technical design of the blockchain. I
show that Bitcoin oscillates between being subject of location and, at the same
time, performing its spatiality in a no-place.
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In  order  to  illustrate  this  apparent  contradiction,  I  track  the  way  the
network behaved in relation to space during a determined period of six months in
2015.  The  tracking  of  the  network  behaviour  shows  that  its  nodes  cluster  in
identifiable regions. Thus, I argue that the network is locatable and concentrates
in  certain  regions.  However,  the  notion  of  territory  is  non-essential  for  the
performance of  the network.  Following Andrew Barry  (2001;  2006)  and Saskia
Sassen  (2006)  work,  I  argue  that  the  relation  between  territories  (as  state-
controlled  planar  geographies)  and  the  Bitcoin  space  is  made  mostly  through
standardization processes. Nonetheless, I stress that the way this network works
and makes sense of its space is not directly subjected to territorial arrangements
or  state-determinations.  On the contrary,  part  of  the imaginary  related to the
frictionless exchange promised by this machine is the minimization of the territory
as a technology of power. The chapter ends by arguing that a better understanding
of the network requires a non-planar approach. Thus, the post-Westphalian figure
of  the  Stack  offers  a  better  model  to  understand  the  political  geographies  of
Bitcoin and other blockchains.
The final chapter focuses on the organisational dynamics of Bitcoin as an
open  (source)  project,  paying  particular  attention  to  developments  after  the
disappearance of Nakamoto (the creator). Unlike previous chapters, which focused
on different sides of its computational performance, Chapter Five describes the
internal  decision-making  involved  in  the  development  of  its  computational
workings. The chapter starts with an overview of different projects that attempt to
integrate  blockchain  protocols  into  democratic  processes.  The  final  notion  of
utopia as “governance through other means” is expressed by these projects.  A
considerable number of blockchain projects are an investment in using technology
to overcome perceived flaws in human interactions and traditional organizational
forms.  The brief  discussion of  these utopian projects  on improving  democracy
opens the way to investigating the internal democratic processes in around the
development of the Bitcoin protocol.  Like other Open Source Software projects
(OSS), the development of Bitcoin has produced clear guidelines for proposals,
voting, responsibilities, and cooperation for deployment. I start by portraying the
specific strategies for consensus inscribed in the OSS nature of Bitcoin. Everyone is
free to  propose a change to the code,  and all  proposals  go through the same
procedure. Ideally, most disagreements are discussed and settled through these
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strategies.  In  a  worst-case  scenario,  the  possibility  of  forking  —splitting  or
replicating the code to develop another project, which may or may not compete
with the original— offers a diplomatic way to deal with strong disagreements.
However, I will argue that the combination of Bitcoin as an OSS and as a
scarce economic artefact complicates the strategies for democratic consensus. The
chapter follows a well-known controversy in the history of Bitcoin that persisted,
unresolved,  despite  the  refined  procedures  for  reaching  agreement  in  the
modifications of the code. The controversy centred on how to scale the network
capacity of the Bitcoin to process transactions. While an immediate solution —to
expand the blocks' capacity in the chain— was technically easy to implement, it
entailed  a  clash  in  the  ideological  positions  of  the,  until  then,  fairly  cohesive
community  of  developers.  I  follow the rationale  for  and against  this  particular
solution for scaling, and identify key actors in the discussion. The reconstruction of
the controversy not only clarifies the scope of the disagreement, it also evinces
what is at stake in the larger history of Bitcoin as a digital and political artefact. I
argue that the developers —and by extension the community— were divided by
the resolution of, on the one hand, the utopian ends of a frictionless free market,
and on the other, the also utopian ends of decentralization. While these utopian
ends were previously indistinguishable, the block-scaling controversy made clear
that  even  if  they  were  initially  not  contradictory,  opting  for  one  or  the  other
ultimately  meant  to  choose  between  significantly  different  technical
developments.
Through  these  diverse  inquiries  into  the  Bitcoin  blockchain,  this  thesis
contributes to the discussions on how technology rearranges social structures of
power. The analysis of this current phenomenon offers a detailed overview of the
socio-technical operation of technology devices from a diversity of approaches,
and provides empirical evidence on the ontological and epistemological scope of
this operation.  It  also contributes to develop an appropriate political theory to
think  about  new technologies  and  their  impact,  which  takes  into  account  the
specificities, limitations, and affordances of blockchains’ technical grammar. The
discussion  of  power  dynamics  in  the  times  of  planetary-scale  computation (in
Bratton terms), provides a fertile ground to extend knowledge on the relations
between  power  and  technology.  This  thesis  contributes  to  this  discussion  by
providing an account of the novel technology embodied in blockchains within the
context of power apparatuses.
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Chapter  1:  Outsourcing Authority  to  Algorithmic
Production
The £50 note is rarely seen in the wild. Cash is an endangered animal in the United
Kingdom (Jones 2017), it is easier to find whichever combination of plastic and
silicon on day-to-day transactions. Even without considering the gradual transition
to  a  “cashless  society”  (Scott 2016b),  fifties  are  a  rarity  in  the  sterling  family.
Whoever has placed his or her eyes on this elusive note may have noted the steam
engine featured on one of its sides. Introduced in 2011, the design praised the
archetypal machine of the industrial revolution that changed the landscape of the
country and the fate of the world. The note includes the figure of James Watt,
inventor of the steam engine, and of Matthew Bolton, his business partner. On the
note, a Bolton quote reads: “I sell here, Sir, what all the world desires to have -
POWER”. The quote is compelling for a number of reasons. First, it implicitly states
the  universal,  borderless,  nature  of  power,  and  exemplifies  the  globalizing
tendency of industrial and modern capitalism. Second, that power is a product on
sale, it is transitional, for the right price. Third, it is embodied in a machine: what
confers power is not what is produced but the process, the industrial work itself.
Finally, the former messages are enveloped in a square of flowing fiat paper, itself
a medium identified with power. 
Bolton was the co-founder of the lunar society, which gathered industrials  and
intellectuals of the so-called Midlands Enlightenment. He describes the benefits of
his coinage presses as follows: “It will coin much faster, with greater ease, with
fewer persons, for less expense, and more beautiful than any other machinery
ever used for coining (...) The machine keeps an account of the number of pieces
struck which cannot be altered from the truth by any of the persons employed.”
(Delieb 1971). Although these words are around 200 years old, Bolton could very
well be talking about the affordances of the bitcoin machinery.  Like the steam
engine, the first implementation of blockchain technology has been the basis for
promises  of  global  democratization,  abundance,  renewed  economic  trust,
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elegance, and economic freedom. Indeed, one finds too many promises, attached
to  different  and  often  incompatible  projects,  made  under  the  same  banner:
anarcho-capitalist  untraceable  money;  perfect  industrial-compatible  standards;
collaborative action coordination; digital citizenships for the ultramodern state; a
new distributed internet aiming to replace its late re-centralized platformisation;
the list goes on. Like any other myth associated with solutionism (Morozov 2013),
blockchains do bring exciting and diverse enhancements, but not for everyone.
Will this technology ease the worst excesses of the current economic system? Do
its disruptive qualities enable a tweak of the system towards more social ends?
Will  it  enhance  economic  participation  and  revitalise  struggling  communities?
Which  heads  of  this  Blockchain  chimera  are  real,  and  which  have  a  virtual
existence? And how is it  possible that the same piece of technology generates
remarkably different dreams and realities?
This  chapter  offers  an  explanation  for  the  sometimes  incompatible
diversity of this technology. It is grounded on the very particular position regarding
an apparent lack of authority in Bitcoin. My reading of authority is close to Max
Weber (1991) bureaucratic or  rational authority, which is recognized as the one
coming from a normative order, and  traditional authority, which is an inherited
type of domination. I will argue that while the design of Bitcoin strongly depends
on normative grounds – more at the development level of open software projects,
than in relation to state regulations – the performative element of the technical
system displaces  control  from traditional  bureaucratic  institutions  towards  the
technical operation of the system. To begin with, normative figures are elusive in
Bitcoin's ecosystem. Neither sovereign (Foucault 1982) nor disciplinary (Foucault
2012) subjects or institutions are clearly situated. The execution of decisions in
Bitcoin  is  not  as  easy  to  locate  as  in  other  projects  due  to  several  facts:  the
disappearance of the founder, its open nature, and an undefined and extended
community, to name a few. This vacuum of a clear authority opens up a space to
be disputed by different groups with variable degrees of success. I focus on three
groups that claim this space, and which are in great part defined by their relation
with the figure of the state: a group identified with libertarian ideals, which plays
an antagonistic role towards state control of assets and identities; a group that
sees in the blockchain the possibility  for  alternative approaches to  democracy,
thus the promise to distribute state control; and a group that sees the figure of the
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state as an important player in the incorporation of this technology into platforms
to improve  financial  markets.  Public  blockchains,  however,  fit  partially  but  not
entirely  into  these  groups.  The  vacuum of  authority  obfuscates  how power  is
performed, and feeds the idea of the blockchain with dissimilar utopian outcomes.
The  second  part  of  the  chapter  provides  an  argument  that  locates
authority into the system of production itself. Here I argue that the specificity of
production in public blockchains encapsulates, very much like the steam engine,
the emergence of a power structure. This structure is based on the computational
logic that underpins the process of mining, which folds exchange (as accumulation
of  transactions  into  blocks)  and  production  (as  transactions  into  blocks  are
successfully  accumulated)  into  a  single  action.  I  explain  thoroughly  how  this
procedure works, and argue that it is based on the idea of a superabundance of
computational  resources.  Hardware  consumption  in  the  form  of  algorithms
transforms energy and intensive calculation into an efficient and fully automated
management system. The performance of the blockchain as a production machine
takes the place of institutional authority. More than to a group outside the system,
legitimation and accountability are primordially outsourced to the computational
system or production itself. Both parts – the authority vacuum and the production
of power – explain the paradoxical momentum of the discourse and actualities of
the blockchain.
The  first  notion  of  utopia  addresses  this  paradox:  an  unclear  interplay
between the public and the private. The latter embodied in the generation of a
private digital token able to circulate almost seamlessly, thus expressing a liberal-
oriented political goal; the former embodied in a shared network, performed by
the work of a multitude (Hardt and Negri  2005).  The design of the blockchain
effectively combines a public structure to produce a private element. I argue that,
paradoxically,  this  particular  structure  informs  the  rhetoric  of  two  different
political positions. This association maintains the popular rhetoric surrounding the
technology,  an idea of  a  co-operative effort  capable  of  securing  private  digital
tokens.  Numerous  projects  now  and  in  the  past  decade  have  exploited  this
paradox to advertise the technological positivism of blockchains; however, there
are  scarce  examples  of  projects  that  actually  perform as  a  social  co-operative
effort.  The  coexistence  of  the  public  and  the  private  in  the  blockchain  is
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anomalous  insofar  as  it  deceitfully  feeds  an  empowerment  discourse  of
collaboration and radical redistribution of power relations.
1.1 Enter the void: Power in the Absence of Authority
Bitcoin is, among other things, an open technological protocol. As such, it is ruled
by a specific governance model of open software. Details on the successes and
failures on this model applied to Bitcoin are presented in detail in the last chapter
of  this  work.  There,  I  show  how  the  notion  of  Bitcoin  as  a  financial  product
prevents the use of classic open source strategic actions. I also stress the lack of a
clear leadership in the project. While the early years benefited from the presence
of  a  creator  —even if  always  under  the  veil  of  anonymity— his  absence  was
followed by diffused and never completely compelling leadership roles within the
nascent Bitcoin communities. Satoshi Nakamoto, the pseudonym for the creator
or group that envisioned Bitcoin and presented the first version of the software,
progressively lost contact with the rest of the developers, and finally disconnected
from any discussion at the end of 2010. His identity is unknown to this date. The
attempts to offset Nakamoto’s disappearance with an institution (i.e. the Bitcoin
Foundation) have soundly failed. The foundation’s purpose was to “standardize,
protect  and  promote the  use  of  bitcoin”  (Matonis  2017).  Its  original  board of
directors included figures that became highly controversial and thus affected their
leadership  roles.7 While  the  foundation  exists  to  this  date  (with  a  complete
different set of board members), it does not play a central role in the extended
community. In a way, the system was designed to be un-proprietary, to belong to
no-one, which does not immediately translate to belonging to everyone, as much
as the surrounding rhetoric of decentralization claims. I will expand on what is at
stake in being a system that is not owned in the second part of this chapter. As an
open project, Bitcoin’s definitions of ownership and leadership differ from states
and corporations, and after Nakamoto’s disappearance, authority within it became
hazy to say the least.
7 Two of the six original board members were related to criminal activity: Charlie Shrem,
the founder of Bitinstant, was sentenced to two years of prison (2014-2106) for aiding
the operation of the  Silk Road black market. Mark Karpeles, the CEO of the major
bitcoin exchange MtGox, was arrested in Japan in 2015 and charged of embezzlement.
Mtgox became famous for loosing 850 000 bitcoins from his customers, valued 450
million USD at the time (and almost 3.5 billion USD at September 18 th 2017). At this
moment, he is released on bail. 
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The vacuum analogy works to invoke a seemingly void space, that is, a lack
of  authority.  Even if  emphatically  surrounded and  partly  inhabited by  abstract
figures like that of the Community, the Corporation, or the State (embodied in
specific instances as per case: the main developers, Blockstream, or the People’s
Bank  of  China),  neither  of  them plays  the  role  of  de  facto ruler.  If  any,  each
maintains authority in their own specific blockchain manifestation. The hard-fork
controversy, which I consider in Chapter Five, made evident the fragmentation of
the so-called community. In that chapter, I narrate this break attentively to show
how  Bitcoin,  the  archetype  of  decentralized  trust,  failed  to  decentralize
community driven design.
A second meaning of  vacuum is  of  a  vortice that  attracts  surrounding
matter.  The  Bitcoin  ecosystem  maintained  a  fuzzy  relationship  with  different
institutions.  Part  of  its  community  was  at  times  confrontational  with  state
regulation, for example, while others were open to negotiations with state actors.
A position for and against private financial corporations or tech giants was never
totally settled either (but a look at the evolution of these relations is revealing).
Some institutions, including old and new financial technologies corporations (e.g.
IBM Blockchain Solutions), occupied the void with more success than others. The
vacuum of authority attracted different players and reconfigured the power and
influence relations not only for Bitcoin, but also for the numerous iterations of
blockchain technology that followed. 
The  chimerical  status  of  diffuse  governance,  the  lack  of  infrastructural
ownership, and production of digital private property, sheds light on the current
multiplicity  and  incoherence  between Blockchain  projects.  This  becomes  more
evident  when  the  position  of  each  group  in  relation  to  centralized  authority
institutions is brought into question. In order to open an inquiry of how authority
is performed in these particular systems, I will present three different categories of
blockchain endeavours based on their relation with the state. Each group is an
abstract generalization of more complex empirical nuances, however, this strategy
will  allow  me  to  clearly  distinguish  one  from  each  other.  A  straightforward
research question guiding this section is then: are blockchains aiming to destroy,
replace, or reinforce traditional state institutions? The answer to such a question
may be radically diverse depending on which interested party is addressed. Each
interpretation feeds a different set  of projects that supports distinct ideologies
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present  in  the  blockchain:  freedom (destruction  of  the  state),  cooperation
(replacement of the state), in-corporation (reinforcement of the state). But not all
are equally vibrant, funded, or populated. Thus, they have different degrees of
reality.
Political Vortices: Freedom, Cooperation, and In-corporation
In 2014, Lui Smyth, an anthropology PhD student, conducted a survey directed to
the (then)  relatively  small  Bitcoin  user  community.  Based on 300 answers,  his
research  showed the  political  compass  of  the  community  through  some basic
demographics:  “one  quarter  libertarian,  matched  by  a  quarter  liberal,  and  a
quarter  more left-wing,  with a few smaller groups of  other political  identities”
(Smyth  2014a).  The  “left  wing”  refers  to  the  users  that  saw  themselves  as
‘socialists’,  and  the  “other  political  identities”  include  communist,  theocratic,
anarchist,  and  conservative,  among  others.  The  Bitcoin  project  was  initially
supported by a combination of tech savvy, liberal, and libertarian-oriented actors.
Many saw an opportunity to gain economic sovereignty from the state via the
distributed  ledger.  The  enthusiasm  for  pursuing  the  free  subject  through
technological artefacts follows Foucault’s (1982) notion of governmentality, a form
were a governing power is exercised after traditionally modern sovereignity, i.e.
outside  of  the  view  of  the  state.  Power  then  is  exercised  through  dispersed
technical strategies (Foucault 1980a). The many possibilities of implementations of
economic  self-governance  through  technology  made  this  a  golden  age  for
envisioning and implementing the blockchain as cryptocurrencies.8
The Bitcoin project can be read as a libertarian or anarchic model, which
points to different readings of economic and social ‘freedom’. If not all, a great
majority  of  its  expressions  was  categorically  against  the  state  as  a  regulative
authority of law and exchange of value. These “visions of a techno-leviathan,” as
described by Brett Scott,
8 While  there  is  no question  that  a  good  degree  of  diverse  political  positions  exist
among Bitcoin enthusiasts, there was a substantial libertarian formations surrounding
the system. See for example (Popper 2015) for a close narration of the people invested
with Bitcoin’s early years; and (Golumbia 2016) for a critical perspective on the heavily
oriented libertarian ideology of the project design and ecosystem.
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appeal[ed] to people who wish to devolve power away from banks by 
introducing more diversity into the monetary system. Those with a left-wing 
anarchist bent, who perceive the state and banking sector as representing 
the same elite interests, may recognise in it the potential for collective direct 
democratic governance of currency. It has really appealed, though, to 
conservative libertarians who perceive it as a commodity-like currency, free 
from the evils of the central bank and regulation (Scott 2014).
The space where Blockchain technology proposed to settle was in the realm of
economics  at  first,  but  as  Scott argues,  the  use  of  blockchain  technologies  to
disrupt other kinds of centralized institutions within the state, like copyright law,
DNS management or even democratic tools like voting systems, quickly followed.
An  interesting  finding  of  Smyth’s  survey  was  that  despite  the  main  use  of
blockchains  as  a  disruptive currency,  the average Bitcoin  enthusiast  was  more
driven  by  the  political  sentiment  that  the  system  represented  than  by  actual
monetization:  many didn’t  “talk  about their  stash as  an asset,  but  rather  as a
shared interest” (Smyth 2014a). This detail will become particularly relevant as the
finance  industry  gradually  overshadowed  the  libertarian  community  in  the
ecosystem in the years that followed. Unlike the early years, the system would
become less relevant for their political values and more for their qualities as a fluid
financial asset.
From the initial  explosion of  altcoins that  followed Bitcoin,  only  a  few
surviving  examples  remain  today,  and  most  of  them  act  as  cryptocurrencies
patching security and protocol issues of its predecessor. Some notable examples
went beyond that, like  Namecoin, which (still) attempts to distribute one of the
historically  centralized  cogs  of  the  Internet,  the  Domain  Name  System.  The
blockchain fuelled the imagination of the anarchist dreamer. It appeared that for
any task done by an institutional centralized authority, there was a small project in
the  Bitcoin  ecosystem seeking  to  replace  it.  But  attempts  like  Namecoin  have
become a rarity. One of the biggest contemporary projects representing the early
libertarian positions – primarily concerned to get rid of state involvement in the
production and exchange of money – can be found in  Zcash, a fully anonymous
cryptocurrency  aimed  to  mend  the  pseudonymity  holes  that  enable  new
techniques  for  tracking  and  identifying  Bitcoin  users.  However,  the  explicit
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concerns  for  privacy  and freedom have  been surpassed by  financially-oriented
goals9. 
A  minor  (but  familiar)  second  category  of  the  blockchain  enthusiast,
gathers a group that observes the blockchain with criticism and creative curiosity.
This  very  loose  group  gathers  researchers,  artists,  and  activists.10 Internally
diverse, but hardly associated or driven with the libertarian ideology of the first
category  or  the  profit-seeking  motor  of  the  financial  technology  industry,  this
category  is  less  antagonist  to  the state.  Instead,  it  has  an invested interest  in
tweaking the shortcomings of the technology, stressing its implicit ideologies, or
playing with their cognitive and affective affordances.
This  cluster  of  projects  is  also  concerned  with  improving  democratic
participation,  creating  new  forms  of  enhanced  horizontal  organization,  or
questioning traditional notions of money, in many cases through provocation. This
is  the  promised  moment  of  distributed  collaboration.  This  point  of  view  is
undoubtedly invested in deconstructing the relation with the state, but rarely with
the  explicit  goal  of  eradicating  its  institutions.  For  example,  Commoncoin,
envisioned  by  Tiziana  Terranova  and  Andrea  Fumagalli,  was  inspired  by
community-based policies, such as minimal wage, basic income, negative interest
and generative transactions (Terranova and Fumagalli 2015). In a similar fashion,
Steve Huckle and Martin White (2016), on the premise that the tokens (‘native
digital assets’) circulating through blockchains can be linked to any social construct
of value, offer tentative applications of the technology for socialist-driven projects.
As promising as these projects sound, however, they are often imaginative
exercises. That is the case with the former examples. They offer no continuity, are
minimally developed, or have no implementation at all. Radical social ideas for the
Blockchain remain ideas. This is a frequently recurring symptom. There are also
arguably weaker versions of a truly communitarian system currently deployed and
these  can  be  considered  experiments  in  progress,  like  Swarm
(http://swarm.fund/), the crowdfunding attempt that makes use of ‘crypto-equity’,
or Steemit (http://steemit.com/), a social network that rewards creators for their
9 In Chapter Three I argue that these concerns are relevant as a basis for the blockchain
both as a technical object and as a metaphor. Nonetheless, projects with the ultimate
goal of perfecting privacy in the blockchain are a minority in the current ecosystem.
10 The Moneylab conference and associated publications (Lovink, Tkacz, and Vries 2015;
Gloerich and de Vries 2018) gathers this particular positioning.
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content.  Both  are  blockchain-based  working  examples  that  attempt  to  change
current distribution models. However, they are particularly recent, and thus it is
difficult  to  predict  their  success.  It  would  be  reasonable  to  expect  minimal
adoption, progress and even their inevitable demise, especially when compared to
their finance-oriented counterparts. Brett Scott posits the correct question in the
title  of  a  working  paper  for  the  United  Nations  Research  Institute  for  Social
Development  (UNRISD)  workshop:  How  can  cryptocurrency  and  blockchain
technology play a role in building social and solidarity finance? (Scott 2016a). The
outcome of Scott’s excellent paper is, perhaps unsurprisingly, that the question
remains unanswered.
This cluster is relevant from a politically progressive point of view, but the
category is more than modest in the vast ecosystem of the blockchain. This cluster
is  out  of  sight  of,  or  irrelevant  for  the  heavily  financed  projects.  However,  its
relevance relies more on the role it plays in maintaining at the same time a critical
position and the conviction that blockchains are pieces capable of social solidarity
enhancement. As I will argue, these imaginaries of the potential of the technology
are a direct consequence of the production system of public blockchains, and play
a significant role in the endurance of its utopian promises. 
Finally, the fintech industry, a corporate chimera itself, has received with
open arms the distributed ledger technology.  This is the booming age of private
blockchains. Differentiated from the state, but not as its antagonist, the industry
has slowly integrated blockchains into their own financial models and pushed for
standards that will allow the industry to exploit the technology under certified and
legal frameworks.
This interest produces an interesting contrast with Bitcoin’s early years.
Smyth’s 2014 survey also measured the most trusted groups in the eyes of the
bitcoiner. Trust at the time was first of all placed in the “core developers”, followed
closely  by  “merchants”  (Smyth  2014b).  The  last  position  was  occupied  by
“financial  companies”.  The  Bitcoin  enthusiasts  even  showed more  trust  in  the
“governments”  category,  something  remarkable  considering  the  explicit
opposition of the libertarian population among them. Smyth reminds us that “to
understand the sometimes slippery ethics of Bitcoin, we have to account [...] for
its perceived dialectical opponent, an entrenched and indifferent economic elite”
(Smyth 2014a).
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If the discursive life of Bitcoin and other blockchains is characterized by
being confrontational to the state (although in practice its survival and evolution
has  been  made  possible  by  a  smoother  relation),  the  relation  with  tech
conglomerates is not obvious (this occupies a middle point in the trust scale along
with alternative cryptocurrencies developers). The extended debates I consider in
Chapter Five show this complex relationship as an early sign of the community
breakup. Peter Todd and Mike Hearn (see Chapter Five), both early developers and
enthusiasts of the cryptocurrency, play the roles of opposing forces regarding the
subtle ideological differences that fuelled the “scaling debate”. These differences
are grounded, among other things, on the stance taken by the Bitcoin project in
relation to tech giants and the financial industry. During the early stages of the
debate,  more than once Peter  Todd made personal  attacks  to  Mike Hearn for
being a Google employee:
You come from Google, a place of massive centralized server farms controlled
by one company. Google's services work pretty well - centralization can have 
benefits - but many of us feel that goes down a very dangerous path. It's easy
to see how a world where blocks are sufficiently large that only well funded 
pools with highly visible high-speed internet connections can lead to 
government and large businesses controlling Bitcoin (‘Soft Block Size Limit 
Reached, Action Required by YOU’ 2013).
What does Mike's employer, Google, stand to gain from large blocks that only
large companies can afford to process and validate? What does Google stand 
to gain from a system where every last transaction is recorded on a public 
blockchain, ripe for data mining? Mike after all works for a company that has 
a “real names” policy and actively tries to ensure users can-not use its 
services anonymously. Keep in mind Mike is also being paid by Google to 
work on Bitcoin; 20% time projects, while often speculative, are approved by 
management and must relate to Google's business interests in some fashion 
(‘Funding of Network Security with Infinite Block Sizes’ 2013).
Hearn  would  eventually  leave  Google  to  focus  on  Bitcoin  development,  and
thereafter would leave the Bitcoin project to work for a private Blockchain startup.
Many of the supporters of  block scaling,  like Hearn, aimed to see Bitcoin as a
competitive  network,  more  than  an elusive  one.  Hearn was  convinced on  the
virtues of “basic capitalism” as a general supplier. When confronted by another
user (“nagato”) on his optimist view on the power of capitalism, and how it has
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failed  to  provide  nutrition  and  energy  for  everyone,  Hearn  answers:  “It  has
actually.  The world  produces a  surplus  of  food (see the notorious  EU ‘cheese
mountains and wine lakes’). People still starve, but that's usually due to political
problems (food can't get to where it's needed), not because we don't know how
to feed everyone. (…) [and regarding internet] Really? I get free internet every
time I go to Starbucks.”  (‘Soft Block Size Limit Reached, Action Required by YOU’
2013).11 Technology corporations flawlessly flirted with blockchain technology, but
for some enthusiasts the unique characteristics of common ownership (or lack of
ownership) of the distributed system is what is quintessential to it. This means
that  although  assets  derived  from  the  blockchain  can  be  owned  and
commercialized through or outside the Blockchain, the technology itself (at least
in the case of Bitcoin) cannot. From this point of view, it behaves much like any
open source (Raymond 2008) technology in the last 20 years: it has a symbiotic
relationship  with  corporate  tech  business,  both  contributing  to  and  receiving
benefits from it. As long as the mantra of decentralization was on the table, tech
companies did not pose a threat.
But  times  have  changed  since  2014.  The  void  of  authority  left  by
Nakamoto was partially filled with a few contrasting groups, while any effective
influence on the design of  competing blockchains was limited to a few voices.
While  the  controversy  stagnated and  the  ideological  differences  became more
real, the dream of Bitcoin governance as an ideal democratization of technology
faded. Individuals turned into companies (e.g. many of the core developers were
hired  by  Blockstream).  Tom  Redshaw  recently  contested  that  Bitcoin  can  be
considered  a  democratic  appropriation  of  technology  (Redshaw 2017),  for  the
most part because a subgroup overriding power over a certain technology is far
from democratic.  While  the  fork  controversy  slowly  grew,  the  fintech  industry
started  developing  its  own  alternative  and  personalized  blockchains.  Redshaw
identifies that even the libertarian community has started to be eclipsed by the
financial sector presence, showing how an already existing set of institutions have
taken  command of  a  supposedly  alternative  tool.  Subordinate  actors,  be  they
11 It  is hard to tell  at which point Hearn is  joking or being cynical.  As the discussion
continues, “nagato” tells Hearn that he probably supports unemployment benefits,
which benefit less fortunate and get funded 'somehow'. The answer from Hearn is
“Yes, I do support unemployment benefits. People who lost their job and die on the
streets are annoying if you trip over them. A bit of tax is a reasonable price to pay for
not having to jump over bodies all the time”(March 08, 2013).
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libertarians, anarchists, or even a broader set of society, are unable to challenge
the power structures of the finance industry and their conditions of supremacy, as
long as no broad democratic models of technological design are put into practice.
Here the list of projects is vast and healthy. A majority of the investment
currently  relies  on the many  “incorporative” (Swartz  2017)  blockchain  projects
that seek to aid taming the complexity of modern finance, not to replace it. An
example is the Nasdaq Private Market, a blockchain implementation concerned to
manage private shares of technology companies pre-IPO’s: “The goal here is not to
disintermediate  the  financial  system,  but  to  determine  how  to  be  better
intermediaries” (Swartz 2017, 99). Another example is the Hyperledger, an open
blockchain development project backed up by a long list of big institutions and
corporations (IBM, the Linux Foundation, Cisco, Intel, JP Morgan, and Wells Fargo,
to name only a few), which works to develop a secure blockchain framework for
regulated industries.
Inherent Design and Public Blockchains
The three categories I have presented are neither exhaustive nor always exclusive.
They  all  may  present  themselves  as  collaborative,  for  example.  But  their
understanding  of  this  notion has  significant  differences,  which  can even  be  in
contradiction. They also focus their attention on different parts of the blockchain
—e.g. security vs. efficiency. Their position in relation to the figure of authority
represented by the state shows some of their irreconcilable differences. However,
a  future  case-by-case  study  would  show  an  interesting  granularity.  For  the
moment, they demonstrate how the speed of technology has been accompanied
by  different  scenarios  driven  by  dissimilar  political  positions  and  ends.  Before
delving into a discussion on their performance of authority in the second part of
this chapter, I will question the role of decentralization in these devices. This will
offer a sharper position to differentiate the former categories. 
The politics of the blockchain as incorporated fintech and as collaborative
public projects can be detected in the contemporary discussion of platforms. On
the one hand, an already evolved notion of platform capitalism already surrounds
us. Masked by the mild and ubiquitous term of the “sharing economy”, a handful
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of massive platforms fuelled by the Silicon Valley imagination shape our relation
with other (eg. Uber, Facebook, Amazon, Airbnb, Google). On the other hand, a
diverse  movement  to  re-conceptualize  and  redistribute  the  affordances  of
platforms is gaining momentum (Scholz and Schneider 2017). In his analysis of the
conundrums of the first kind of platforms, Nick Srnicek broadly defines platforms
as digital infrastructures that facilitate interaction between groups (Srnicek 2016).
Blockchain  technology  was  envisioned  to  ease  the  exchange  of  digital  pieces
without the need of a central authority via the mediation of algorithms. In this
sense, it  shares the instrumental goals of other platforms and, like many data-
driven ventures, works fairly well with the  key  functions  of  contemporary
capitalism:  advantage  is  given  to  the  algorithm;  it  enables  coordination  and
outsourcing of workers; allows the optimization of processes; low-margin goods
are  easily  transformed  into  high-margin  services;  and  data  analysis  generates
more  data  (Srnicek  2016,  41–42).  However,  while  public  blockchains  may  join
Srnicek’s  categories  of  capitalist  platforms  (in  terms  of  advertising,  cloud,
industrial, and product, the platforms identified by Srnicek) with minimal caveats,
they remain a fata morgana due to the lack of corporate ownership: even if the
Bitcoin blockchain development is constrained by a loosely identifiable group, the
blockchain as such is not ‘owned’ by any individual or institution in particular.
A key conceptual element to understand the malleability of the political
position  among blockchains  is  the distinction between public,  distributed,  and
decentralized (Baran 1964). The organizational model of blockchains, for example,
can be distributed while having different degrees of centralization. On the one
hand,  Bitcoin  is  an  example  of  a  public  —as  opposed  to  incorporative—
distributed  instance  that  becomes  centralized  in  relation  to  the  amount  of
computer  power:  a  hypothetical  cluster  of  computationally  powerful  machines
located in a single room would effectively regulate the behaviour of the network,
regardless  of  the  number  of  less  powerful  machines  distributed  around  the
world.12 On the other hand, the same distributed technology can be implemented
in private blockchains,  in which a defined institution or group can control  and
modify the basic rules of behaviour. An example of the latter is Linq, a private
Nasdaq blockchain, aiming to provide private securities transactions (‘Nasdaq Linq
Enables  First-Ever  Private  Securities  Issuance  Documented  With  Blockchain
12 The role of computer power in topological formation of the network is discussed in
Chapter Four.
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Technology  (NASDAQ:NDAQ)’  2016).  Like  other  private  blockchains,  the
shareholders  of  the  system  are  limited  and  deliberately  selected.  The  system
design  of  a  distributed  ledger  remains,  but  the  centralization  and  ownership
differs on each blockchain. Blockchains may be public or private, centralized or
distributed, or any combination of the former.
Thus, I dispute the common misconception that the main characteristic of
the blockchain is to be inherently decentralized and public. What is more, I argue
that this strongly attached association is responsible for the plethora of dissimilar
blockchain projects. While a diversity of projects seems to stimulate inclusion and
competition, the close look at  the actual  development  of  them reveals  a  false
diversification.  This  misconception  at  the  same  time  detracts  from  the  main
characteristics of  the blockchain as a folded apparatus of  digital  production of
control and sovereignty (this is developed in the second part of this chapter), and
feeds a blockchain imaginary with dissimilar utopian capacities. An exploration of
the role of “decentralization” via Langdon Winner’s notion of political design will
clarify the significance of the term beyond its immediate discursive use.
Winner argues against the usual idea that it is people’s use of technology,
and  not  technology  itself,  that  is  political.  He  understands  ‘politics’  as
arrangements  of  power  and  authority  in  human  associations  that  include  the
design and use of technological devices: “rather than insist that we immediately
reduce  everything  to  the  interplay  of  social  forces,  it  suggests  that  we  pay
attention to  the characteristics  of  technical  objects  and the  meaning of  those
characteristics” (Winner 1980, 123). Winner distinguishes two ways, inherent and
non-inherent,  in  which  an  object  can  have  political  properties.  In  the  former
(inherent), the system requires certain kinds of political relationships that “(…) are
strongly, perhaps unavoidably, linked to a particular institutionalized patterns of
power  and  authority.  Here,  the  initial  choice  about  whether  or  not  to  adopt
something is decisive in regard to its consequences” (Winner 1980, 134). This kind
of relation is deliberately designed or strongly compatible with a certain ideology.
In the latter (non-inherent),  the device design can also be easily  adopted by a
certain  pattern  of  power  or  authority  or  establish  a  new  one.  However,  this
political relationship is circumstantial, as it can be subjected to change depending
on the different practical uses of the artefact. Therefore, it does not  require the
maintenance of determined social conditions. Winner's main example is the low
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bridges on Long Island in New York, built by Robert Moses, which were designed
such that public transport buses could not use them. The argument is based on
Moses’ alleged discomfort with users of public transit (poor people) reaching his
public parks. The main argument of Winner is that it is necessary to look both at
the use and the design of technological devices to observe their political qualities.
Artefacts like an atomic bomb, a factory or even a ship are, for instance, designed
to be ruled in a hierarchical, authoritarian and centralized manner. Regardless of
whether or not the process of decision-making around the aptness of these kinds
of machines can be sorted out democratically, their technical operations, like the
triggering of a device, requires the expression of hierarchical authority.
Blockchains  are  only  ‘compatible’  with  centralization:  “a  given  kind  of
technology is strongly  compatible with but does not strictly require, social and
political relationships of a particular stripe” (Winner 1980, 130). The distributed
ledger  of  the  blockchain  does  not  require  centralization  any  more  than
decentralization, at least for the technical system to fulfil the basic necessity of
genuinely updating the ledger. Blockchain technology, however, remains strongly
compatible with centralized systems, and thus it is being implemented privately by
different institutions, especially in the financial technology sector. On the other
hand,  a  hypothetical  blockchain  made  of  all  the  world’s  population,  evenly
distributed, would not be instrumentally different. Blockchains are thus, equally
compatible with centralized or decentralized systems, but all blockchains  require
social  and  political  relationships  where  the  control  of  trust  is  displaced  from
institutional  production  and  recording,  to  computational  production  and
recording.13 
The  nuanced  relations  between  these  terms  (distributed  and
decentralized)  and between the notions of  public  and private,  complicates  the
categorization of the Bitcoin blockchain. I have distinguished these terms to clarify
their  relevance  and  association  to  critically  pinpoint  the  phenomenon  of  the
blockchain. My reading also strengthens my claim that while the groups analysed
contest the vacuum of authority left by the open nature of Bitcoin project, neither
13 Matteo  Pasquinelli  uses  the  term  mathematical  recording,  when  researching  the
database  as  a  political  form (Pasquinelly  2017).  I  prefer  to  use  the  more  concise
‘computational’ term. 
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of them fully  reclaims this  empty space; that is,  neither  provides a convincing
legitimation of the system. As previously indicated, my position is that in public
blockchains,  and  specifically  in  Bitcoin,  authority  is  displaced  from  external
institutional actors to the technical system. The next section of this chapter will
analyse this displacement and its association with the technical operation of the
blockchain. The operation of mining (or production of tokens) plays a key role in
this  discussion,  as  it  is  to  this  particular  technical  performativity  where
legitimation is outsourced, and from which the system makes itself accountable
through computation. 
1.2 Automated Anomalous Production
The  rest  of  this  chapter  offers  in  the  first  place  a  close  observation  of  the
production model of the blockchain, and then a theorization of the specific notion
of power that is distilled from this model. I refer to it as an anomalous model of
production  because  it  consists  of  an  apparently  contrasting  pair:  a  token
singularity  embodied in  the form of  a  digital  asset,  produced by  a  distributed
infrastructure without ownership. On the one hand, a cooperation-based public
infrastructure, on the other, the multiple but unique singularities of digital private
property produced by this very infrastructure. The blockchain itself is the folding
together of these two deceptively opposed pieces. In fact, one is not without the
other:  digital  private  property  exists  only  due to  the digital  public  distribution
modelled by the blockchain, and vice versa. Mining, or the mechanism to generate
tokens (bitcoins,  litecoins,  ether,  etc.),  crystallizes  this  process,  which is  at  the
same time a validation of exchanges, the production of units, and the distribution
of information. While it is possible to focus on each separately, they are performed
holistically.
I will distinguish between a material and a logical layer of mining to show
how  the  process  is  at  the  same  time  based  in  and  exploiting  an  idea  of
superabundance, or unlimited resources. First, I analyse the increasingly evident
excess involved in the energy consumption and production of waste of specialized
hardware  for  the  double  purpose  of  securely  validating  transactions  and
producing tokens. I call this the hardware (material) layer of production. I show
how in this layer excessive use of energy is represented in terms of waste and
35
efficiency. The indication of Bitcoin’s inherent materiality paves the way to address
deeper layers in the process of production, and allows me to offer a reading of the
notion of control in relation to the work done by this process.
Mining I: Waste and Excess
In  her  recent  work,  Tiziana Terranova has  drawn attention to  the necessity  of
questioning how algorithmically-enabled automation works “in terms of control
and  monetization”  and  “what  kind  of  time  and  energy”  gets  subsumed  by  it
(Terranova 2014, 387). Cryptocurrencies are payment technologies that automate
the  production  of  money-like  tokens  (Bergstra  and  Weijland  2014)  following
algorithmic rules to maintain a fixed production rate. Different kinds of energy and
residues, which are not always acknowledged, are involved in this process. The
more visible end of the production cycle known as mining shares a definition of
waste and energy consumption shared with many electronic devices.
An  introductory  video  to  Bitcoin  explains  that  “the  bitcoin  network  is
secured  by  individuals  called  miners.  Miners  are  rewarded  newly  generated
bitcoins for verifying transactions.” (WeUseCoins 2014). Miners are machines that
verify the signed public keys for each transaction and which validate these into
blocks in a public registry (i.e. the Blockchain). The job for successfully validating
and packing the transactions produces new tokens for the miner, and generates a
Proof-of-Work.  The former is  the result  of  a ‘puzzle’,  which can be then easily
checked by any other machine in the network.  Since the design of the system
seeks a controlled pace, if  the coins are generated too fast (because there are
more and/or stronger miners) the ‘puzzle’ becomes harder (Nakamoto 2008b).14
Solving puzzles to produce tokens directly translates into a relevant issue of
consumption of energy and production of waste. From the deployment of Bitcoin
up until the middle of 2010, mining was a task that any modern CPU could handle,
even though the process would push it to its limits and heavily reduce its lifetime.
Until mid-2011 the workload moved to GPUs, but was rapidly surpassed by FPGAs
(Field  Programmable  Gate  Arrays),  which  reduced  energy  consumption  while
14 I will address relevant details on the functioning of the 'puzzle' in the algorithmic layer
section.
36
achieving  more  hashes  per  second.  The  next  natural  step  were  ASIC  miners
(Application Specific Integrated Circuit) at the beginning of 2013.15 These iterations
are part of a constant evolution in the competing field of mining. The evolution of
puzzle-solvers  goes  from  available  multi-tasking  machines  (e.g.  any  desktop
computer)  to  designs  exclusively  made  for  this  task.  With  this  evolution  also
comes a new kind of exclusive waste, generated by swiftly replaced mining boards.
Even  though  the  Bitcoin  network  was  maintained  at  the  beginning  by
every enthusiast with a computer and some energy to spare, today the mining
industry is populated with pools and dedicated farms. This evolution was foreseen
in Bitcoin’s design (Nakamoto 2008a). In pools, different miners contribute their
processing power to calculate a block together.  The reward is  then distributed
among  them,  usually  accordingly  to  the  computational  power  given,  although
each pool has its own share protocols. Each one of these clustered miners can
have one or multiple ASICs. Mining farms on the other hand are dedicated places
that behave in a more or less Fordist fashion, and are even located in old factories
or  abandoned  stores,  which  house  swarms  of  ASICs  (Paul  2015).  The  energy
consumed  in  farms  is  striking.  A  paper  from  2015  estimated  that  the  mining
network at the time consumed about the same amount of electricity as Ireland
(Malone  and  O’Dwyer  2014).  Although  mining  units  energy  efficiency  has
improved in the last years, the difficulty variable has grown too, and the energy
footprint  problems of  production remain.  To cite  a specific example,  one farm
operating in 2015 had been told to have 10,000 S3 mining units  (Mu 2015). The
Antminer S3 is  able to produce 441 Gigahashes per second and consumes 800
Watts per Terahash: that is roughly 4761 Watts in a day, for just one unit. A farm
with 10,000 of  these units  would consume 47,616 Kilowatts a  day.  Comparing
these  figures  with  home  energy  consuming  estimates  in  the  U.S.(‘How  Much
Electricity  Does  an  American  Home  Use?  -  FAQ  -  U.S.  Energy  Information
Administration (EIA)’ n.d.)  shows that just this farm consumes 1,571 times more
energy  than  an  average  household  every  day.  Mining,  today  more  than  ever
before, is a race, and reducing the energy footprint is not grounded in pollution
awareness, but in cost cutting. As mining units become progressively more energy
efficient, they simultaneously become more obsolete. A constant refill of state-of-
the-art equipment is necessary to stay competitive. According to Michael Bedford
15 For a history of Bitcoin mining hardware, up until the end of 2013, see Taylor (2013).
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Taylor, it took four years to achieve the third generation of mining hardware, and
although there are no figures of the number of ASIC units being produced and
sold,  it  would be fair  to  assume that  there  is  no market comparison with the
consumption figures of the smartphones, tablets and other popular devices.
Units by themselves are not more threatening than a colossal mountain of
used smartphones, what is menacing is the mono-task logic that produced them.
Unlike the smartphone market, mining units do not suffer of a short life because
of their  hardware resistance, cheap materials  or consumption trends;  ‘planned
obsolescence’ for ASICs, rather, resides in the scarcity model of Bitcoin’s design.
Tokens have a fixed limit (21 million) and are getting harder to obtain, so the fast
production and consumption cycles of the hardware are intrinsic to the system. At
least until the mining becomes unprofitable, in such a scenario, the number of
miners diminish and, with it, the difficulty (which, again and recursively, makes the
people interested in mining to go up). Difficulty, however, rarely drops, and in the
long run describes a stepping curve  (‘Bitcoin Difficulty Chart  -  Chart  of  Mining
Difficulty History’ 2015), which causes mining hardware to age fast.  As specific
circuits optimized for hashing, ASICs do not have a second life. Unlike GPUs, they
are  useless  for  any other tasks,  which makes them completely worthless after
their efficient,  yet short, life.  Since there is no second hand market for mining
units,  they rapidly contribute to High Tech trashing problems.  Electronic  waste
arguably  conforms  today  about  the  same  amount  (in  municipal  numbers)  as
plastic packaging waste (Puckett and Smith 2003). Most of the e-waste is recycled
in  foreign  countries  because  of  low  labour  costs  and  loose  environmental
regulations both externally (at least in the U.S. for export of hazardous materials)
and internally (waste handling in the host countries). Arguably, around 80% of e-
waste is exported to Asia, and 90% of these to China (Puckett and Smith 2003).
The hashing power that runs throughout the bitcoin network —i.e. he most and
more  powerful  machine miners  — clusters  in  China too.  As  of  September 28,
2015, on a rough estimate  (https://blockchain.info/pools) more than 50% of the
hashing power is concentrated in Chinese mining pools and a significant part of
the rest is in the U.S., meaning that most of bitcoin’s e-waste will eventually end
up in Asia.
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E-waste is a residual of production that is not reintegrated to capitalist
production cycles and thus marks one of the many crises of it, as Jennifer Gabrys
argues:
Remainder breaks with sustained cycles of productions; it moves us past 
what might be seen as a Marxian concern with the way raw materials are 
mobilized for production (...) interfering with any notion of a simple feedback
loop from production to consumption, remainder calls attention to the after 
effects and transforms the material arrangements that emerge through the 
density of our technological and cultural practices (Gabrys 2013, 41).
Mining  waste  is  an  immediate  leak  of  its  own  cycle.  Since  it  has  no
secondary use, it is discarded faster than less specialized electronics. It is waste
that  exceeds production.  Mining  devices  of  Bitcoin  and other  cryptocurrencies
insert themselves indiscernibly among the electronic waste in scattered dumps,
but its particular mono-tasking characteristic makes them suitable non-recyclable
remainders.  Waste  in  ASIC  units  follows  the  general  fate  of  the  discarded
microchip  industry,  escaping  the  loop  cycle  and  disrupting  economies  and
ecologies at the outskirts of capitalism’s production. The number of mines and of
ASICs in them is  obscure. Nonetheless,  as said before, the quantity of e-waste
coming directly from mining does not compare to the waste produced by other
gadgets. The discussion around excess is not so much framed in quantity, however,
but in its lifespan and purpose: hardware mining units are limited to the one and
only task of solving the Bitcoin puzzle.
In  response  to  the  question  of  whether  Bitcoin  mining  is  a  waste  of
energy,  the  Bitcoin  Foundation  answers  that:  “spending  energy  to  secure  and
operate  a  payment  system  is  hardly  a  waste.”(‘FAQ  -  Bitcoin’  2015).  It  is  not
considered waste as long as the system works. The idea of waste is superseded by
efficiency, and annulled in  a scenario  where the system is  fully  operative.  The
substantial empty computational work, energy usage, and e-waste produced in
the mining operation has no other goal, and so far no other purpose, than to keep
the machine running to produce secure, distributed and artificial scarcity. Within
the hardware layer energy is translated into efficiency and residue into excess of
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production. The former adaptations happen under a discourse concerned with the
maintenance of a secure payment system. However, the hardware uses formerly
described are mainly underpinned by the rationale of the algorithmic layer. This
preceding layer  has,  as  I  will  argue,  its  own notions of  excess  and a different
reintegration into the production system.
Mining II: Superabundance
The  efficiency  and  superior  security  of  the  Blockchain  system  has  eventually
translated into compelling forms of symbolic and exchange value, as its specific
algorithmic value —which I define as the capacity to distribute security in a system
via  computational  power—  gained  media  attention.  The  exchange  value  of
cryptocurrencies in particular grew as their market performance developed, until
its tokens were effectively considered a kind of financial objects. A rush to adopt
and exploit the venues followed as the system become prevalent, in great part due
to its speculative disposition, which can be exploited as the tokens get exchanged
with fiat currencies. Thus, mimicking traditional financial behaviour, like the widely
known (Bitcoin) bubbles of 2013 and 2017, or the current wide distribution of
blockchain technology in the financial industry.16 The catalyst for their eventual
exchange  value  is,  however,  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  algorithms  designed  to
maintain an artificial scarcity.
Modelled scarcity can be considered through what has been defined as
“governance by design,” which is “the process of online communities increasingly
relying on technology in order to organize themselves through novel governance
models (designed  by  the community and  for  the community),  whose rules  are
embedded directly into the underlying technology of the platforms they use to
operate”  (De  Filippi  2015).  Bitcoin’s  communities  participate  in  a  designed
governance, not only in the sense that rules and development are audited and
enhanced through consensus, but in particular because the latter is obtained using
the platform (i.e. the branch, fork, and version of the software with a majority of
users become the ‘de facto’ Blockchain). What is more, scarcity is part of the rules
enabled by algorithmic governance because, while specificities may be open to
16 A recent example of this are the Initial Coin Offerings (ICO) which, emulating the Initial
Public Offerings of the stock market, seek funding by selling tokens to investors.
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discussion, the enactment of the rules resides in a purely algorithmic dimension.
For example, regarding scarcity, even though the limit of bitcoins is now fixed to 21
million,  this  figure  is  potentially  subjected  to  decisions  of  the  community;
however, regardless of the total number of coins, the generation of new ones is
algorithmically adjusted to sustain production in relation to a ratio of difficulty,
blocksize and time between each block generation. The resolution framework and
enforcement  of  rules  are  hardwired  to  relational  data  schemes interwoven by
discrete steps of precise instructions.17
The puzzle analogy is only appropriate within its algorithmic dimension,
which means it must be understood not as a toy or a game, but as a problem that
must be solved by following a set of rules. More accurately, the puzzle consists of
generating hashes (a string of numbers and letters with a defined length) until one
of them fulfils  the requirements of the variable ‘difficulty’  level (in the case of
Bitcoin,  the  number  of  zeroes  at  the  beginning  of  the  resulting  hash).  This
operation, also called a CISO (Constrained Input Small Output) problem is solved
by trial and error18 and due to the random number involved in the process – the
‘nonce  value’  –  finding  a  'desirable'  final  hash  is  a  truly  exceptional  event
(Courtois,  Grajek,  and Naik 2014).  Every attempt to come up with a successful
hash uses a new random number, thus randomizing the result. Difficulty is hence,
in  this  context,  associated  with  probability  and far  from tribulation.  Regarding
Bitcoin, difficulty is an algorithmic adversity.
The  difficulty  variable  (D)  at  the  19th of  September  2015  was  set  on
59,335,351,233.87, which translates as a 2^25 x  D number of average hashes to
find  a  block.  This  means  one  opportunity  to  build  a  block  for  every
19,909,640,081,173,010,000 (A) tried hashes. The only way to deal with the odds
involved in this operation is to have a machine capable of generating as many
numbers of attempts per second as possible, i.e. an ASIC miner. A state-of-the-art
dedicated  unit  available  today  can  manage  to  make  about  5,500,000,000,000
hashes per second.19 To calibrate the surplus involved, it is better to think of it in
negative  terms:  unlike  the lottery  (at  which a lonely  miner  would  have better
odds) where every non-winner plays a passive role, the miner is a machine that
17 Here I am referring to Berlinski’s general definition of algorithm.
18 Alternatives  have  been  suggested  to  improve  this  procedure  with  less  costly
computation methods (Courtois, Grajek, and Naik 2014).
19 SP20 Jackson by Spondoolies-Tech (http://www.spondoolies-tech.com/products/sp35-
yukon-power-shipping-from-stock).
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actually uses computational power to actively generate around a sextillion (A - 1)
useless  hashes.  I  suggest  that  the  algorithmical  layer  of  Bitcoin  production  is
superabundant —underpinned by the idea that digital resources are not bounded
— since the mining operation is based in the generation of a sextillion unusable
strings.
Designed scarcity is only maintained in a decentralized network via the
rules embedded in the excessive use of resources as explained above. In a chapter
entitled  “Economies  of  Abundance,”  Gabrys  (2013)  describes  Robert  Noyce’s
micro-chip  sell  strategy.20 This  strategy  consisted  of  selling  integrated  circuits
(which were not as popular at the time) for less than their actual cost. This risky
strategy paid out by enhancing market value through the necessity for microchips
as  more machines  relied on them.  In  a  way,  Noyce not  only  designed a  sales
strategy,  but  the  pervasiveness  of  the  microchip.  Within  Bitcoin,  the  original
design of scarcity in a functional distributed system is also the blueprint for the
pervasiveness of excessive computational work.
Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies are not systems inherently designed
for  waste  nor  significant  concerns  in  that  sense,  and  their  peculiar  mode  of
production involves a behaviour shared by many algorithmic devices.21 Yet, they
are a telling example of how the idea of unlimited resources gets embedded into
automatized and instrumental apparatuses. Ignoring the more obviously material
e-waste  (Gabrys  2013),  the  enormous  surplus  of  the  algorithmic  layer  (a
continuous  sextillion  number  operation  procedure)  is  underpinned,  to  some
degree,  by  the  idea  that  digital  informational  resources,  unlike  its  more  overt
material  counterpart,  can’t be  excessive.  There  is  a  rationale  of  unlimited
resources attached to the idea of the digital, in part because it is still understood
as immaterial. Gabrys reminds us that “waste and waste making include not just
the actual rubbish of discarded machines but also the remnant utopic discourses
that describe the ascent of computing technologies” (Gabrys 2013, 4). ‘Virtuality’
as immateriality is a live fossil of the rise of computing and its spread onto popular
culture  and  mainstream  use.  What  is  more,  rather  than  eventually  becoming
20 Noyce was the manager of Fairchild Semiconductor, and then co-founder of Intel, see
Berlin (2005).
21 Much of the cryptography involved in Bitcoin was developed to improve security in
different devices, and is used on a day to day basis by generally accepted payment
systems (e.g.  Europay,  Mastercard and Visa) (de Jong,  Tkacz,  and Velasco González
2015); (DuPont 2014). Also, see Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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recognised as material  due to its  entanglements with users,  waste,  or  servers,
digital immateriality has not disappeared.
Countable: The Computational Control of Trust
Algorithms  have  been  successfully  integrated  into  the  capitalist  economy  in
notorious  ways  (Gerlitz  and Helmond 2013),  mostly  as  a  means of  production
which generates value by monetizing and accumulating social knowledge, from
cognitive means to  user  behaviour (Terranova 2014,  383).  Bitcoin is  somewhat
unique in this sense, since it is heavily driven by the algorithmic production of
tokens designed to be themselves a novel kind of exchange value. It is tempting to
see  Bitcoin  and  other  cryptocurrencies  as  devices  attempting  to  resist  the
controlled  cycles  of  capitalism  production  system,  as  utopian  machines.
Automation —human knowledge, skills and work absorbed into machines— can
develop  productive  powers  not  always  contained  by  capitalist  economy (Marx
1980,  696).  Nevertheless,  I  argue  that  the  surplus  in  the  algorithmic  layer  of
production  (i.e.  the  excessive  operation  of  mining’s  algorithmic  layer)  is  not
released  from  the  production  cycle  —as  is  the  case  with  e-waste—  but
reintegrated into it, both by the security design of the device and by the scarcity
model as a new means of control for an algorithmically-enabled economy.
My argument follows James Beniger’s (1986) seminal work to understand
the economy of information as means of control, and Alexander Galloway’s study
of  protocol  as  a  design  for  decentralized  control.  Beniger  proposes  that  the
industrial  revolution  generated  a  crisis  of  control,  when  communication
technologies and information processes lagged behind the fast developments of
energy technologies and their applications (Beniger 1986). The current economy
of  information is  thus  seen as  a  reaction to  the  accelerated  improvements  of
manufacturing  and  transportation  of  the  19th  century,  what  Beniger  calls  the
“societal control revolution” of the 19th and 20th century. In his view, control is
the capability of one agent, human or not, to influence another with a determined
purpose.  Within  communication  technologies,  this  purpose  is  directed  to
information  processing.  In  a  similar  fashion,  Galloway  (2004)  updates  the
discussion on control by considering the specific form that the internet brought.
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His work is a critique of the network influenced by Foucault's studies of historical
episteme’s  of  power/knowledge.  Backed  up  also  by  Deleuze’s  ‘Postscript  on
Control  Societies’  (Deleuze  1992),  Galloway  focuses  on  the  internet  as  an
apparatus  of  the society of  control.  He identifies protocol  as the management
style of this new apparatus and defines it as “a set of recommendations and rules
that outline specific technical standards” (Galloway 2004, 6). Protocol is able to
manage control despite inhabiting a distributed diagram (unlike the centralized or
decentralized  conditions  of  sovereign  and  discipline  societies,  respectively).
Technical devices appear in political life, not only as a direct force of domination,
but as dispersed technical devices of a larger apparatus (Foucault 2012).  While
Galloway  acknowledges  that  the  control  society  and  its  networks  are
comparatively  more  democratic  than  disciplinary  apparatuses,  he  clarifies  that
central points of control still exist. More importantly, Galloway argues that current
networks, even if made of heterogeneous and fluid materials, are still organised
through the systematic management of protocol. By turning bodies into statistical
entities through sets of rules intrinsic to the blueprint of the network’s system, the
management  of  life  as  “distributed  masses  of  autonomous  agents”  (Galloway
2004, 87) becomes possible.
Bitcoin's  production  system,  as  Beniger  argues  about  control,  is  a
recoupment of communication over energy. Unlike the residues of the hardware
layer that escape the production cycle, the generation of unused hashes of the
algorithmic layer are reabsorbed into the system: excessive computation, fuelled
by randomness is a priori for performance. The continuous generation of hashes –
Bitcoin’s instantiation of digital superabundance – is a subtle strategy for both the
conservation  of  a  state  (scarcity)  and  for  the  supervision  of  a  decentralized
informational  system  (a  secured  ledger).  Terranova  warns  that  alongside
automation new types of  control  and strategies to reintegrate surplus are also
generated, “[automation] must be balanced with new ways of control (that absorb
and exhaust) the time and energy thus released” (Terranova 2014, 385). From an
algorithm’s own logic, the excessive random hashes are not wasted because they
are not residue; on the contrary, they remain in the system as enablers of the key
states of  scarcity and security.  In a scenario where Bitcoin’s  distributed system
operates  successfully,  the  algorithmic  excess  of  the  system  should  not  be
considered waste, but a digital element of control. The use of randomness and the
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logic  of  unlimited resources  that  comes with  mining  is  protocological:  it  turns
actual  energy  consumption  and  superfluous  but  intensive  calculation  into  a
management system.
The pervasiveness of  a coded computational mindset is,  of  course, not
exclusive to the blockchain. The integration of randomness through code into a
diversity of systems as both a mode of thought and platform for the enactment of
its  own use and consumption (Parikka 2014) is  becoming ordinary.  One of  my
favorite examples, No Man’s Sky, is a recent space exploration game that exploits
computer-made virtual worlds. While it is not the first game to use ‘procedurally
generated’ elements, the game made use of this technique as a basis and banner
for its launch. Most of what exist in the game —star systems’ order, flora, fauna,
behavioural patterns, etc.— is procedurally generated as such. By giving the game
a  set  of  simple  rules  and  variables,  the  computer  generates  every  possible
combination of  them. The result  is  the overwhelming possibility  to  explore 18
quintillion planets. The creators advertise the factual impossibility of the task as
one of the highlights of the game: “if a new planet was discovered every second
after the game comes out, it would take 584 billion years to visit every one just for
a second” (Hiranand 2015). Outsourcing design labour to the computer, allows the
production of large amounts of content with the use of random combination of
individual  elements.  These  elements  are  human-made,  but  their  factual
combinations are generated by the computer.  The combination of  randomness
and computer-made operations results in unpredictable outcomes, even for the
developers.22
In the blockchain, the labour to generate numbers, validate transactions,
produce  blocks  and  introduce  new  tokens  into  circulation  is  almost  fully
automated.  The human part  of  the miner  assemblage  is  free  to  modify  some
variables of this process, but has to ultimately adapt to the rules of the protocol
(the decision-making of these rules is analysed in Chapter Five). The human miner
is a maintainer of their machine counterpart. On the one hand, the design of the
system  relies  on  this  idea  of  superabundance,  and  on  the  other,  the  actual
algorithmic performance works through its own mode of thought. Bitcoin proof-
22 It is interesting to observe that  the promise of  infinity was good enough to lure a
considerable interest before the release, but the hype among the users faded shortly
after. Wide computational permutations in exchange for narrative, was not enough to
impress an understandably angered human audience.
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of-work  is  a  non-human,  non-mechanical  kind  of  labour  —“algorithm-made”
(Coeckelbergh 2015,  94)—that  produces new tokens.  Aside from programming
and setting up the machines, barely any human labour is involved in the process.
Both programming and setting up the machines are not by any means small tasks,
and they depend on an assemblage of  a  huge number of  names,  discussions,
infrastructure,  discourses,  electricity,  investment,  and so on.  Machines  are  not
built  by  nature,  “they  are  ‘organs  of  the  human brain,  created by  the human
hand’;  the  power  of  knowledge,  objectified”(Marx  1980,  706).  However,  the
production process is executed exclusively by algorithms: labour is predominantly
digital,  what  remains  instrumental  is  only  the  arrangement  of  labour.  What  is
more,  because  the  nonce  value  plays  a  key  role  in  the  process,  randomness
becomes  a  fundamental  for  production.  Luciana  Parisi  argues  that  this
randomness is the founding condition of programming and with it our notion of
logic as rationality gets surpassed: “this new function of algorithms thus involves
not the reduction of data to binary digits, but the ingression of random quantities
into computation:  a new level  of  determination that  has come to characterize
automated  modes  of  organization  and  control”  (Parisi  2013,  ix–x).  Algorithmic
randomness, more than being a systematized reproduction of rules or an applied
representation of rationality, works as an outbreak from it, and points to different
modes  of  control.  What  the  blockchain  distributes  is  the  control  of  trust,  the
confidence  that  no  matter  how  extended  the  universe  of  shareholders,  all
recorded statements are valid. This consistency has the caveat of being computer-
made. It is the big breakthrough of Bitcoin, and all blockchain systems inherit this
basic,  but  crucial  operational  characteristic.  The  primordial  finding  of  Bitcoin’s
anonymous  designer  was  to  solve  the  Byzantine  General’s  problem  (Lamport,
Shostak,  and  Pease  1982),  which  requires  an  algorithmic  implementation  for
secure  communication  and  common  agreement  among  unreliable  peers
(Nakamoto 2008). The solution of the blockchain means solving the computational
puzzle through mining. The operation effectively solves the Byzantine General’s
problem  by  generating  a  computer-made  operational  version  of  trust.  This
computer-made operation is at the core of blockchain technology.
What No Man’s Sky and blockchains share,  among other things,  is  the
predominance of computer-made elements for their operations. In the case of the
blockchain, shared trust is displaced from institutions and a diverse array of social
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interactions,  to  the  instrumental  operation  of  mining.  Specifically,  it  is  the
controlled distribution of trust that makes blockchains unique. Blockchains make
possible a mode of control that performs even among distributed, fluid, pseudo-
anonymous, and apparently non-authoritarian social schemes. Like protocol, they
provide a type of control tuned to the pace of decentralized arrangements.
Accountable: The Management of Anomalous Production
Langdon Winner quotes Friedrich Engels’ small essay On Authority to provide an
example  of  an  imaginary  situation that  does  not  require  hierarchical  rule,  yet
nonetheless is characterized as being an authoritarian system. In this hypothetical
instance, land and instruments of labour have become collective and control is
apparently decentralized, however, Engels warns that authority —within a cotton
mill and industrial environments in general— would pass from a few capitalists to
the ‘authority of the steam’,  which is the timed operational work necessary to
keep the mill running. Engels adds that “The automatic machinery of a big factory
is much more despotic than the small capitalists who employs workers ever have
been” (Engels  1978,  731).  In  this  kind of  control  system, intentionality  can be
ignored, since authority is embedded in the device, not as addendum, but as a
main property. Engel’s example is relevant, because it considers that the rules for
timed labour are set by the workers in the cotton mill, but once they are put into
action, the machinery takes over, leaving little space for autonomy. The same can
be applied to the human-made rules that design blockchains, which get surpassed
once  the  system  is  operational.  As  explained  before,  both  the  ownership  of
production and control of the registry are computer-made. Particular meanings of
control,  trust,  and  authority  are  folded  into  the  instrumental  operation  of
production and recording of the distributed ledger.
In a recent talk, Armin Nassehi (Nassehi 2017) elaborated on the idea that
technologies  have  created  an  excess  of  control,  and  pointed  at  an  important
difference in how we deal with information before and after the dominance of
digital  communication technologies.  In  his  reading,  previous  systems  validated
knowledge by  accountability. That is, through the authority of the sources. The
epistemological soundness of news, for example, was underpinned by the veracity
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of the source. The ubiquity of processing of discrete data, or paraphrasing Engels,
the taking over of the machine, made a significant turn into countability. Nassehi
argues that now our validation of information is procedural, driven more by the
algorithm than by the authority behind it.23 Matteo Pasquinelli  (2017) makes a
similar  claim  and  argues  that  today  the  statistics  feeding  the  algorithms  take
control of sensitive decision-making, e.g. US drones autonomously decide, based
on pattern recognition and anomaly detection, where to strike in a topological
data landscape. My claim is that the notion of countability has not really subsided
accountability,  but  that  accountability  has  folded  into  countability,  and  that
blockchains are an archetypal example of this folding action. In them, the steam
machine  (the  countable)  has  become  legitimate  (is  accountable  for).  This
legitimacy does not come from any external  source, but built  into the system.
With this in mind, I will close this chapter by framing a notion of power that takes
into account the algorithmic model of production (mining) previously developed.
Scott Lash (2007) argues that cultural studies must change its conception
of power as domination through ideology or discourse. In his reading, both power
and resistance have become post-hegemonic. Strongly relying on Foucault, Lash
traces the shift from what he calls extensive to intensive politics. He identifies that
extensive politics are framed by an epistemological regime, and in them power is
enacted as power of one entity  over another entity, and expressed in terms of
normativity. While extensive politics are based on the Kantian (Kant 1999) motto
of knowing things by its predicates —i.e. not what something is, but what are its
qualities— intensive politics would in theory replace cognitive judgements with
questions  of  being.  He  also  states  that  power  within  extensive  politics  is  not
enacted through an external  determination,  but  from within.  Lash argues that
hegemonic power works like a mechanism, through  potestas (poivoir), executing
or reacting to an external force. On the other hand, intensive power works more
like  potentia (puissance), vital force or energy (Negri 1991). Power in this sense
unfolds itself from beings. Within this intensive regime, communication replaces
the symbolic, which, Lash argues, is the ‘iconic of hegemonic power’. Sovereignty
and all  kinds of legitimate domination with the dual role, of the ruler and the
ruled,  collapse into the order  of  communications.  Legality  is  then displaced as
legitimation,  and  replaced  by  the  immediate  performance  of  communications
23 The taking over of accountability by countability seems to be particularly relevant for
the discussion of post-truth.
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flows. Lash follows here Lyotard’s critique of postmodernity (Lyotard 1984) and
the  association  between  technology  and  modern  performance  as  pure
optimization.  For  Lyotard,  technical  devices  “follow  a  principle,  and  it  is  the
principle  of  optimal  performance:  maximizing  output  (the  information  or
modifications  obtained)  and  minimizing  input  (the  energy  expended  in  the
process). Technology is therefore a game pertaining not to the true, the just, or
the beautiful,  etc.,  but to  efficiency:  a  technical  ‘move’ is  ‘good’ when it  does
better and/or expends less energy than another” (Lyotard 1984, 44). Both Lyotard
and Lash recall Luhmann’s proposition on how the normativity of law is replaced
in post-industrial  societies by performativity of  the processes (Luhmann 1975).
According to Lash, legitimation of previous political systems was made discursively,
through serious speech acts, whereas legitimation is intrinsic to communication
systems.
An  extended  theory  on  how  legitimation  inherently  happens  in
communications  systems  can  be  found  in  Hardt  and  Negri’s  (2001)
characterisation of the political order known as Empire. The ‘despotic’ normativity
of the machine, as Engels calls it, becomes in Empire a revolution of the notion of
sovereignty previously held by the Monarch and the State. In the transition from
monarchy to a democratic system, modernity allowed the maintenance of order
and the domination of aspects of the previous apparatus without the necessity of
a transcendental entity (as a unity, such as the King). A social contract (cf. Hobbes,
Locke, Rousseau) made it possible to entrust the powers of the multitude to the
figure of the state through norms. According to Hardt and Negri, it is in this period
of extensive politics, where capitalism as an economic model was able to flourish
and the market was marked as a ground for “the values of social reproduction”
(Hardt and Negri 2001, 85). The state in late modernity is reduced to its minimal
expression, yet is a necessary element for the preservation of the new system of
capitalism  and  sovereignty.  However,  as  Empire  develops,  the  state  is
overshadowed  by  the  corporation,  especially  those  related  to  communication
technologies. Corporations not only replace the role of the state regarding the
articulation of biopower and global order,  but they also restructure this space.
They occupy the place of colonialist and imperialist systems, but at the same time
deprecate “the imposition of abstract command and the organization of simple
theft and unequal exchange” (Hardt and Negri  2001,  31).  That  is,  they do not
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behave  like  states  in  this  sense,  yet  the  state’s  symbolic  power  remains  as  a
placeholder, and the state’s bureaucratic structure is kept as a tool to record “the
flows of the commodities, monies, and population that they set in motion” (Hardt
and Negri 2001, 31). As industrial and financial corporations produce commodities
and  subjectivities  (needs,  bodies,  and  social  relations),  power  is  enacted  by
corporations  in  the  process  of  production,  but  not  expressed  as  domination
between two entities. Instead, power is reflected in the organization of what is
being produced: it  is  in the management of production where the corporation
expresses authority. Organization acts as a ghost limb of disciplinary state, which
was  responsible  for  the  management  and  distribution  of  resources,  but  since
legitimation does not  come from a centralized  institution any more,  it  is  then
displaced to the process itself.
However,  unlike  corporations,  public  blockchains  like  Bitcoin  lack  hard
ownership  and  a  defined  body,  due  to  their  ‘open’  qualities.  Unlike  Google,
Facebook,  Uber,  and  the  majority  of  strong  non-state  technology  players  that
behave as a flexible but centralized monopoly, this particular technology is not a
corporation,  an  NGO,  a  foundation,  or  any  kind  of  institution.  Even  the  core
developers  have  a  small  hand  in  the  execution  of  authority  (as  is  showed  in
Chapter Five), and are forced to negotiate changes to the protocol with the miners
in particular, but also with an extended community of investors, users, markets,
and other minor roles. As I have argued, the crucial difference is the headless, yet
open,  situation  that  Bitcoin  generated.  This  is  more  evident  in  Bitcoin’s
governance,  which  makes  it  an  interesting  case  of  study,  however,  all  public
blockchains, even if they have more functional and clear authority bodies, lack
ownership of the protocol and infrastructure. The mining protocol may differ in
their specifics for each blockchain (i.e. Proof-of-Work in Bitcoin [Bitcoin.org 2015],
Proof-of-Stake  in  Litecoin  [Litecoin.org  2015],  Proof-of-Value  in  Backfeed
[Backfeed.cc 2016], Proof-of-Cooperation in Faircoin [Faircoin.org 2016], but as a
basic technique for distributed trust and security —to tame the Byzantine generals
—  is  the  blueprint  of  blockchain  technology,  and  so  far  shared  by  all  the
phenomena of the ecosystem. This  impossibility to own the system makes the
displacement  of  legitimation  from  an  organization  towards  the  process  of
production far more compelling.
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A lack of ownership is partly what feeds the dissimilarity of the projects
that opened this chapter. The reason lies in the folded production process, which
manages to nurture at the same time two different visions of power identified by
Foucault.  He  famously  distinguishes  two  analysis  of  how  power  can  be
characterized, deducted from the economy (Foucault 1980b). On the one hand, he
identifies a liberal conception, where power is a right that can be possessed as
one possesses  other  commodities.  Because it  is  subject  of  property,  it  can be
juridically  transferred.  On  the  other  hand,  he  identifies  a  Marxist  conception,
where power is understood in terms of its economic functionality, that is, by the
role it plays in the maintenance of relations of production and class domination.
Foucault  does  not  dismiss  the  former  views,  although  he  does  highlight  that
power in both conceptions is not given and then enacted, but it comes to play in
action, as a relation of forces. Power then is performed, and not held.
The political  economy of  Bitcoin performs both the liberal  and Marxist
perspectives. First,  the big breakthrough of  public  blockchain technology is  the
possibility  of  exchange  of  value  without  a  centralized  authority,  that  is,  the
possibility  to  isolate  a  system  through  its  own  transactions.  This  allows  the
arguably flawless transmission of money tokens under a logical infrastructure that
cannot be ‘possessed’, at least not in the same way that a corporation owns its
infrastructure.  Uber  profits  from  the  management  of  a  pure  organizational
structure, keeping their material assets to a minimum.24 This lack of assets allows
them to monetize the ‘sharing’ motto in part due to the fact that they don’t own
any of the products, thus, they can genuinely exploit the alleged sharing culture
discourse, playing the role not of owners, but of enablers. On the other hand, for
the Bitcoin machine, the assets are privately owned (as much as one can be the
proprietary of  a  piece of  data),  but  the organizational structure,  the exchange
network, cannot. This does not mean that the behaviour and logic of this structure
is not influenced by a socio-technical assemblage, but it does mean that the hard
legal property scheme does not apply to it. Then, from a practical point of view,
Bitcoin does not rely on legal ownership rights as an authoritative statement, and
thus,  power  as  authority  is  displaced  to  its  fluid  productive  and  transactional
properties: the structure is inherently public, the products are inherently private. 
24 Also known as SaaS or PaaS, Software or Platform as a Service.
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For Hardt and Negri, the most conspicuous characteristic of the complex
apparatus of Empire is monetary. In a way, money as a means of circulation is the
language of the post-hegemonic apparatus; within Empire, every biopolitical figure
is permeated by money (Hardt and Negri 2001). That certainly highlights Bitcoin as
a  relevant  example  to  be  considered  within  Hardt  and  Negri’s  theory.  The
economic association must be naturally considered, but the crucial element here
is  that  what  is  produced are  fluid  digital  singularities  of  private  property.  This
makes  its  money-like  application  obvious,  but  this  is  due  to  their  private
transactional properties, and not some categorization in the economic realm. They
are digital tokens enabled to hold their uniqueness (their unique singular status,
despite being a digital element), and capable of circulation without reproduction.
They can be easily thought as money, they are certainly fit for that conception, but
it is not an essential relation. This is why blockchains fit the liberal conception of
power: as their tokens circulate, they are subject to possession and transaction as
commodities.
Regarding the Marxist connotation of power, blockchain technology does
little to modify any notion of class domination;25 if any, it generates new internal
subject classes (e.g. the miner) with its own field for domination while, allegedly,
depriving the same from other fields (e.g.  state banking).  However,  the system
does modify the production of assets. 
Hardt  and  Negri  distinguish  three  paradigms  of  economic  production:
agriculture and extraction of raw materials, industry and manufacture of goods,
and  services  and  the  manipulation  of  information.  They  identify  that  in  the
informational economy: “the assembly line has been replaced by ‘the network’ as
the  organizational  model  of  production”  (Hardt  and  Negri  2001,  295).  With
network,  they  refer  to  a  decentralized  mode  of  production  for  which  this
networked infrastructure is  immanent:  information and communication are the
very commodities produced “ the network itself is the site of both production and
circulation” (Hardt  and Negri  2001,  298).  They state  that  corporations such as
Microsoft,  IBM  and  AT&T  were  already  centralizing  massively  parts  of  the
information power structure. When Hardt and Negri’s work was published, there
was no Facebook, Google, or Uber on the horizon. The capitalization of platforms
25 This goes beyond the scope of analysis of this work, but is definitely a relevant matter
for future research.
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was some years  off,  but these authors  already had identified the dangers  and
capabilities  of  corporations  to  exploit  and  centralize  information,  whether  by
control of infrastructure, or by the concentration of attentive subjectivities and
affective  production,  and  generating  their  own  niche  kinds  of  expanding
economies (Gerlitz and Helmond 2013). Hardt and Negri use an analogy of the
railroad to talk about the immanence of infrastructure, production, and circulation
in the information paradigm. Likewise, Bill Maurer (2014) picks up the idea of the
railroad system as the 'rails' of money infrastructures to consider contemporary
telecom  companies  as  the  'pipes'  of  the  money-token.  He  argues  Bitcoin  is  a
phenomenon where both the token and the rail have collapsed into one form of
the blockchain.
This folding is another essential characteristic of the blockchain, and the
way the means of production is modified. The mining action is at the same time
exchange  (as  accumulation  of  transactions  into  blocks)  and  production  (as
transactions into  blocks  are  successfully  accumulated).  This  notable  process  of
producing tokens is in a way an implosion of the means of production, insofar as it
merges  both the instruments  (the tools)  and the subject  (materials)  of  labour
(Marx  1992,  chap.  7).  The instrument  of  labor  is  computing  power,  while  the
subject of labor the output of previous computing power. What I have called the
anomaly of  production is  the computational folding of  production that merges
Foucault’s liberal notion of power by generating private tokens (a digital singularity
capable  of  accumulation),  and  a  version  of  the  Marxist  notion  of  power  by
modifying the relations of production (merging instruments and subjects of labor
with exchange, and token generation in a public collaborative infrastructure). 
The folding is anomalous insofar as it deceptively feeds an empowerment
discourse of collaboration and radical redistribution of power relations. However, I
have argued that its main affordance is not to restructure balance in relations of
domination,  but  to  grasp  a  much  desired  accountability  and  control  in  an
inherently fluid system. Authority is not distributed among the users or a larger
community of stakeholders, but appended to the system in the form of a highly
efficient  computational  management  performed  through  production.  This
argument also explains the higher compatibility  with existing financial  systems,
already governed by the grammar of statistics, than with co-operative projects.
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Open space and the performance of  power  in  the relations of  the distributed
network do endure, even if they are less visible.
The three clusters attracted by the vaccum of authority disclosed in the
first part of the chapter are naturally a generalization of a broader, fine-grained,
complex ecosystem. But they illustrate the diversity of projects tucked under the
same  technological  phenomena.  They  also  tell  different  stories  on  the  ends,
substance, and ideals of the blockchain. However, they have very different degrees
of  existence.  Some  fade,  some  are  only  imagined,  others  grow  sturdily.  The
promise  is  in  each  case  propelled  by  the  anomaly  in  production,  which  by
combining  an infrastructural  collaborative-based  model  with  the production of
digital  private  property,  becomes  a  flammable  material  that  fuels  dissimilar
outcomes.  The  discourse  surrounding  blockchains  exploits  this  anomaly.  The
blockchain  system is  populated with  an  empowerment  discourse,  yet  its  main
affordance  is  far  from  restructuring  balance  in  relations  of  domination  or
modifying  the  status  quo  of  global  financial  powers,  and  closer  to  tighten
accountability and control in an inherently fluid system. Blockchains are a prodigal
child of protocol (Galloway 2004). They are a perfect device to provide order over
the  multitude  (Hardt  and  Negri  2001).  Rachel  O’Dywer  argues  that  the
decentralization  of  infrastructures  does  not  necessarily  correlate  with  the
reduction of the mechanics of domination, as power structures shifts from “dumb-
pipes” towards software-based fluid services (O’Dwyer 2012). Blockchains manage
to not only to bring back the bit-pipe into the discussion by integrating it into the
production of software (in the form of mined and secured digital assets), but to
maintain a deceivingly adaptable pipe-dream.
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Chapter 2: The Political in Digital Methods
This  chapter  addresses two interwoven notions:  first,  the methodologies
involved throughout the thesis, and second, it narrows a notion of ‘the political’
that overarches the different methods used.  The discussion on the use of  ‘the
political’ serves the purpose not only of clarifying the epistemological position of
my work, but also as a pathway to stressing the materiality of the blockchain as a
socio-technical  assemblage  accessed  through  different  methodological  arrays.
Furthermore,  the  ‘political’  also  highlights  the  recursive  performance  of  the
methods themselves. I understand recursivity not only as Kelty’s (2005) notion of
“recursive publics” – a group concerned with the technical and legal conditions of
possibility enabled by their own association – but also as an action that changes
the  order  of  the  objects  observed,  and  in  doing  so,  the  act  of  observation.  I
introduce how this  recursivity  expresses  in  the methods used in  the following
chapters, and acknowledge methodological issues associated with digital methods
in particular and in general with the study of computational objects.
2.1 Point of Entry: From Where to Access the Blockchain as a Digital Object?
Blockchain  technology  presents  a  methodological  challenge  due  to  their
multiple readings. Bitcoin in particular, like other digital objects, is not constrained
by a single definition. The argumentation I offered in the previous chapter places a
reading that stresses these phenomena in relation to how structures and notions
of authority are modified by the technical performance and specific affordances of
the  technological  device.  However,  a  field  less  concerned  with  the  relations
between  power  and  technology  and  more  with,  for  example,  the  security
enhancements that blockchains bring, may offer an entirely dissimilar panorama.
Even an observation fixed on Bitcoin can provide a plethora of diverse definitions
and narratives of the object, each from a different field. Minimal definitions of
Bitcoin been already provided, as diverse as: a digital tool for making payments
(de  Jong,  Tkacz,  and  Velasco  González  2015),  a  piece  of  computer  software
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(Karlstrøm 2014), an informational commodity (Bergstra and Weijland 2014), an
egalitarian creation (Boase 2013), or, as Yves Mersch, member of the Executive
Board of  the European Central  Bank,  has  put  it,  ‘the  regional  currency  of  the
Internet’  (Mersch  2014).  It  can  also  be  easily  defined  as  a  distributed  public
record,  an  anonymity  tool,  and  a  network  of  machines.  These  definitions  can
agglutinate,  overlap,  and  even  contrast  with  each  other,  depending  on  the
observing  field.  Because  Bitcoin  is  at  the  same  time  a  protocol,  a  currency,
software, a network and a cultural phenomenon, it can play the discontinuous role
of instrument, method and object of research.
From the  researcher’s  point  of  view,  Bitcoin  is  a  relatively  new digital
object.  The ‘digital’  has been defined as ‘composed of  many different  kinds of
elements, ranging from computer networks, scanners, algorithms, software and
applications  to  different  actors,  institutions,  regulations  and  controversies’
(Ruppert, Law, and Savage 2013, 31). Many disciplines from the social sciences like
media  and  communication  studies,  cultural  geography,  digital  anthropology,
science  and  technology  studies,  internet  studies,  digital  cultures  and  digital
sociology (Wynn 2009) are heavily involved with digital research and some have
even been spawned by it (Lupton 2014, 13). However, as technology surrounds
most of our activities,  a similar fate of the online-offline division occurs to the
digital  and  non-digital  distinction  (Berry  2014).  Information  can  be  produced,
mediated,  organized  or  made  digitally  available  in  different  degrees,  this
complicates delineating the fuzzy borders between the digital and the social or
between the digital  and its counterparts (Cramer 2013).  Digital  and non-digital
entities can take the form of  native – forms and materials  “born” in,  and not
migrated to a digital medium (Rogers 2013) – and non-native data, subjectivities,
techniques, objects, institutions, methodologies, and so on.
Bitcoin,  as  a  digital  object,  is  framed  by  its  own  medium-specific
constrains and regimes, and also produces its own kind of data, categories and
agencies. Due to its novelty, it  stands on a challenging starting position. It was
designed to be an oxymoron to close observation: regarding its actual technical
functioning, it is transparent and public (certainly not without complexities, since
its guts require at least a little notion of how cryptology strategies are enabled in
software). Observation for this side of the object is open and the working and
results  for  every  transaction made with  the device are  easily  available(‘Bitcoin
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Block  Explorer  -  Blockchain.Info’  2015).  Some  social  aspects  of  its  use  are,
however, on a nicely crafted dark side. Unlike more traditional research on social
networks like Twitter or Facebook, where social content, data and metadata of
how these software-enabled platforms are used is gathered and analysed in closed
spaces, or even partially available for the non-corporate researcher, the data on
cryptocurrencies is democratically scarce. The issues of accessibility are not only in
the  order  of  availability  of  information:  the  phenomena  also  posits  a  general
challenge on from which point  of  view, among the many fields and associated
methodologies, should it be accessed. 
A  creative  fiction  book  by  Milorad  Pavić,  the  Kazahar  Dictionary,  tells
different  stories  in  an  encyclopedic  form.  The  narrative  gets  broken  or
superimposed by the order in which the reader access the text. In fact made of
three  dictionaries  (Christian,  Muslim,  and  Jewish),  the  same  entry  may  be
repeated  in  each of  them,  sometimes  telling  a  different  story,  and  sometimes
complementing a coherent narrative. The text is challenging and open from the
very  start,  since  every  entry  acts,  very  much  like  the  name  suggests,  as  a
legitimate point of beginning. The path that comes after is not defined either, one
can search for the same entry in the other dictionaries, go to one of the suggested
hyperlinks to other entries, or even pick a new random word to continue. The
form of the text is made so that a narrative is created in the process of accessing
it. There is no right point of access or pathway, and order emerges only insofar as
the  act  of  reading  is  taking  place.  The  book  exploits  this  form  to  delightfully
generate an unfamiliar and unprescribed passage. 
I am not suggesting that this playful lack of (previously determined) order is
a methodological technique to be extrapolated to social sciences research. The
entertaining  reading  of  this  fictional  dictionary,  despite  any  analogy,  is  not
equivalent to academic research of a technological device. However, it is true that
blockchains  are  a  good  example,  and  certainly  not  the  only  one,  of  research
objects that have different readings depending on the point of entry or the path of
inquiries chosen to observe them. What is more, the question on how to access a
research  object  is  methodologically  relevant.  Moor  and  Uprichard  (2014)
underline the materiality of the method itself when accessing a complex research
object, taking the Mass Observation Archive (MOA) as a case study. The MOA, a
database of the everyday life  in Britain,  is  a project based on a nonsystematic
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design of samples coming out of self-motivated participation: “The 'Observers' do
not constitute a statistically representative sample of the population but can be
seen as reporters or “citizen journalists” who provide a window on their world.”
(massobs.org.uk 2015). The project has been ongoing since the beginning of the
eighties  (with  a  first  iteration  from  1937  to  1950).  While  the  majority  of  the
archive consists of writings from the observers, it also gathers other kinds of data,
such as recorded interviews.  Moor and Uprichard highlight  the materiality  not
only  of  the  archive,  but  also  of  the  act  of  “getting  dirty”  with  data  that  the
researcher accessing the archive makes. Since there is no digital version of the
archive, the researching is confronted with a number of boxes to be opened and
explored. Moor and Uprichard stress that even thought the data is there, the way
to access  it  has  material  consequences:  “We cannot  get  around this  problem,
regardless  of  what  kind  of  data  we  are  accessing,  whatever  the  research,
whichever methods are used, problems of access are intrinsic to empirical social
research” (Moor and Uprichard 2014, 36).
Digital phenomena may appear to have fewer constraints of access and
fewer issues related to materiality due to its virtual format. Given its mathematical
enclosure  and  software-based  boxes,  a  notion  of  neutral  access  is  commonly
associated with the digital landscape. An extreme of this deterministic position,
can  be  found  in  Kevin  Kelly’s  descriptions  of  technology.  For  Kelly  (2011),
technology offers a degree of objectivity that even allows for a level of agency
independent from the human interactions with it. He sees technology not as a set
of  particular objects, but as a whole; a large “out of control” autonomous being.
He proposes the use of the term “technium”, arguing that both “technology” and
“culture”  fail  to  describe  this  entity:  technium  includes  “culture,  art,  social
institutions,  and  intellectual  creations  of  all  types.  It  includes  intangibles  like
software, law,  and philosophical  concepts.  And most important,  it  includes the
impulses  of  our  inventions  to  encourage  more  tool  making,  more  technology
invention and more self-enhancing connections” (Kelly 2011, 11). In Kelly’s view
the technium is starting to exercise autonomy. For autonomy, he specifically refers
to an enhancing of the self in many areas (except self-consciousness, for which
Kelly  believes  has  not  happened “at  this  point”):  self-repair,  self-defence,  self-
maintenance, self-control, self-improvement. While he acknowledges that there is
no single example of technological device holding all the former characteristics, he
argues that there are particular examples that perform one or the other. Since his
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reading of technology is holistic, and refers to a planetary system, he argues that
the  technium,  as  a  whole,  has  a  sort  of  agency.  Not  only  does  it  want  what
humans design and command it to do, but also its possesses its own drives.
Kelly’s  view  is  controversial:  technology  is  neither  completely
independent, nor autonomous. It  is built  by specific humans, travels in specific
cables, executes specific algorithms (even if more and more fed by randomness
and  blackboxed  [cf.  deep  learning,  google’s  AI  encrypted  language]),  and  its
growth and failures are moulded by chance and the bureaucracy surrounding it
(Latour  1996).  Hence,  while  the  complexity  of  the  object  allows  for  multiple
readings and points of entry, I don’t understand blockchains as utterly relativist
objects, neither as independent objects such as Kelly’s technium.
Instead,  my  research  point  of  view  benefits  from  the  Science  and
Technology Studies (STS) tradition that understands objects as nodes with its own
agency  and  social  weight  within  networked  assemblages  (Latour  2007a).  This
position allows me to anchor my perspective of the object in a middle point in
between  a  technological  determinism  and  social  constructivism.  While  my
position  is  closer  to  the  latter,  I  do  not  consider  blockchains  as  a  completely
designed object, and allow room to discuss a mode of thought befitting to the
machine/algorithm and alien to social phenomena (see the notions of randomness
and  superabundance  discussed  in  Chapter  One),  but  never  independent  of  a
network of relations. While the Latourian approach is based on relations between
asymmetrical actants, it does not have claims of an overall objectivity. It is closer
to the specific objectivity of Donna Haraway’s (1988) situated knowledges, which
distances  from  transcendental  claims  of  the  individual,  objective,  neutral  and
rational observer (Code 2014) —such as Kelly’s Technium— and upholds a specific-
embodiment  objectivity.  For  Haraway,  situated  knowledges  are  about
communities made of active meaning-generating material-semiotic actors part of
a dynamic apparatus.
However, this research should not be considered a contribution to STS or
Actor Network Theory (ANT), since my main interest is not to focus on identifying
relevant  relations in a network of  humans and non-humans.  Alternatively,  this
work is a close analysis of the machine logic of production and the behaviour of its
network,  closer  to  the  field  of  Software  Studies;  a  historical  dissection of  the
technologies that preceded it, closer to the field of Media Archaeology; and an
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observation  of  some  internal  discussion  of  governance,  closer  to  a  digital
ethnography. I  will  elaborate on how the chapters of this study relate to these
fields in a moment, but I want to stress that while this work is not an explicit heir
of ANT, it does share the particular ontology of partial, locatable objects made in
their relations, and the epistemological concerns of such ontological stance.
2.2 The Political as Gathering
One of the challenges is how to makes sense of “the political” in such, if not
relativist, “relationist” ontology. The fading of archetypal figures of authority and
performance  of  political  exercise,  such as  the  state,  in  digital  phenomena like
blockchains highlight the relevance of this inquiry. It is not contested that states
have strengthened their role in controlling the “free” internet of the 90s, using
different  techniques such as  censorship  and division  of  platforms according  to
territorial  constrains  (i.e.  China’s  firewall  and  their  main  internet  services
ecosystem, such a Baidu and Alibaba, as developed in Chapter Four). However, on
the one hand their central role as control points is diplomatically contested by
transnational corporations; on the other hand, alternative illegal services that also
challenge their manoeuvrability keep surfacing from the deep ends of the web.
Bitcoin, for example, is in a middle point here: its markets do follow regulation as
any other service depending on the territorial law of each country, but at the same
time is the  de facto currency of black markets in the dark web. What I want to
stress is  that phenomena such as blockchain technology provide an interesting
standpoint to reflect on a post-state notion of “the political”.
Hardt and Negri point out the transformation of this notion in the figure of
the  Empire  discussed  in  the  first  chapter.  According  to  them,  the  political  as
‘determination of  consensus’  or  ‘sphere  of  mediation  among  conflictive  social
forces’ has disappeared. Consensus is now determined by economic factors (e.g.
speculation  of  currencies):  “Government  and  politics  come  to  be  completely
integrated  into  the system of  transnational  command.  Controls  are  articulated
through  a  series  of  international  bodies  and  functions  (...)  Politics  does  not
disappear, what disappears is any notion of the autonomy of the political” (Hardt
and Negri 2001, 307). This reading considers that in a period of global capitalism,
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systematic relationships of transnational corporations and other bodies disperse
the place of politics. Representation in post-hegemonic times “leaks out”, and the
ubiquity of computation and media “bequeaths to us ubiquitous politics” (Lash
2007, 71). The identification of the political as a central power is dismissed, and
instead it spreads across an untraceable number of actors and relations. Since a
delimited sphere of “the political” disappears, ANT as a relational method stance,
and its notion of politics, become particularly relevant to rephrase politics.
Latour  defends  ANT  notion of  politics  in  a  reply  to  a  Gerard  de  Vries
critique (de Vries 2007). De Vries argues that ANT does not engage with a political
position,  and  suggest  that  it  would  benefit  from  considering  existing  political
philosophies (in de Vries example, using Aristotle as political framework). Latour’s
reply defends STS exclusion of pre-determined political theories, not because they
cannot  be  applied  to  an  understanding  of  the  politics  involved  in  a  relational
research, but because they prescribe issues that frame what is to be known of a
network. Instead, ANT follows the issues that are generated by the relationships,
and previous to the interactions of the network. Moreover, he defends that this
research technique does not imply a lack of politics, but a different, perhaps more
raw, notion of them. Latour’s reading of STS ignores canonical elements of political
theories,  like  ‘traditional  characters’  (citizens,  ideologies),  ‘traditional  sites’
(demonstrations, control rooms), ‘traditional passions’ (indignation, anger), “but
pays  attention  to  new  means  through  which  politics  are  carried  out”  (Latour
2007b, 3). Latour ANT’s approach is concerned with understanding politics neither
as a domain or procedure, nor as a set of beliefs that can simply applied to any
situation.  Instead,  he argues that  situations produce their  own politics.  Latour
argues that STS has expanded the vision from the traditional political scientists, by
introducing a notion of politics as the composition of the shared world or cosmos
(Stengers 2010). Politics in this reading are then issue based (Marres 2007) and
generate their  own publics,  and not a sort of  definition to put into use in the
absence of any issue. He identifies layered ways in which politics can turn around
issues or “successive moments in the trajectory of an issue” (Latour 2007b, 2).
First,  how  a  connection  of  humans  and  non-humans  (neither  symbolic  nor
naturalistic causalities [Latour 2007a]) redefine the cosmogram; then, the moment
an issue generates a concerned public; followed by the moment a governmental
machinery that turns the issue into a common problem; fourth, the issue gets
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absorbed by democratic processes; and finally, it is integrated into bureaucracy.
Latuour argues  for  the relevance of  STS  in  detecting the  ‘political-1’  moment,
where “every non-human entity brought into connection with humans modifies
the collective and forces everyone to redefine all the various cosmograms” (Latour
2007b, 5).
While my research does not claim to follow or be based on the Science
and Technology Studies  (STS)  tradition,  the work  on  this  thesis  coincides  with
Latour’s STS positioning: First, I  understand ‘the political’ in a broad sense, and
acknowledge that different instances, or moments, can be considered part of the
political but researched by different methodologies and theories. And second, I
pay particular attention to the early stages of the previously presented trajectory,
that is, to the way new relations between humans and non-humans (cryptography,
developers, mining stations, borders) are put into play in a still undetermined way,
and considered these as political relations. Thus, the focus of this study should be
considered political in part because it does rely on a political theory framework (it
makes  use  of  political  economy discussions,  e.g.  Hardt  and  Negri’s  Empire,  to
discuss  the  notions  of  regulation  and  production  and  the  significance  of  its
outsourcing to computational processes, as introduced in the first chapter), but
also  because  the  emergence  of  blockchain  objects  reconfigures  a  network  of
asymmetric elements.26 The miner machines, for example, are non-human actors
that come into play with other already existing human and non-human actors (like
developers, or open source standards), and in doing so, disturb or event create
new power assemblages. While this research is not ANT committed, it does share
its characterization of power not as reservoir, but as a product of these relations
(in  the  specific  case,  the  relations  at  play  in  the  production  of  tokens  by
distributed computation).27 The point of view of ANT also benefits the approach to
the agency of non-human elements. The computation involved in superabundance
and production of authority, as seen on Chapter One, by a bitcoin’s mining has no
agency  by  itself.  But  it  does  have  it  in  a  relational  scheme.  While  not  being
completely designed, nor self-governed, it becomes a “matter of concern” (Latour
2007a, 114), which is capable of agency when considering as  gathering,  rather
than  as  object.  While  along  this  work  I  will  constantly  refer  to  blockchains,
26 For  Actor  Network  Theory  (ANT),  the  symmetry  does  not  imply  an  identity  of
substances, but to ignore any a apriori distinction between “human intentional action
and a material world of causal relations” (Latour 2007a, 76)
27 See Latour (2007a, 71).
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cryptocurrencies, and bitcoin as digital objects, I am understanding them with the
aid  of  ANT,  that  is,  neither  isolated  agencies  nor  anthropologically  designed
machines, but as gatherings. 
2.3 Digital Methods and Recursivity
Going  back  to  Moor  and  Uprichard’s  assessments  of  empirical  research,
while digital research may promise easier points of access and stroll through its
mathematically-defined categories,  these  software  boxes  come with  their  own
methodological challenges. While an ANT stance eases the transition on how to
think  about  the  political  in  distributed  digitally-enabled  arrangements,  the
pervasiveness  of  the gatherings,  however,  may be also recursive.  I  will  explain
what I mean by recursive and how I identify it as a persistent problem in digital
methods  and  digital  objects  research.  Methodologically,  each  of  my  following
chapters  deals  with  a  more  pronounced  issue  of  recursivity:  cultural,
epistemological,  and  performative.  However,  all  share  the  main  claim  that  a
grammar of digital communications is pervasive in culture and knowledge. Not
only  because  we  are  used  to  a  daily  interaction  with  digital  objects,  but
particularly, because a computational mode of thought consumes the very way we
encounter these and other objects. While this is an interesting subject to discuss
at  length  from,  for  example,  an  ethical  perspective,  my  interests  here  are  to
acknowledge and question how digital methods in my own work imply a digital
mode of thought in accessing research objects.
Cultural Transcodings
The  methodology  of  chapter  three  (A  techno-political  prehistory  of  the
Blockchain) can be read along the lines of media archaeology. It tracks the lineage
of the blockchain components, since the early seventies up until right before the
emergence  of  Bitcoin  in  2008.  The  chapter  is  an  attempt  to  understand  the
parallelism of cryptography and money, by also supplying the political context of
some of the main pieces that make blockchain technology possible. While Chapter
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Three acts as a brief history of cryptography and digital cash, the intention is to
provide an explanation, not only of the lineage of the Bitcoin’s previous life, but
also to explain the actual relevance of a device such as the blockchain by way of
exploring the history of its elements. I consider this chapter belongs to the media
archaeology tradition, because like it, the method is epistemological as much as it
addresses  the  temporality  of  the  objects.  The  question  of  ‘where  to  start’
observing an object is what makes media archaeology notable. The archaeologist
avoids the figure of the historian, which starts from the beginning, and of the
‘analyst’  who  focuses  on  current  developments  of  the  object  of  study,  and
positions  him or  herself  in  the  middle  of  these  ends.  The  field  builds  on  the
Foucauldian tradition (Foucault 1982) that excavates the ‘conditions of existence’.
Jussi  Parikka summarizes  the meaning of  archaeology in the work of  Foucault:
“Archaeology  here  means  digging  into  the  background  reasons  why  a  certain
object, statement, discourse of, for instance, in our case, media apparatus or use
habit is able to be born and be picked up and sustain itself in a cultural situation”
(Parikka 2012, 6). Friedrich Kittler expands this Foucauldian approach by adding
that this excavation is not restricted to the discursive and institutional realms, but
also to media networks and scientific discoveries. Indeed, the discourse associated
with blockchain objects is not detached from its own materiality. Kittler stresses
that even manifestations of media that lack physical attributes are dependent on
an  array  of  machines,  cables,  routers  and  many  layers  of  hardware  for  their
performance (Kittler and Metteer 1992). Chapter Three ties a level of discourse
with the material cryptography in which this discourse was expressed.
Blockchains  are  not  traditionally  understood  as  cultural  media  such  as
cinema or photography, but they can be archaeology tracked as one of the most
important mediums of exchange of new media. I identify blockchain technology as
a medium, in  part  due to the circulation properties that  their  embodiment as
cryptocurrencies entails, but also due to my theoretical framework informed by
Media Theory.  Representation of cryptocurrencies as digital money stresses its
distinctive circulating properties, it attaches a digital trail to the notion of money
as a medium of abstracted ownership  (Krämer 2015). The constitutive transitive
qualities of Bitcoin, for example, defined by its author as peer-to-peer electronic
cash (Nakamoto 2008b), bestow the intention of using the system as a medium
resembling  digital  money.  More  importantly,  my  reading  follows  the
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aforementioned lineage of a foucauldian approach that observes technology as a
cohesive  element  for  the  operation  of  power  relations  (Foucault  2012).
Technological  objects in this  reading are  part  of  authoritative arrangements  to
control and manipulate groups and individuals. Likewise, my approach follows an
observation  of  technology  and  media  invested  in  identifying  the  power
configurations  that  are  enacted  by  the  materiality  properties  media.  The
discussion on the power, technology, and materiality axis is advanced by a Media
Theory  approach,  which  strengthens  the  role  of  old  and  new  media  in  this
literature  tradition.  Thus,  my  position  identifies  blockchains,  and  Bitcoin  in
particular, as a medium within this line of inquiries. That is, a material technology
that performs and is  performed within  an arrangement of  diverse objects and
subjectivities, and whose observation as new media is revealing for contemporary
socio-technical studies.
Blockchains  certainly  fulfil  Lev  Manovich’s  principles  of  new  media
(Manovich 2001, 27). He identifies five characteristics of new media objects:
1. Numerical representation: new media objects can be formally described
and subject to algorithmic manipulation.
2. Modularity: media as collections of discrete data.
3.  Automation:  principles  1  and  2  allow  for  automation  of  operations:
“human intentionality can be removed from the creative process, at least in
part” (Manovich 2001, 32).
4. Variablity is also allowed by the first two material principles: new media
objects  are  not  fixed,  they  can  exist  in  “different,  potentially  infinite
versions”(Manovich 2001, 36).
5.  Transcoding:  this  characteristic  refers  to  the  ability  of  new  media  to
traduce  between  two  layers,  a  “cultural”  (contents,  meaning,  formal
qualities) and a “computational” (file size, compression, format).
The first characteristic, the numerical representation of media, is applied to
blockchains without much controversy, inasmuch as they are natively numerical.
The information represents may represent  different  kinds  of  values (i.e.  digital
assets), but its primitive form is that of the number. The cryptographic techniques
at the heart of the blockchain as medium are an instantiation of numerical and
algorithmic manipulation. They also comply with being modular structures of data:
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the  tokens  and  validation  that  takes  place  in  the  blockchain  conduction  are
discrete  and  stackable  pieces  of  information.  However,  the  characteristic  of
“variability”  is  not  as  easily  applied.  Indeed,  the  blockchain  has  a  replicable
structure. In fact part of its most notable attributes is that of being a distributed
database. The information is  shared between any number of computers in the
network, but unlike the pieces of a jpeg-encoded photography, on the blockchain
only part of the information is replicable (the public key), while another is kept
private (the private key). This clever use of cryptographic pairs makes each token
(i.e.  each  bitcoin  unit  or  sub-unit)  digitally  unique,  and  thus  not  subject  of
counterfeit.  I  have  previously  (Chapter  One)  discussed  that  in  the  production
process of the Blockchain, the accountability provided by the notions of authority
and legitimacy is outsourced to computational power. Modularity is relevant here,
because as I  mentioned, a part of the blockchain is  spread and replicated (the
ledger and the transactions), while other is unique and non-repeatable (the tokens
as digital signatures). Then, how the variability principle works in blockchains must
be considered with a pinch of salt. Dissimilar outcomes may come depending on
what is looked: a string of a hash, the private key of a transaction, the information
acknowledged between nodes, the code belonging to a software wallet, or the
code for the protocol version have different degrees of variability.  Finally,  I  am
particularly interested in the transcoding capacity of digital  objects like Bitcoin.
According  to  Manovich,  the  transcoding  process  allows for  the substitution of
former cultural categories and concepts for new ones deriving from computational
ontologies, epistemologies, and pragmatics.
An omnipresent example of new media is the database, which is the form
behind many of  the interfaces we encounter  in the digital.  For  Manovich,  the
database takes the form of the privileged narrative after the cinema, which in turn
replaced the novel. He defines a database as a structured collection of data, but
highlights  that  this  structure,  as  the  combination  of  data  structures  and
algorithms, depicts an ontology of the world in computational terms. New media
objects are interfaces to a database, thus narrative and database do not share the
exact same status: “More precisely, a database can support narrative but there is
nothing  in  the  logic  of  the  medium  itself  that  would  foster  its  generation”
(Manovich 2001, 228). Manovich previously states that databases represent the
world as unordered lists of items, while a narrative is the opposite: “a cause-and-
effect trajectory of seemingly unordered items (events)” (Manovich 2001, 225).
66
The blockchain can be read as an interface to a new iteration of the database, and
the whole notion of the blockchain fuels the narrative of decentralization through
technology.  The  database  in  this  case  is  not  only  an  efficient  backend  for
organizing information,  but an actual  transcoding of  notions such as trust  and
authority  into  mathematical,  statistical,  and  numerical  forms.  The  archaeology
method of Chapter Three recognizes the evolution of this transcoding.
Epistemological Grammar
The  use  of  computational  forms  in  my  own  research  is  more  evidently
shown in Chapter Four, which gathers data from the Bitcoin network to trace a
geographical blueprint. While the weight of the argumentation in that chapter is
to question which notion of decentralization with empirical evidence and to reflect
on which kind of territoriality shapes and is shaped by such distributed networks,
these discussions  are  underpinned by  the empirical  method used to  form the
map. I use a small server and a script to gather data from an API of the network,
from which I select the most persistent geographical data points (nodes) during six
months  (I  discuss  the  technical  specificities  of  this  digital  method  along  the
chapter).  The  different  steps  of  this  digital  method  are  already  soaked  in  a
computational  ontology.  First,  API  calls  offer  a  limit  set  of  a  priori formatted
categories and definitions for the possible data. The characteristics of the node
object exist within this logic. The category of “protocol version” exists as part of
the API parameters because it is a relevant piece of information for the effective
functioning of the network, while the political stance of the node owner or the
general incentives for keeping this node running are not machine-relevant, and
thus not available as part of what can be digitally gathered. Traditionally important
categories for social research may not appear, in part because this device was not
designed for this kind of information retrieval, but also because social categories
are not part of most technical grammars. Then, scrapping data from the bitcoin
network  involves  'medium-specific'  limitations,  'alien'  analytics  assumptions  to
social research, and an inherent risk of importing 'inquiry categories' into our own
(Marres and Weltevrede 2013). The same applies to the distillation process (i.e.
the  selection  of  nodes  by  their  persistence,  measured  by  timestamps),  also
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produced  by  code  categories.  While  coding  in  general  has  broad  and  creative
outcomes, it is also “the manifestation of a system of thought —an expression on
how  the  world  can  be  captured,  represented,  processed  and  modelled
computationally  with  the  outcome  subsequently  of  doing  work  in  the  world”
(Kitchin and Dodge 2011, 26).
Philip  Agre  names  this  systematic  representations  of  organizational
activities in computation as “grammars of action” (Agre 1994). The representation
follows what he calls the “capture model” of privacy, which has the deliberate
intention of reorganizing industrial work activities to ease computers capturing of
tracking information. He pays special attention to the use of linguistic metaphors
as one of the attributes of these representational schemes. Agre observes that
human activities can be framed as the sum of a set of unitary actions and the rules
to compound these activities into sequences. This is what he calls grammar, which
refers not so much to the content of each activity, but to the architecture that
allows human activities to be represented by computers. The representation of
information  (the  grammar),  the  intentions  that  guide  the  creation  of  the
frameworks used with this grammar (the development), and the multiplication of
methods in future epistemological directives, are already embedded in the many
manifestations of the digital objects. Both the device (the server, acting as a node),
the  instructions  for  retrieval  and  distillation  (the  scripts),  and  the  data  (the
information for each node and snapshot) are considered 'natively digital' (Rogers
2009). This means it is subject of predefined categories, specificities, definitions
and  interactions  that  are  implicit  and  may  not  even  be  evident.  That  is,  an
unavoidable  computational  ontology  comes with  the use  many digital  objects,
with  its  own  rules,  logic  and  grammar.  The  researcher  working  with  digital
methods is forced, by platforms and 'medium-specific' inheritances, to become an
analyser  and  a  distiller:  data  collection  becomes  extraction,  and  making  of
knowledge, distillation (Marres and Weltevrede 2013). What I want to stress here
is that the very use of digital methods by digital research reinforces in many cases
the cultural transcoding previously discussed. Not only on a cultural level, as the
use of terms like “data” as information, but also to an epistemological degree: the
very same tools and language used to know and make sense of this digital object
come from a computational ontology. This does not imply a one way influence: in
many cases computational terms and techniques are inherited from other fields,
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methodologies and modes of thought. The direction of influence may change. This
is what I refer to with recursivity: the use of digital methods to observe digital
objects  in  many  cases  reinforces  a  computational  way  of  understanding those
objects. 
Digital methods are easily transformed into epistemological data; it  has
been argued that what defines the digital is not its new technical possibilities, but
the actual transmutation and multiplication of methods (Mackenzie and McNally
2013).  According  to  this  idea,  digital  methods do  not  only  display  data  about
something in the world, but turn this production into data about how things are
known, data that can get dissolved into other digital devices. Multiplied methods
become data themselves. The former methodology description shows more about
what we are allowed to apprehend via our own methods than about how exactly
are machines distributed in the world. Even though it does show the latter, from a
methodological  point  of  view  the  importance  of  the  mapping  resides  in  the
epistemological highlighting of relations, i.e. what the location of machines says
about how a broader ecosystem is understood. The very process of localization
builds up on what we think we can know of this ecosystem. Methods relying on
data manipulation replicate  this  grammar and,  in  doing  so, influence potential
epistemologies for  future objects.  Material  logistics involved in digital  research
methods  are  not  “outside”  of  data,  but  ontologically  and  epistemologically
intrinsic to it (Moor and Uprichard 2014). Digitalization requires the researcher to
take into consideration the content of the digital as much as the form it takes. This
recursivity also expresses in the decision-making of the objects, what I previously
refer to as performativity. 
Performative Design
Paul Dourish (2014) extends Manovich’s line of research of the database,
focusing more on its characteristics as an infrastructure, and less as media. Like
Manovich, he stresses the materiality of information in this format, and considers
it a foundational characteristic of the digital. For Dourish, the digital is inherently
material, and this materiality is not simply because the structure is represented as
electrical or magnetic traces, that is, not only due to its physical infrastructure. It is
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also because the material “constraints” allow the specific infrastructure to work in
the form of a database, that is, how information is coded for specific executions. In
his  analysis  of  the  database,  Dourish  also  identifies  a  relation  between  the
organizations behind the design of data structures and the organizations interests
in charge of the development. He argues that the development of System R, a
relational  data  model  that  was  the  blueprint  of  many  contemporary  database
systems, was an overall design not only related with data structures, but with a
model  to  offer  computing  services  and  computing  architecture  manufacturing.
System R was developed by IBM, a software provider, a hardware developer, and a
provider  of  bureau  services.  Dourish  argues  that  IBM’s  position  allowed  the
corporation “to develop its  computer architectures to enhance performance in
executing  relational  database  transactions,  and  to  define  the  benchmarks  and
measures by which database systems would be evaluated” (Dourish 2014, 15). The
grammar  of  the  relational  database  in  this  case,  is  related  to  sociomaterial
configurations  that  involve  a  business  model,  software  systems,  and  physical
manufacturing of an organization. Indeed, the capture process identified by Agre
is never completely technical, and it includes elements of interpretation, strategy
and  institutional  dynamics:  “capture  is  never  purely  technical  but  always
sociotechnical in nature. If a computer system ‘works’ then what is working is a
larger  sociopolitical  structure,  not  just  a  technical  system  (...)  if  the  capture
process is guided by some notion of the ‘discovery’  of a pre-existing grammar,
then this notion and its functioning should be understood in political terms as an
ideology” (Agre 1994, 748).
System design marks the third recursivity issue, expressed in Chapter Five.
This chapter follows an elongated controversy within the development of Bitcoin.
The intention to pursue a governance system ruled by an open model, but with a
community with evident dissimilar interests broke the blockchain into at least two
opposed kinds of organization with different models and ends. While the decision-
making process intended to follow strict rules based on the meritocracy of the
code, along with well-designed rules to advance and implement a proposal, the
search for an objective governance failed and ultimately showed how technical
design is tied with political ends. The chapter shows how the size of a block for the
blockchain, a technically superfluous problem in terms of design, is not minor as it
is  connected to conflicting ontologies. Permutations within digital  grammar are
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not  neutral.  They  are  created  with  deliberated  intentions  and  goals.  Digital
transactional data and algorithms are not usually designed with the purposes of
social  researchers  in  mind.  Although  some cases  are  inherited  from academic
logics [e.g. Page rank and citation schemes (Beer 2012)] the mould cases for data
allocation  are  made  to  and  from  quite  different  perspectives.  At  this  point
Facebook data scientists have access to what is probably the largest concentration
in history of social interaction data and metadata (contents, actors, relations), and
while their methodological behaviour can resemble that of the social researcher,
their ends and aims are most certainly focused into another chain of intentions,
and  enframed  by  specific  systems  of  though,  political  economies  and  politics
(Kitchin 2014). For example, providing a better experience for the user to enhance
their business, in order to improve its marketing performance or even create new
products (Gerlitz and Helmond 2013; Cusumano, Goeldi, and Dutton 2013), like
the Facebook's Messenger or Twitter's Periscope. Similar sets of digital techniques
and tools  for research are used with dissimilar intentions. What I  am stressing
here is that a factor of intentionality exists in the development of technology, but
also in the methods to understand the technology and the social arrangements
involved with it.
This chapter addressed the challenges and complexities associated with
my research  of  blockchains  as  digital  objects.  I  started  by  suggesting that  the
technology is a particular object of research, and offers a multiplicity of points of
access, which make relevant the question of from where is it possible to think
about its political properties. My position on this is to understand the object with
the aid of an STS point of view, that is, not as an independent entity and thus, not
located in a technological deterministic position, but as a gathering of relations.
This  point  of  view  seems  adequate  for  a  system  that  distributes  authority
throughout  a  sociotechnical  assemblage.  Also,  the  STS  position  stresses  the
materiality of digital objects, and the possibility of non-human relations that allow
modes of thought closer to computation, and not only as a social construction. I
then focused on the general methodological issue of digital methods that is the
recursive reinforcement of a computational grammar. That is, the use of a set of
categories, that are themselves part of a computational ontology, to understand
computational objects. While this issue is not a problem by itself, I consider the
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importance of recognizing its recursive status, and that the use of digital methods
as tools of research does not only change their  prosthetic or  instrumental role
(Bradley 2011), but also an ontological one. This recursivity is expressed iteratively
in the grammar, the methods, the epistemology and the cultural transcoding that
takes place while observing digital objects. 
As with many new digital objects, the emergence of Bitcoin generates an
opportunity to produce new methodologies. Specific research paths can emerge
from what  the  affordances  of  novel  digital  objects  bring  up,  and  re-distribute
among  other  social  science  research  methodologies,  obeying  the  argued
distributed  nature  of  social  research  in  online  environments  (Marres  2012).
Agencies modeled by digital methods, like 'nodes' on the bitcoin network, inherit
attributes  from  the  digital  logic  of  its  digital  devices,  in  most  of  the  cases,
unavoidably. Then, digital research must consider the implicit contract of working
with  entities  derived  from  computational  sources,  specially  when  tied  to
extraction and distillation techniques.
An open question is posed by Law and Ruppert (2013) on how dynamics
of methods that are shaped by the social28, that work to format the social, and
that are used opportunistically, intersect with each other. Far from attempting to
answer such an elusive  interrogation,  I  would add to it  that  the awareness of
current  computational  ontologies  and  an  acknowledged  intention  of  the
researcher to restructure the social, are key to identify the opportunistic shaping
of society:  how devices collect,  communicate and store data, how its grammar
belongs inevitably to social and political institutions, and how their usage directly
reinforces  a  kind  of  knowledge  articulated  by  the  devices'  own  logic.  Then,
methods  should  be  used  and  designed  considering  the  former  and  highlight
aspects of the device that are less constrained by computational ontologies. This
follows the suggestive path of 'emergent'  methods, i.e.  inventive methods that
“are able to grasp the here and now in terms of somewhere else, and in doing so –
if they can also change the problem, to which they are addressed – they expand
the  actual,  inventively”  (Lury  and  Wakeford  2012a,  13);  and  of  'affirmative'
approaches to 'biased' digital research, i.e. methods to exploit the ambiguity of
digital devices, treating them as an empirical resource positively marked by bias
28 E.g. Mckenzie (2012) shows how databases’ elemental names —tuple,  key,  relation,
etc— were taken from set theory semantics.
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(Marres 2015) methods. From this perspective, 'emergence' denotes not only the
notion of coming forth, but emerging as a change in the previous state of affairs
caused by the devising, use and deployment of methods.
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Chapter  3:  A  techno-political  Prehistory  of  the
Blockchain
This chapter is concerned with the origin of Bitcoin. Borrowing a Tung-Hui
Hu (Hu 2016) approach, it can be read as a prehistory of the Blockchain. Hu shows
how the modern notion of  the ‘cloud’ not only grew from older networks but
remains layered over them. He also traces the growth of the cloud as an idea that
expanded beyond a technological platform. While the blockchain has a relatively
young history, both as technology and as a metaphor, this chapter dissects the
technical pieces (or “gears”) of Bitcoin as the first working blockchain. In similar
fashion  to  Hu’s  work,  this  chapter  provides  a  political  context  from  which  to
understand  the  function  of  the  Blockchain’s  gears  and  also  the  surrounding
conditions that enabled the generation of these gears.
I follow his notion of prehistory in the foucauldian tradition, as a way to
provide an understanding of the technical conditions and entities that shape the
conditions of possibility for new technology. Hu underlines both the underpinning
of  new  technologies  in  previous  infrastructures,  but  also  how  ideas  on  new
technologies  portray  a  powerful  metaphors  that  go  beyond  the  platform  as
technology to pervade how society organizes and understands itself. My work on
this  chapter  uses  this  dual  notion of  prehistory  to  shed  light  on  two  aspects
involved in the history of blockchains: first, the political context where its technical
pieces materialized, that is, the historical conditions involved in the creation of its
structure. I use the term “gear” to refer to the technical pieces or iterations that
either are directly used in the software or protocol (e.g. the ECDS algorithm, an
iteration  based  on  the  RSA  algorithm;  both  implementations  of  asymmetric
cryptography of digital signatures), or that are an implementation of a previously
projected technical piece (e.g. Hal Finney’s RPoW which inspired the PoW used in
Bitcoin). Second, to indicate how these technical pieces gradually entwine with an
ideology that pervives not only in Bitcoin, but in subsequent implementations of
the technology. Very much like the cloud, ‘the blockchain’ is also a metaphor that
exceeds its technical capacity and materiality. It is a current  cultural fantasy (Hu
2016, xxiv), partially embedded in the political context of its own technical pieces.
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The  prehistory  of  its  gears,  thus,  informs  its  material  constitution  and  the
ideologies associated with its current embodiments. 
This prehistory is not exhaustive. It is focused on making sense of Bitcoin
as a cryptographic device; one to which a specific transactional value is attributed,
which detaches its production and circulation processes from traditional authority
institutions (state and central banks).  I  identify three historical trajectories that
interweave  with  the emergence  of  Bitcoin:  one concerned mostly  with  secure
communications; a second that adds a political agenda and the formation of a
specific  kind  of  politics  associated  with  secure  communications;  and  a  third
interested in the generation of an economical value exchange system. Based on an
analysis of the gears and technical functions of blockchain technology, I argue that
the technical gears of the blockchain are strongly marked by its prehistory. Indeed,
I suggest that Bitcoin is a technical embodiment of this (political) prehistory.
I then move to discuss literature surrounding the political weight of code
and identify  specific  events  where  code  and  politics  were  strongly  associated.
Placing the prehistory of the blockchain within the context of this literature, allows
me to argue that blockchains expand the performativity of code as a contender of
state institutions, not only as a replacement for regulation and execution, but also
as a producer and transmitter of economic value.
3.1 Bits and Pieces
Three  trajectories  are  connected  by  two  events:  the  first,  a  controversy
surrounding the Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) protocol and software; the second, the
rise and fall of Digicash, an early attempt to implement digital cash. The former is
a moment where cryptography techniques came into conflict  with government
regulations, while the second is a practical attempt to create a state-independent
form of money through cryptographic techniques.29 These events should not be
taken as indisputable seminal moments or “causes” that can be traced in a straight
29 Digicash was partly funded by the Dutch government, which sought a new payment
technology  for  their  transport  system.  The  technology  allowed  to  outsource  the
authorization  of  small  cash-like  payments  from  a  fiat  system  to  a  cryptographic
scheme,  thus,  susceptible  for  adoption  by  the  Dutch  government,  but  not
independent of its institutional structures. 
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line of events up to the appearance of the blockchain. In fact, PGP is not part of
the  Bitcoin  protocol  (or  any  other  blockchain  to  my  knowledge),  nor  is  any
technical specification of Digicash. On the contrary, the failure of Digicash signals
the discontinuity of this history. Instead of causal examples, these events should
be read as representative moments where the main concern of a specific historical
period is woven into the next one: in the first case the concern of cryptography
with an anti-state political stance, and in the second, the synthesis of non-state
cryptography  with  payment  functionality.  More  examples  that  stress  the
continuity and discontinuity may be found in extended research of the prehistory.
The gears of Bitcoin thus are presented as a line of descent in the tradition
of Foucault, Kittler and Media Archaeology. The material elements built in Bitcoin,
e.g. the specific cryptographic technique used to hash information, are used to dig
into a particular history of communications. Unlike Nietzsche’s genealogies, which
allegedly sought the origins of, for example, guilt,  Foucault’s take on genealogy
aims to show how dissimilar practices and discourses are assembled to form, for
example, the regime of incarceration (Lightbody 2010, 185). In the same way, my
approach  shows  a  particular  thread  of  cryptographic,  economic,  and  political
elements  that  are  materially  knotted  in  Bitcoin.  Friedrich  Kittler  takes  up  the
genealogical  and  archaeological  techniques  of  Foucault,  but  emphasizes  the
material weight of the medium. His seminal work on “discourse networks” (Kittler
and Metteer 1992) considers the sociological conditions of literature as media, but
stresses the role of media as provider of new forms of social relations, modes of
memory, and the way devices offer new ways of perception. The term “discourse
networks”  designate  not  only  the  institutional  arrangements  but  also  the
relevance of technological devices to allow society to select, store, and process
information. For media archaeologist Jussi Parikka the two main contributions to
media studies that Kittler brought were to observe ‘old media’ as media systems
for institutionalizing information for on the one hand, and to decode the working
of power in the current environment of technical media on the other. 
I  am not  observing  old  media  in  the  same exact  sense  as  Kittler:  the
history of digital cryptography is relatively new, and my starting point is at the end
of the nineteen seventies. Elongated lines of descent can be traced through the
history of cryptography, e.g. Kittler locates the first uses of cryptographic methods
to the Roman transition from Republic to Empire (Kittler 2008), and discusses the
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importance of cryptography for the outcome of  the Second World War (Kittler
1999). Unlike other archaeologies this line of descent looks at a brief period of
time, compressed yet significant to explain the political positioning of the gears.
But  like  Kittler  I  observe  the  pieces  in  relation  to  institutionalization  of
information.  In  the  particular  case  of  the  “trajectory  of  manifestos”,  or  the
moment  where  tech-savvy  communities  antagonized  state’s  control  of
cryptography,  encryption  as  a  medium  was  in  a  way  re-institutionalized:  the
political  struggle  demanded the use  of  the techniques available  for  a  broader
public, and while the control was partially taken from state institutions, to say that
it was de-institutionalized would be misleading. Instead, as I argued in the first
chapter,  notions  of  power  performance,  such  as  authority,  are  coded  or  re-
institutionalized in software, protocols, and computational frameworks. In this line
of thought my work also follows the Foucault/Kittler tradition that seeks to decode
power dynamics within the digital media landscape. Finally, my research lingers in
between the medium-specificity of Kittler and Hu’s medium-agnosticism: I do not
look at  one technical object,  but a series of ‘trajectories’  that include different
technologies and diverse socio-political contexts; however, the Bitcoin blockchain,
read as a specific material medium, acts as a reverse point of departure to trace
this lineage.
This genealogy comprises the period from the early seventies to Bitcoin’s
white  paper in  2008.  The descent,  as  Parikka  states,  is  not  only  historical  but
infrastructural:  “Media  archaeology goes back not only in  time,  but inside the
machine” (Parikka 2012, 81). I will associate three different materialities embodied
in the machine with each trajectory: technical gears, discourses, and projects. The
technical  gears  listed  in  the  trajectory  of  insecure  communications  are  actual
pieces or inherited versions of technology that take part in the code or protocol of
Bitcoin.  This  machinery  includes  Merkle  trees,  Blind  signatures,  Elliptic  Curve
Digital Signature Algorithms (ECDSA), Reusable Proof of Works (RPoW), and the
SHA-256 hashing algorithm. Then, the trajectory of manifestos considers some of
the techno-political discourses that expressed the utopian spirit of the internet as
a place unaffected by “real world” politics and, thus with the potential to create its
own  political  frameworks.  Three  popular  representative  manifestos  of  the
emerging cypherpunk culture are discussed: the Crypto Anarchist Manifesto, the
Cyphernomicon, and the Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace. Finally,
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the trajectory of crypto-money gathers some of the partially successful attempts
to create a digital  version of  cash or state-  and industry-independent payment
systems.  Endeavours  towards  the  creation  of  digital  cash  that  culminate  with
Bitcoin include Digicash, Hashcash, B-money, and Bitgold. In some cases, Bitcoin
inherited and applied specific techniques from these projects, others helped to set
up the landscape where the idea of a distributed payment system was feasible.
The threading of  these trajectories  sheds light  on the assemblage of  technical
objects, concerns, and discourses, which became the condition of possibility for
the appearance of digital objects like Bitcoin. 
Secure Communications and the PGP Event
David  Khan’s  (1996)  seminal  work  on  the  history  of  cryptography,
Codebreakers,  identifies  two  core  elements  for  cryptography  that  appeared  in
Egyptian civilization:  a  deliberate  transformation  of  writing  and  the  pursuit  of
secrecy.  While  he believes  that  its  first  uses  of  cryptographic  techniques were
aimed  at  increasing  the  mystery  and  magical  elements  surrounding  religious
places,  such as tomb’s  epitaphs,  a  great part  of  the history of  cryptography is
embedded  in  the  history  of  military  communications.  Despite  its  non-military
uses, the interrupted evolution of secret communications that became the “deadly
serious  science  of  today”  (Kahn  1996,  66)  is  constantly  coded  along  military
conflicts. This relation is not unexpected: military events benefit from a dedicated
channel of communications for strategic purposes and are capable of gathering
extraordinary amounts of resources to develop and expand secrecy techniques.
The  20th  century  provided  a  fertile  ground for  the  accelerated  evolution  and
usage of cryptography by introducing mathematical formalizations into two of the
biggest world-wide conflicts.  Secure communications through cryptography was
critical to the outcome of the Second World War, as exemplified by the successful
decoding of German ENIGMA machines by Alan Turing’s British counterpart, the
COLOSSUS (Kittler 1999, 253), or the Japanese message disclosing the incoming
bombing of Pearl Harbor that opens Khan’s book narrative (Kahn 1996, 6). The use
of cryptography for strategic and military communication continued through the
cold war and into the present. 
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Bitcoin  and  all  the  subsequent  blockchains  are  an  expression  of  the
cryptography that sprouted after being detached from its exclusive use in national
security.  They  are  also  a  modern  solution  for  how  to  securely  exchange
information  through  cryptographic  methods  (the  solution  to  the  Byzantine
Generals’  problem  mentioned  in  the  first  chapter  of  this  work).  The  term
“cryptocurrency” is the union of a unit capable of circulation, a currency, and the
cryptographic  techniques  that  allow  for  an  untampered  transmission.  I  will
develop an account on how the connection between these two parts evolved. For
the moment, I will briefly discuss how this exchange of messages works in Bitcoin.
Transactions within the Bitcoin protocol are the transference of coins —or
any kind of token in other blockchains— from one owner to another. However, this
should not be understood as an exact analogy to a payment made with non-digital
money, or even with other digital payment systems. The tokens in Bitcoin are but a
record of  a  transaction,  information in  a ledger.  Arguably,  this  operates  in  the
same way as the rest of non-physical money.30 But the crypto-coin is made itself
from information of current and previous transactions. It is not only an entry on a
database, but an entry that signals a chain of events happening before it. These
transactions are grouped into blocks, hence the popular “block-chain” label. The
way in which a user can claim ownership of a coin, and thus having permissions to
add new information to the registry in the form of new transactions, is through
the use of digital  signatures.  The electronic  coin is  then defined as  a chain of
digital  signatures.  Signatures,  like  their  ink-on-paper versions,  serve to  provide
proof of the origin and integrity of a digital element, such as a business document.
But the digital versions replace notarial power with mathematical proof, and are
commonly  used  today,  in  particular  since  the  emergence  of  asymmetric
signatures.
Public-key,  or  Asymmetric,  cryptography  was  implemented  in  1976  by
Diffie and Hellman (1976) as a solution for sharing a secret key without previous
communications between the peers and even through an insecure channel or in a
broad  network.  Their  seminal  paper  acknowledges  that  the  major  problem  in
cryptography is privacy, thus their answer allowed making public one of the pair of
30 The  amount  of  fiat  money  in  the  form of  cash  that  circulates  in  the  economy  is
‘insignificant’ (Jessop 2015), compared to the credit in circulation: it is estimated that
the former accounts less than 3 per cent of the economy, while the latter accounts for
almost the remainder 97 per cent (Ryan-Collins, Greenham, and Werner 2014).
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keys, while keeping the other private. Jean-Francois Blanchette (2012) discusses
extensively the working and history of public-key signatures (without ignoring the
history  of  its  failures).  He  summarizes  Whitfield  and  Diffie’s  brilliant  but
‘deceptively  simple’  system  of  key-pairs:  “The  trick  lies  in  the  mathematical
relationship between the public and the private part of the key: although each key
provides the inverse function of the other,  even with significant computational
resources it  would require  considerable amount of  time to deduce the private
from the public portion of the key” (Blanchette 2012, 43). The technique exploits
one-way  function  problems:  mathematical  puzzles  that  are  easy  to  prove  for
correctness  but  difficult  to  solve.  Having  both  keys  proves  their  unique
relationship  quickly,  but  having  only  one is  extremely  difficult  to  generate  the
other. This solution improved the effectiveness of cryptosystems by leaving behind
the  unreliable  beliefs  and  heuristics  and  replacing  them  with  algorithms  and
computational power, ultimately achieving 'provable security',  a mathematically
demonstrable type of guarantee (Blanchette 2012, 8). The technology allowed the
exchange  of  securely  encrypted  messages  between  two  parties  using  public
available information (the public key), as long as a key pair remained private (the
private key). In the Bitcoin system, the receiver of the coin generates a key pair,
making half  of it  public.  The other half  is stored in an online or offline wallet.
Whenever a person ‘spends’ a coin, they use their private key to sign a new one
(and thus transfer the value). The digital signature of a payment resolves the part
concerning  the  authenticity  of  the  ownership  and  the  authentication  of  the
parties. From a technical point of view, what makes the action reliable is not the
user choices or interaction as a person, but the coin as a chain of verified additions
to the ledger.
Public-key  cryptography  exchange  was  later  implemented  in  the  RSA
algorithm and broadly used for obtaining public keys and digital signatures (Rivest,
Shamir, and Adleman 1978). Rivest, Shamir and Adleman are ahead of their time
when they venture that their cryptographic method has ‘obvious applications’ for
electronic funds transfer systems.31 Bitcoin uses Elliptic Curve Digital Signatures
Algorithm  (ECDSA),  a  secure  algorithm  similar  to  the  RSA  but  with  a  smaller
31 The  RSA  algorithm  is  another  good  example  of  the  close  relation  between
cryptography and the military. It was in fact independently discovered at the British
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) early in 1973 by Clifford Cocks, a
mathematician working at  the institution, but remained classified information until
1997.
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footprint, which improves communication within its network. It uses a one-way
function using big prime numbers, which means that it is relatively easy to read
the coded message from one way and almost impossible on the other way around.
It is based on DSA, a Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) proposed in
1991 by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), an agency of
the United States’ Department of Commerce  (López and Dahab 2000). ECDSA is
complemented by Merkle trees to generate  new blocks  on the chain with the
minimal amount of information. Patented by Ralph Merkle in 1979 (Merkle 1980),
Merkle trees are used in Bitcoin mainly as a technique to save space: transactions
are hashed in a tree, and only the root (the addition of the branches’ hashes) is
included in the block resultant data (or ‘header’). The use of Merkle trees is handy
to authenticate a hash comprising a large set of data (Merkle 1980).
The public in public key is relevant beyond their technical affordances. It
signals the dissemination of the cryptographic affairs to a broader audience, and
the notion that good cryptographic techniques benefited from public scrutiny. For
Blanchette,  the  cryptographic  moment  fuelled  a  debate  (sometimes
confrontational) over the control of this applied mathematical knowledge, which
was previously solely  under state  control,  and then reclaimed by the scientific
community. What is more, Blanchette notes that the claim was grounded on a
growing critique of a state’s management capacity, and an incipient sentiment of
moral responsibility on the tech-savvy community towards a fair use of crypto:
“Cryptographic  tools  and  knowledge  would  thus  move  from  a  dysfunctional
institutionalist context dominated by the needs of states for self-protection, to one
regulated by the scientific ethos of openness” (Blanchette 2012, 40).
The gradual  separation of  state and cryptographic  techniques is  clearly
represented in the PGP event. Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) was a software created
by Phil  Zimmerman,  a young cryptographer with  the goal  of  creating a  public
software that allowed the practical use of public-keys. By 1991, Zimmerman was
close  to  having  a  finished  product.  In  the  same  year,  a  bill  to  strengthen
antiterrorism measures was introduced to the US congress, it prohibited any kind
of  encryption  inaccessible  to  federal  government  request.  Zimmerman  was
pushed to publish and release his software through a young but blooming internet
network. The dispute between the cryptographic community and the government
is thoroughly narrated in Stephen Levi’s (1996) work on the post-war history of
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cryptography.  The  book’s  very  title  —“Crypto:  how  the  code  rebels  beat  the
government, saving privacy in the digital age”— is evidence of the morally infused
position of the cryptographic community towards the government. Zimmerman’s
has  a  significant  place  in  the  history  of  cryptography,  not  only  because  he
managed  to  produce  a  working  and  efficient  software  for  public  secure
communications, but also because of the symbolic role he played as a resistance
towards the control of the state: 
Zimmermann's  do-it-yourself  effort  to  create  a  crypto  program  and
distribute  it  to  the  people  —  an  effort  consciously  undertaken  to
circumvent government control — marked a new dimension in the ongoing
battle between the NSA and the cryptographers who worked outside its
reach.  The  agency  had  once  felt  that  its  voluntary  prepublication
compromise with academics had mitigated much of the potential damage
of that community's emergence (Levy 1996, 257).
In 1993 Phil Zimmerman was being accused of exporting ‘munitions without
a  license’  for  having  his  PGP software  distributed  worldwide  (Garside  2015).
Strong  cryptography  —i.e.  encodings  that  security  agencies  with  substantial
resources are unable, or struggle, to decode— was considered a weapon and thus
not to be shared outside the country. However, the new materiality of software
was different from that of a bullet: while the execution of the PGP program may
be considered a weapon deployment by law, the diffusion of the source code was
made possible through its slippery embodiment. Zimmerman exploited this and
published the source for PGP in a book format, thus being able to export it. The
code associated with cryptography challenged the government’s role by exploiting
its malleable materiality, and inaugurated a moment where this materiality was
seen as a possibility for executing a different kind of politics. What followed was a
period of  manifestos claiming the blooming digital  communications as a space
independent of centralized politics. 
Manifestos and the Digicash Event
The  PGP  event  encouraged  the  political  organization  of  the  crypto-
community to have regular meetings,  mailing lists  and the spreading of  crypto
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software  (Barok  2011).  The  Electronic  Frontier  Foundation  (EFF),  an
institutionalized association that sought to defend civil liberties in the upcoming
digital age, was founded in 1990. The EFF is still active and describes its goals as:
“EFF  champions  user  privacy,  free  expression,  and  innovation  through  impact
litigation,  policy  analysis,  grassroots  activism,  and  technology  development.”
(‘About EFF’ 2007). It was founded by John Gilmore, Mitch Kapor and John Perry
Barlow – hackers and technology enthusiasts with strong political positions. In the
same  line  of  thought,  Timothy  May  (former  physicist)  and  Eric  Hughes
(mathematician)  devised  the  idea  of  a  movement  standing  for  a  political
libertarianism that enabled a technified society where anonymity was a crucial
right. A meeting set to start such a group on September 19, 1992 (Levy 1996, 263)
sprouted what was later known as “the cypherpunks”. May prepared a fifty-seven-
page document for the gathering that would be known as the Crypto Anarchist
Manifesto. The political tinge among the various early manifestations of Internet
Governance was evident in the very format of the manifesto. The libertarian or
sometimes  so-called  anarchist  discourse  standing  for  the  development  of
techniques able to ensure the privacy and anonymity of the individual was set in a
demanding and passionate form that emulated historical examples (such as that of
Marx and Engels or the Futurists).
The Crypto Anarchist Manifesto’s (May 1996) first line is in fact a direct
reference to the Communist Manifesto: “A specter is haunting the modern world,
the specter of crypto anarchy”. Immediately after this  rephrasing of Marx, it  is
stated that two persons should be able to exchange messages, make business and
negotiate in complete anonymity, and that technology is on the edge of making it
possible. In the same manner that, by creating the printing system in the middle
ages, technology 'reduced the power of medieval guilds' and restructured social
power, cryptography is bannered as the technology that will change the nature of
corporations and get rid of government interference in our economic transactions.
A  year  later,  the  Cypherpunk's  Manifesto,  proclaimed  a  similar  set  of  beliefs
focused on private interactions and encryption as the indication for the 'desire' for
it. There is a straightforward position of distrust towards any institution that will
offer  privacy:  “We  cannot  expect  governments,  corporations,  or  other  large,
faceless organizations to grant us privacy out of their beneficence. It is to their
advantage to speak of us, and we should expect that they will  speak” (Hughes
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1993). The text ends by gesturing toward the possibility of a distributed system of
governance,  made  possible  by  a  dispersed  system.  A  year  afterwards,  The
Cyphernomicon, a second text by May was made public. This was an extended
explanation for the cypherpunks group and mailing list.  The section 3.4.1 (May
1994), concerning Beliefs, Goals and Agenda states:
• that the government should not be able to snoop into our affairs
• that protection of conversations and exchanges is a basic right
• that these rights may need to be secured through _technology_ rather
than through law
• that the power of technology often creates new political realities (May
1994)
Even though not all members shared the occasionally extreme positions of
the Cypherpunks mailing list's founders (May, Hughes, and Gilmore) most of them
were drawn by the appeal of a right to secure communications. There are two
implicit statements in the Manifestos: technology is more reliable than law, and
holds  the  capacity  to  transform political  reality.  Code  translates,  among  other
things, directly as political praxis. In the words of May: “I don't see any chance that
it will be done politically. But it will be done technologically” (Levy 1996, 200). This
kind of proposition presumes the incapability of traditional enabled institutions to
guarantee citizens' rights and challenges the (traditional) “code” on which they are
structured;  that  is,  it  questions  the  law  and  the  institutions  that  uphold  and
enforce it.  At the same time, it  is strongly confident about the capacity of the
computational techniques to  replace the old  notarial  code.  According  to Barok
(2011), Gilmore expected a “guarantee – with physics and mathematics, not with
laws – that we can give ourselves real privacy of personal communications”, while
Hughes  ultimate  goal  “was  combining  pure-market  capitalism  and  freedom
fighting. In his world view, governments were a constant threat to the well-being
of  citizens,  and individual  privacy was a citadel  constantly  under attack by the
state”  (Levy  1996,  259).  But  not  everyone  was  subscribed  to  the  ‘anarcho-
capitalist  libertarianism’:  Phil  Zimmerman,  Hal  Finney  and  Julian  Assange,  for
example ‘were alien to it’ (Barok 2011, 5).32 
32  The list  subscribers  included:  “Adam Back,  the author  of  Hashcash proof-of-work
system;  Julian  Assange,  the  founder  of  WikiLeaks;  Bram  Cohen,  the  creator  of
BitTorrent;  John Young of Cryptome.org and WikiLeaks ex-member; Hal  Finney,  the
author of reusable proof-of-work system, and others who were directly involved in
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The Cypherpunks mailing list was mostly active from 1992 to 2001, after
which  John  Gilmore  ceased  to  host  it  (Jeong  2013).  The  movement  bloomed
during  the  1990s,  an  era  of  mass  mediatization  of  the  Internet.  Its  impetus
resembles  what  i's  identified by  Wellman (2004)  as  the  first  stage  of  Internet
Studies:  an  early  period  of  utopian  and  dystopian  visions.  These  visions  are
archetypically  exemplified  in  Barlow's  Declaration  of  the  Independence  of
Cyberspace  (Barlow 1996),  which,  resembling  the  tone  of  the  previous  crypto
manifestos, stands against the intrusion of state governments and for the creation
of an independent social contract and governance for the internet. This was the
peak  of  the  utopic  moment  for  the  newly  opened  “cyberspace”.  Code  and
transmission of information were the banners for a new, politics and enactment of
rights, heavily infused by libertarian ideals. The cypherpunks mailing list mantra,
“Cypherpunks  write  code”,  refers  not  only  to  the  creation  of  technical  tools
through software development, but to the emancipatory power of technology and
the  potential  to  build  a  state-free  society,  or  at  least  a  landscape  with  less
centralized control and fluid exchange of digital goods.
Kittler’s notion of code stresses this dual meaning. On the one hand, he
defines it as  ‘sequences of signals over time’, based on a Wolfgang Coy definition
(“from a  mathematical  perspective a mapping of  a  finite  set  of  symbols of  an
alphabet onto a suitable signal sequence” [Kittler 2008, 5]), and as such, part of
every communication technology and every transmission medium. On the other
hand,  it  links  code  with  its  inherent  historical  function  as  a  medium  for  the
transmission  of  power.  In  fact,  Kittler  (2008)  states  that  is  in  encryption were
codes are  materialized in the form of  transmission of  authority.  He traces the
origins of encryption to what was allegedly the first secret message system in the
Roman  Empire,  in  the  letters  of  Julius  Caesar  and  Augustus  (according  to
Suetonius).  Augustus  is  also credited for  the creation of  the first  military  mail
system.  Following  an  etymological  pathway,  he  also  notes  that  the  Emperor’s
orders  were  called  ‘codicillia’.  The  term  codex,  was  used  as  “book”.  Thus,  for
Kittler:  “the  basis  on  which  command,  code,  and  communications  technology
coincided was the Empire” (Kittler 2008, 41). This meaning, according to Kittler,
remained in the lineage of Empires until Napoleon, strongly associated with the
development  of  PGP,  anonymous  remailers,  SSL,  Linux  kernel,  or  Tahoe-LAFS
decentralised filesystem“ (Barok,  4].  It  must be noted that  neither Chaum, Merkle,
Diffie, Hellman, Rivest, Shamir or Adleman were, as far as I know, part of this particular
mailing list.
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book  of  law.  Code  was  then  the  transmission  of  law,  a  circulating  book  of
commands, rights and obligations. In this reading, code is a both a technique and a
medium appended with command and law. According to Kittler, the use of the
codex partly explains the success of Christianity which “took the historical chance,
the  technological  leap”  (Armitage  2006)  to  adopt  this  medium  instead  of  the
scrolled paper. In a similar fashion, the utopian manifestos claim the code as their
own medium to design and transmit the laws of the upcoming cyberspace. 
Lawrence Lessig links the fading of the post-communist euphoria of the
mid-1990’s with the emergence of the digital utopias that promised a new exciting
opportunity  to  develop  new  societies.  The  “cyberspace”  expanded  from
universities to become a target for libertarian utopianism, where “freedom from
the state would reign. If not in Moscow or Tblisi, then in cyberspace would we find
the  ideal  libertarian  society.”  (Lessig  2006,  2).  However,  Lessig  notes  that  the
panorama that was being constructed ultimately become closer to an instauration
of new kinds of control through code (like Galloways’ analysis explained in the first
chapter of this thesis), than to an anarchic landscape. For Lessig, code acted as the
new regulator, he famously paraphrased William Mitchell (1996) to encapsulate
his view: code is cyberspace “law”. Lessing argues that code since the 90’s became
the way a constitution is made, not as only as a book of rights and obligations, but
also  as  architecture,  that  is,  as  the  technical  conditions  of  possibility  for  the
development  of  actions  and  values:  “What  values  should  be  protected  there?
What values should be built  into the space to  encourage what forms of  life?”
(Lessig 2006, 6). He ultimately asks that code raises the opportunity to ask which
regulators we prefer. As I have argued in the first chapter, the current constitution
of  the  Internet  is  largely  centralized,  the  practical  regulation  on  the  web’s
permitted uses and limits has and is being molded by a minority of actors, and the
transition  of  control  and  authority  to  computational  arrangements  is  not
necessarily synonymous with an improved redistribution of power and authority,
but  merely  a  reconfiguration  of  it.  But  the  landscape  at  the  time  was
overwhelmingly positive, in particular for libertarian-related agendas. 
The benefits of code for the construction of the political utopias were not
only to act as a new command repository, but, as Wendy Chun (2013) argues, its
inherent  capacity  to  be  put  into  practice.  Like  the  orders  coming  from  the
Emperors, which were put into practice upon receiving the message, code has the
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capacity  to  be its  own trigger  of  power,  it  acts  both as  a passive  recipient  of
information-law (such as PGP code source in its book/codex format), and as an
active  instantiation  of  command  (such  as  the  act  of  encrypting  sensible
information using the PGP software). Chun refers to research that theorizes code
as  performative  element,  such  as  Hayles’  (2005)  argument  that  code’s
performativity has a direct and causal change in the machine, unlike the human
language, which relies on more mediated chains to have an effect (like the Roman
messenger riding towards its goal with a piece of paper). This line of thought is
also shared with works like Alexander Galloway’s, as Chun identifies. For Galloway
(2006),  unlike  natural  languages,  code  is  commands  issued  to  a  machine  in  a
determined  material  substrate,  and  thus  should  be  looked  through  an
instrumental  logic  rather  than  a  psychological  one.  Chun  however,  challenged
Galloway’s  position  by  asking  if  code  can  be  understood  without  being
anthropomorphized at all: “How can code/language want—or most revealingly say
— anything? How exactly does code “cause” changes in machine behavior? What
mediations  are  necessary  for  this  insightful  yet  limiting  notion  of  code  as
inherently executable, as conflating meaning and action?” (Chun 2013, 23). Chun’s
reply to Galloway is that the mere use of high-level languages is already a way to
anthropomorphize the machine by embedding them in “logic” and reduce actions
to  commands;  for  Chun,  the  fact  that  code  is  already  enabling  and  disabling
actions makes it a policing act. And it is this executability of code in the form of
software  that  makes  it  really  remarkable:  “What  is  surprising  is  the  fact  that
software  is  code;  that  code  is—has  been  made  to  be—executable,  and  this
executability makes code not law, but rather every lawyer’s dream of what law
should be: automatically enabling and disabling certain actions, functioning at the
level of everyday practice” (Chun 2013, 27). What code embodies is an instance of
performance of power that is traditionally assigned to bureaucratic law and other
institutions of governments. For Chun, Lessig’s famous adage “code is law” depicts
the superposition of disciplinary and sovereign power, of control through a silent
apparatus  and  through  explicit  submission  of  bodies.  By  following  inherent
hierarchies in the history of code and programming, like the work of female ENIAC
programmers on one hand, and the resistance of “wizard” coders to a nascent
automated  programming  on  the  other,  Chun argues  that  code  reworks  power
relations vertically: automation is populated both by narratives of liberation and
empowerment. 
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This crypto ideologies of state emancipation eventually gravitated towards
money. The second historical trajectory involves Digicash, the first implementation
of an electronic cash system tuned to the cypherpunks concerns on freedom of
information and the rights for privacy enabled through code. This event does not
depict  a direct causality towards Bitcoin,  or an uninterrupted lineage from the
cypherpunk  movement.  May’s  document  for  the  first  cypherpunk  gathering
already  included  discussions  of  “digital  money  in  virtual  realities”,  but  in  fact
Digicash was already implemented in 1990, two years before the first cypherpunk
meeting, and by 1999 —two years after Barlow’s manifesto for the independence
of the cyberspace, and almost ten before the creation of Bitcoin— the project had
already  declared  bankruptcy.33 The  event,  however,  tied  the  techno-libertarian
ideology with the intention to generate a stateless system for economic exchange.
Its rise and failure inspired forthcoming attempts to achieve the very same goal,
with Bitcoin as the most successful heir, itself stacked on previous efforts.
While the former cryptographic technology was concerned with general
secure  communications  with  possible  deployments  in,  but  not  limited  to,  the
financial field, David Chaum was the one who explicitly tied the two in a project to
create digital cash. Despite being described as a silent figure who never attended a
cypherpunk’s  meeting,  posted  to  the  mailing  list,  and  even  had  a  conflictive
relationship  with  some  of  its  members,  Levi  depicts  Chaum  as  “the  ultimate
cypherpunk”, “the privacy revolution’s Don Quixote”, and “the Houdini of Crypto”
(Levy 1996, 267). Chaum’s early paper “Numbers Can Be a Better Form of Cash
Than  Paper”,  opens  with  the  following  statement:  “Soon,  by  accessing  a
computerized  network  from  almost  anywhere,  you  may  be  able  to  pay  for  a
purchase, change your insurance coverage, or perhaps even send an electronic
“letter” to a friend” (Chaum 1993, 174). The line already signals the hierarchical
belief on the development of digital payments, which appear even more feasible
than  electronic  letters.  Chaum  tied  his  thoughts  on  the  technological  with  a
recurrent political concern, for him cryptography was both an opportunity and a
menace to privacy:34 “Current developments in applying technology are rendering
hollow both the  remaining  safeguards  on privacy  and the right  to  access  and
33 For a close narrative of the rise and fall of Digicash, and an extended history of the
development of non-distributed digital cash systems see (de jong, Tkacz, and Velasco
González 2015).
34 Arguably, he even stated that ‘the difference between a bad electronic cash system
and well-developed digital cash will determine whether we will have a dictatorship or
a real democracy’ (‘How DigiCash Blew Everything’ 1999).
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correct  personal  data.  If  these  developments  continue,  their  enormous
surveillance potential will leave individual's lives vulnerable to an unprecedented
concentration of scrutiny and authority.” (quoted in Levi 1996, 269). Thus, a great
deal/amount of his efforts in the development of an electronic cash system were
aimed at providing mathematical foundations for anonymity. Where others looked
for a disconnection between authentication and secrecy, Chaum “sought to unlink
authentication  from  identification  and  developed  a  series  of  cryptographic
techniques whereby participants could perform information exchange protocols
with surprising properties” (Blanchette 2012, 59). This led to the creation of “blind
signatures”, a technique that enhanced privacy in public-key cryptography created
by Chaum at the beginning of the 80s (Chaum 1983). Blind signatures enabled the
production of verifiable signatures resistant to tracing by the original issuer, but
keeping  the  transactional  and  proof  verification characteristics.  Chaum started
Digicash  in  1990,  a  company  to  develop  his  early  ideas  (going  back  to  the
beginning  of  the  80s  (Greenberg  2012)  on  electronic  money.  The  first
implementation  of  his  blind  signature  technology  was  ‘e-cash’,  a  smart  card
originally  intended to provide easiness and security to the Dutch toll  payment
system. However, as a company, Digicash stalled. According to Eduard de Jong,
security  expert  and  cryptographer  who  worked  with  Chaum  until  1992,  the
mathematical genius of Chaum did not match his marketing abilities and he failed
to position the technology in the market  (de Jong, Tkacz, and Velasco González
2015).  Even  though  Digicash  was  a  company  providing  a  service  and  not  an
extreme anti-state bastion, and can be considered ultimately a failed project, it
established for the first time a relationship between politics, cryptography, and
money that would eventually make it possible for Bitcoin and other projects to
come to life.
Crypto-Money
Digicash  was  perhaps  the  most  relevant  of  the  attempts  to  produce  a
cypherpunk-inspired electronic cash, but it was not the last. A year after Barlow’s
declaration  of  independence  appeared  Hashcash,  a  proof-of-work  algorithm
designed by Adam Back initially as a mail anti-spam tool, but which will become
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later an important part for the production of digital cash. Back's connection with
the Cypherpunks ideals is not exactly surreptitious: his webpage, subtitled with
the unequivocal motto “Cypherpunks distributed data haven” (Back n.d.), still has
an archive of the Wikipedia entries on Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin’s creator, and
links to the cypherpunks mailing list and the personal webpages of Nick Szabo,
Wei Dai and Hal Finney, all inventors of digital money systems. The role of Adam
Back  in  the  generation  of  Bitcoin  is  significant.  The  website  weusecoins.com
emphasizes Back’s  figure on its  ‘Who is who in Bitcoin’  section,35 and Bitcoin's
white paper (Nakamoto 2008b) recognized Hashcash as the basis for its proof-of-
work  to  implement  the  decentralized  timestamp peer-to-peer  revision  system.
Back is in fact one of the few references used by Nakamoto. Although envisioned
“as a mechanism to throttle systematic abuse of un-metered internet resources
such as email, and anonymous remailers” (Back 2002), and not exactly as digital
cash, hashcash marks the beginning of  a short  trajectory of  crypto-money, the
hotbed from which Bitcoin would eventually emerge. This trajectory is populated
with successive attempts to create versions of digital cash systems: Adam Back’s
hashcash, Wei Dai’s b-money, Nick Szabo’s Bitgold, Hal Finney’s RPoW, and finally
Nakamoto’s Bitcoin.
Wei Dai is another of the scarce references in Nakamoto's original paper:
he recognized b-money as a solution for the controlled decentralization of  the
transactions by publicly broadcasting them. Dai projected b-money in 1998, in the
cypherpunks mailing list, as a currency system based on hashcash (DuPont n.d.).
His  system  also  generated  coins  by  solving  computational  problems  with  the
condition that these had neither practical  nor intellectual particular value. The
transfers  functioned  over  a  hypothetical  'untraceable  network'  where  an
anonymous user broadcasted a message declaring to give a certain amount of
money to  another.  Then  every  node on the  network  updated  its  database by
adding up and subtracting the quantity for each corresponding user (Dai 1998). In
abstract, this functions as the actual Bitcoin network, since every node retains the
whole blockchain and every  transaction is  publicly  announced.  Each node also
sends the new block's hashes (with their transactions) list to its neighbours, and
each node requests items they lack off from one another. Both systems also share
the possibility for new users to use public information to synchronize with existing
35  He plays a significant role in the blockchain ecosystem up to this date, his role as co-
founder of Blockstream is mentioned in Chapter Five.
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nodes. But the b-money solution to deal with dishonest nodes was far from the
technical elegance of the Bitcoin network. Dai proposed that each node should
make a money deposit in a special account as a warrant in case of misconduct.
This solution, compared with the automation that blockchains brought, was still
too  dependent  on  the  centralization  and  human-management  that  the
cypherpunk culture was trying to distance itself from.
Also in  1998 Nick  Szabo proposed Bitgold.  From that  year  to  2005 he
developed his own decentralized currency, which was in many ways an important
precursor for Bitcoin. It  shared the idea of a chain and timestamped proofs of
work,  but  instead  of  a  one-way  channel,  it  used  benchmark  functions:  the
resulting string of bits acted as a proof-of-work and was added to a public registry
(Szabo  2005).  This  measure  allowed  some  public  control  over  the  money
generated, and therefore, the maintenance of its value. The reason for developing
the system is then explained by Szabo's strong concern on the constant danger of
inflation in fiat money economy systems (Szabo 2002). Szabo met Dai in a mailing
list called libtech in 1998. According to Szabo the only people interested in these
kinds of currencies, who overlapped 'cryptography experts and libertarians', were
Dai, Finney, eventually Nakamoto, and himself (Szabo 2011). The year 1998 was
the  golden  moment  of  the  crypto-money  trajectory  (at  least  regarding  the
availability  of  proposals).  Besides b-money and bitgold,  in this  year Hal  Finney
proposed the Reusable Proof of Work System (RPOW) with the goal of creating
tokens of digital money, whose value was underpinned by computer resources. His
RPOW system was designed to rapidly validate tokens that had taken long time to
compute, with the addition of  a sequential reuse (Finney n.d.).  Finney worked
previously with Phil Zimmerman in the first stages of PGP at the beginning of the
90’s. In the same period, he met and kept up a correspondence both with Dai and
Szabo (Finney 2013), both indirect co-designers of Bitcoin. He also received the
first Bitcoin transaction, directly from Nakamoto, and mined block number 70 of
the Blockchain. According to Szabo, at the earliest phases of Bitcoin, Finney was
the only one ‘motivated enough to actually  implement such a scheme’ (Szabo
2011).
It is crucial to acknowledge that many of the gears tools have been used,
and still  are,  continually and for many ends.  Some of them require the others
-conceptually or in practice- to function, and are part of the daily invisible set of
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tools that enable loading a secure webpage, signing into our Facebook accounts,
or  paying  wirelessly  with  a  debit  card.  None  of  these  pieces  is  by  itself
quintessential  for  the particular  function of  Bitcoin.  SHA-25636,  for  example,  is
‘essential’  to  generate  secure  hashes,  but  not  for  making  blockchain-enabled
distributed token transactions, and in fact some altcoins replace it with alternative
algorithms.  There is,  moreover,  a  chain  of  unsuccessful  or  experimental  digital
currencies  (Mondex,  Dancoin,  Geldkarte,  Chipknip,  n-count,  etc.)  whose
implementations date at least from 1992 to the present (de Jong 2014). The latter
were more business oriented experiments than expressions of  a political ideal,
often developed with government aid and thus quite dissimilar to the cypherpunk
inspired crypto-currencies.
The influence that each one of these systems early currency systems had
on later ones varies, and so too does their adherence to the cypherpunk's political
ideals  (mentioned  earlier).  There  are  also  a  number  of  other  trajectories  and
events that feed into the appearance of Bitcoin, like a growing interest in digital
payment  systems  of  all  kinds;  the  global  financialcrisis  of  2008  and  the  bank
bailouts that followed; a DIY culture that grew parallel with digital technologies;
the availability and systematization of free/open/libre software and systems; and
the decreasing costs of chips and other computational devices, just to name a few.
What the former gears —RPoW, bitgold, PGP, etc— describe is not so much the
instrumental conditions of possibility of Bitcoin, as the virtual environment —the
techno-political  assemblage—  that  settled  to  provide  a  proper  setting  for  the
emergence of  the various  blockchain  manifestations.  A secure communications
trajectory,  which  provided  affordable  and  relatively  public  cryptographic
technology, followed by a manifesto’s trajectory, which overlapped the previous
trajectory  to  associate  these  tools  with  political  directives,  anticipated  the
moment where the former embodied the possibility of a politically charged digital
money in the crypto-money trajectory. These lineages illuminate, by means of pre-
historical  research,  the  occurrence  of  Bitcoin  as  a  cryptographically-enabled
economic unit, not due to a causality of events directed to its creation, but due to
the formation of fitting conditions. They help to establish what is ‘expressible’ —
discursively and in practice— in written and code form. 
36  SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm) family algorithms were suggested around the same time
of the Cypherpunks Manifesto. But being standards designed by the NSA for secure
communications, the technology did not participate much on the political disputes of
the time. Bitcoin uses SHA-2, published in 2001.
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Bitcoin Emergence and Libertarian Politics
After Bitgold, the crypto-money trajectory remained ‘silent’ for ten years.
Parallel to the blooming of digital payment and digital cash systems, inaugurated
by digicash and with its own history of successful integrations and failures, quiet
discussions on how to deal  with obstacles  for  a  non-centralized crypto money
scheme developed mainly in mailing lists. Improvements to Back, Dai and Szabo’s
systems  were  made  one  step  at  a  time.  It  was  not  until  2008  that  Satoshi
Nakamoto, in the form of an academic paper, detailed the protocol for his system
to avoid double-spending, as well as the first version of the code to implement
such protocol. The political stance of Bitcoin as a device or of Nakamoto as its
creator,  was  not  explicit.  While  he  acknowledges  the  importance  of  former
attempts and the usage of previous cryptographic gears, the explicit espousal of a
libertarian political position, for example, is not forthcoming in his white paper
(Nakamoto 2008).
This is reflected in the early literature surrounding the new payment system.
For Karlstrøm, Nakamoto echoed the sentiments of the libertarian community, but
was never as explicit as other actors, like May: “Nakamoto has stated that ‘It’s very
attractive to the libertarian viewpoint if we can explain it properly’, and Wei Dai
states it even more bluntly: ‘I hope this is a step toward making crypto-anarchy a
practical  as  well  as  theoretical  possibility’”  (Karlstrøm  2014,  7).  While  Bitcoin
correlated  with  the  cypherpunks  ideals,  Nakamoto  never  acknowledged  this
position.  Barok  suggests  that  the  appeal  for  libertarians  was  thus  more  of  a
marketing manoeuvre: 
it  can  be  considered  a  brainchild  of  cypherpunk  core  values:
importance of anonymity, independence from the central authority,
and  freedom  through  free  software.  Yet  it  is  unclear  whether
Nakamoto was on the Cypherpunks list or familiar with it. He did not
adhere to the ideology of free market anarchist society in any of his
messages  posted  between  November  2008  and  December  2010
(Barok 2011, 5–6).
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More  passionate,  yet  unfounded,  opinions  depict  the  ghostly  figure  of
Nakamoto as a self-declared political banner in the fight against the state: “Satoshi
emerges from the darkness of the digital underground to lead the masses in a
brave new world against the banks, oligarchs and multinationals; all who benefit
from  our  ignorance  about  the  nature  of  money,  our  powerlessness  over
entrenched state monopolies and our obedience to the collusion of government
and big-business.” (Boase 2013). 
Bitcoin’s white paper, however, holds no explicit political stand or claim. It
deals  with  a  mere  practical  problem  of  double  spend,  unresolved  by  former
electronic cash designs. The problem the Bitcoin paper specifically deals with is
double spending, that is, the possibility for someone to use the same 'coin' to
make  two  different  payments  (uniqueness,  as  copyright  debates  know,  is  a
‘troublesome’ notion in the world of digital production. It is explicitly addressed to
the system of Internet commerce, which for most purposes functions well enough
and, when dealing with transaction fees, its author explicitly acknowledges that
the system is “based on open market competition”. But the real concern is one
inherited from the long list of renegade cryptographers: “While the system works
well enough for most transactions, it still suffers from the inherent weaknesses of
the  trust  based  model”  (Nakamoto  2008b,  1).  Even  if  there  is  no  political
reasoning  in  the  paper,  there  is  an  implicit  critique  of  the   centralized
management of money by banks: “The problem with this solution is that the fate
of the entire money system depends on the company running the mint, with every
transaction having to go through them, just like a bank” (Nakamoto 2008b, 2). The
previous sentence expresses the distrust in banks (or companies) as centralized
bottlenecks,  that  is,  doubts are  cast  on the monopoly  of  transactions due the
capacity of the institutions. This concern is shared with the cypherpunks, since
both parts harshly question the capability  and intentions of  the institutions to
operate the transactions. 
Nakamoto solution against double spending was more elegant, from the
point  of  view  of  code,  than  its  crypto-money  predecessors:  its  peer-to-peer
network uses a unique proof-of-work chain to record and publicly broadcast all
hashed  transactions,  which  makes  it  computationally  infeasible  to  act  as  a
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“dishonest”37 node. Even in the unlikely case that a 'bad guy' overpowered the
network, such a person could only, by design, take back money he or she already
spent.  But  then  again,  the  design's  rationale  is  not  entirely  technical  and
sometimes it  resorts to a Kantian reasoning too: “with that kind of computing
power, it is wiser to generate more bitcoins and irrational to scheme any other
fraud or depreciate the network” (Nakamoto 2008a).  There is an archetypically
liberal reliance on the rationality of the subject and its freedom of action, even the
problem of double spending is  understood more as a practical  issue than as a
moral  one.  The  transactions  are  either  valid  or  invalid,  and  the  pinpoint  of  a
double spender does not have the intention of sounding “the alarm and catch the
cheater. We merely adjudicate which one of the spends is valid (...) There is no
reliance on identifying anyone (…) The credential that establishes someone as real
is  the ability  to  supply CPU power.”  (Nakamoto 2008a).  Subjectivity within the
design  of  the  cryptocurrency  is  inherently  understood  in  the  same  terms  of
freedom of anonymity that its cypherpunks gears. Dai's text on b-money opens up
expressing its 'fascination' with May's crypto anarchist  ideas and he eloquently
proceeds to say that within this particular cryptography realm “the government is
not  temporarily  destroyed  but  permanently  forbidden  and  permanently
unnecessary (...) violence is impossible because its participants cannot be linked to
their true names or physical locations” (Dai 1998). 
Unlike extreme techno-solutionist positions, such as the idea that violence
may be simply eradicated by introducing an anonymity variable within a network,
Nakamoto maintains a more reserved position.  When faced with the assertion
that one cannot use cryptography to solve political problems he stoically answers:
“Yes, but we can win a major battle in the arms race and gain a new territory of
freedom  for  several  years”  (Nakamoto  2008a).  Recent  works  such  as  David
Golumbia’s  The Politics of Bitcoin (2016) make a sound case for the influence of
the libertarian ideology that surrounded Bitcoin’s design. But even if the political
agenda  of  Nakamoto  remains  partially  uncertain  (as  he  left  few  traces,  and
remains unidentified as this text is  being written),  its government-emancipated
mode of  production and exchange nicely correlates  with the market  flexibility,
code-enabled  trust,  privacy  requirements,  and  state  independence  so  highly
valued by the cypherpunk and libertarian-alike community.  And the affordance
37  Nakamoto expresses discontent with this  term, probably because its  strong moral
semantics (Nakamoto 2008a).
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brought  by  its  design,  i.e.  the  capacity  to  detach  control  of  exchanges  of
circulation from the centralized figure of the state, resonated not only with the
libertarian yearnings but also with any party interested in increasing fluidity in the
market context. Karlstrøm states that Bitcoin is “at its core an attempt to expand
the  purview  of  markets  through  destabilizing  universally  adopted  state
monopolies on the production and verification of currency” (Karlstrøm 2014, 2). 
For  Sybille  Krämer  (2015)  money  plays  the  role  of  a  state-controlled
medium, and not only a symbol or embodiment of a social institution. For her,
money acts as the abstraction of ownership that can be transmitted. Money is a
medium between people,  and  does  belong to  a  different  category  than other
goods,  as  its  value  is  detached  from  any  materiality,  it  “embodies  the
disembodiment of value, it desubstantializes values. It is the objectification of an
abstraction” (Krämer 2015, 113)). The idea of an objectified placeholder of value
can  be  applied,  following  Krämer,  to  a  symbolic  value  (e.g.  the  value  of  a
commodity). However, the body that holds (by desubstantiation) the immaterial
property must be nevertheless validated by a central entity. According to Krämer,
the very fact that people are unable to produce or consume money without a
central institution to validates its otherwise abstract value, shows the ‘otherness’
of money in relation to other goods. Bitcoin, as a currency-embodied blockchain
phenomenon, allows the production of desubstanialized value without the figure
of the state. According to Bjerg (2016), Bitcoin does not rely on the trust in the
central authority of the state, because this kind of post-fiat money places its value
in the trust of the community. On the contrary, I have argued in the first chapter of
this  research for  the existence of  a  void  of  authority  that  is  not  filled by  any
particular set of players, and against the idea of the community as a main provider
of value. Instead, the new capacity for distributed digital production, in the same
sense  as  law  and  execution  were  previously  developed,  appends  to  the
overwhelming domination of code, to “the conditions of possibility that software
establishes” (Fuller 2008, 2).
The production process of blockchains is the essential novelty brought by
these  technological  devices.  Even  if  we  ignore  the  element  of  an  intentional
confrontation with the figure of the state, embodied in central banks, the system
of  distribution  through  computation  weakens  previous  authority  structures  of
control. That is, the history and emergence of Bitcoin does put into play a coercive
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relation with previous authority systems, regardless if  that was its intention by
design. What is at stake is a rearrangement of a power structure. Brett Scott has
made a similar point when he suggests (Scott 2014) that in the current economy,
banks are merely entities controlling the recordings of transaction data. Meaning
that its privileged position in the current structure of power is linked to recording
as a mean of control. Scott proposes to replace their databases and find a way for
people to control them. For him the blockchain is already a solution for the first
problem, but does not entail  an answer for the second, as he emphasizes that
digital-anonymous-decentralized-ledger  systems  are  not  by  themselves  a
guarantee of good use or social growth.
Whether  blockchain  systems  bring  a  democratization  of  control  and
production or merely relocate these elements towards a new minority of players is
neither a settled issue nor an inquiry to be fully answered by the scope of this
research.  Instead,  my  argument  in  this  chapter  is  that  blockchain  technology
enhances  the  performativity  of  code  for  the  replacement  of  previous  socio-
political institutional strongholds. Not only is it code as law, and command, i.e. as
regulator  and  executioner,  but  also  as  producer  and  transmitter  of  economic
value. The blockchain marks a transfer of authority from established institutions to
code, and the authority expressed is built into the system itself, thus control and
function overlap in the production of  digital  assets.  The trajectories I  followed
departed  from  Bitcoin’s  technical  blueprint  to  present  a  lineage  that  threads
communications and political stances present in blockchains as current cultural
phenomena. The “stuff of software” (Fuller 2008, 1), or Bitcoin’s as an assemblage
of  techniques,  is  used  as  a  springboard  to  tell  the  story  of  a  genealogy  that
established the conditions of possibility for a state-independent exchange artefact.
This research explains the emergence of a digital object (Bitcoin)38 by dissecting its
pieces  and  tracing  their  lineages,  but  it  also  expands  into  the  further
performativity of code that is expressed in other instantiations. Its prehistory is
generative of a diversity  of techno-political artefacts (e.g.  Ethereum and newer
blockchains) expressing the metaphor of the blockchain. This metaphor is fuelled
by  discernible  historical  claims  —peer  to  peer  circulation,  distributed
mathematical verification, and anonymous usage— that reconfigure code as law,
command, execution, and production.
38  Bitcoin’s evolution will  be further discussed in Chapter Five, through observing its
governance and design.
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Chapter 4: The Space of the Bitcoin Network
This chapter explores the spatial and location characteristics of the Bitcoin
blockchain. It inquires as to where the blockchain is  performed, and provides an
answer that draws upon the technical characteristics of the blockchain network.
Through an exploration of the empirical operation of the network, I  open up a
broader  discussion  regarding  the  position  of  blockchains  among  new  political
geographies.  I  pay  particular  attention  to  the  repositioning  of  the  concept  of
territory, from a technology of sovereign power in the form of horizontal division
of  the  space,  to  a  technology  of  sovereign  power  in  the  form  of  flexible  but
controlled layers or stacks (Bratton 2016). The relation with the figures of state
and with technology corporations, like in the former chapters, plays a significant
role  to  understanding  the  specific  performance  of  public  blockchains,  both  as
antagonists and allies.
The chapter opens with a brief overview of the internet infrastructure and
its geographic issues. It is relevant to offer a brief context of the geopolitics of the
internet, because a) blockchains are networks underpinned by the structure of the
former, and b) they intend to mend privacy issues opened by the geolocalisation
of this infrastructure. Then, a technical  overview of the network distribution is
offered: this consists in the use of technical tools to provide an overview of its
nodes.  This  section  shows  the  relevance  of  spatial  analysis,  as  it  shows  how
territorial  constraints  influence  the  production  and  transference  of  bitcoins,
despite the attempts of the system towards full distribution. The analysis of the
network  shows that  the  network  is  decentralized  but  concentrated,  and  thus,
materially locatable. This approach ultimately shows two different kind of “limits”:
on  the  one  hand,  the  network  has  its  own  concentrations  and  these
concentrations are partially subjected to the traditional conceptions of territory
and  quit  specific  nations.  On  the  other  hand,  the  partial  information  that  is
possible to obtain through a territorial framework is limited, and thus, a different
political geography is  required to make sense of blockchains as a technological
phenomenon.
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Thus, I  explore two approaches to think the relation of blockchain as a
technical  phenomenon  with  other  territorial  arrangements.  I  propose  that
blockchains diminish the relevance of earth topographies, but maintain a relation
with geographically-demarcated states through standardisation processes, e.g. the
formal  agreement to  use bitcoins to pay for  services.  I  also note that another
characteristic of blockchains are to expropriate the state functions of production
and  transmission  of  assets,  thus  partially  competing  with  geographical  states.
These two relations stress the importance of a relation with state-nations, but also
the non-essential role these play in blockchains development. I argue that in this
technology, a claim for space, state competition, and the disappearance of the
territory as a technology of power (Elden 2013) is embedded in the promise of
frictionless circulation of assets. I  end the chapter with the idea that the Stack
(Bratton 2016) offers a better framework to think about the space generated and
fulfilled with blockchains. The Stack is relevant as a geopolitical framework for the
blockchain, as it allows the re-configuration of a post-territorial power structure,
based on the internet as infrastructure, but that generates its own subjects and
authority  models.  It  interacts  with  the  established  state  geographies  and
disciplinary models, but it is only partially subjected to it, and in doing so builds a
distinct  political  geography  with  its  own  models  (allegedly  sovereign)  of
“computational” authority.
The overarching narrative of  the utopia along this  chapter exploits  the
most direct meaning of the word, based on its etymology: a no-place, or a place
that is no-where. While the parts of the Blockchain (like the physical nodes that
make  up  its  network)  can  be  located  with  some  degree  of  specificity,  a
geographical or territorial approach does not properly describe the extension of
the  Blockchain.  The  object  is  itself  paradoxical:  it  is  neither  universal  nor
immaterial, which means it can be located, but the way it performs its spatiality is
no-where in particular. This utopic mode is more visible when contrasted with the
territoriality  performed  by  traditional  political  definitions  of  the  state,  and
particularly  relevant  within  the  discussion  of  internet-enabled  infrastructures
fuelled  by  a  rhetoric  that  imagines  emancipation  from  territorially-based
authorities.
99
4.1 Cyberspace and Territory as a Technology of Power
The notion of territory and political delimitations are strongly interwoven.
Modern  nations  are  limited  by  territorial  borders  and  primarily  identified  as
geographical  units.  Borders in the form of  natural  formations such as rivers or
mountains,  human-made  constructions  such  as  walls,  and  even  invisible  lines
mark the formal limits of the res extensa of political clusters. Our current notion of
territory is settled with modernity and the formation of the nation-state, however,
geographical  delimitations  have  a  long  history  of  ties  with  powerful  political
structures  (Elden  2016).  The  early  Roman  Empire  had  less  clear  notions  of  a
frontier,  in  part  because  it  was  thought  as  an  ever-expanding  imperial  power
without limit, (imperium sine fine),  growing throughout the whole world (orbis
terrarum).  Its “frontier consciousness” (Graham 2006) developed gradually  and
not only due to a topography-based military expansion. The perception of space
was  formed  by  a  complex  gathering  of  economy,  strategy,  defence  and
administration  processes.  The  limes,  or  borders,  were  seen  as  administrative
jurisdictions  in  the  fourth  century  (Isaac  1988)  than  as  a  hard  limit  of  the
boundaries  of  empire  (imperii  fines).  According  to  Graham  (2006),  what  was
earlier thought as a division of regions and people, evolved from the third to the
fifth century to an idea of a territorial frontier. 
The separation of the earth, following these readings, was tied more to a
notion of authority related to the control of goods and people, than a sovereign
demand  upon  land.  Stuart  Elden  argues  that  the  notion  of  territory  as  a
sovereignty  technology  was  fundamentally  developed  by  late  Western  politics
(Elden 2013). Elden focuses on historical political writings regarding law, land, and
empire to show that authoritarian and sovereign claims were made upon land and
people but not on the full  modern notion of territory as the legal control of a
delimited space. It is not until Leibniz's definition of the sovereign as he who is
'master of  his  territory'  (Elden 2013,  320–21) that the territorial  notion of  the
control of space is produced. Elden's interpretation adds a genealogical approach
to previous seminal works that understand territory as a social construct aiming to
influence people, relationships or other phenomena via the control of space (Sack
1986). Benjamin Bratton (2016) pinpoints the modern design of territorial nation-
state  in  relation of  jurisdiction at  the 1648 Peace Treaty  of  Westphalia,  which
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ended the Thirty Years War. The Peace of Westphalia was based on an agreement
of co-existing legality in between states, a shared European political order based
on territorial sovereignty. For Bratton, this agreement inaugurates a global design
of geopolitics based on planar geography, the result of a process of “separating
and containing sovereign domains as discrete adjacent units  among a line and
horizontal  surface”  (Bratton  2016,  5).  Following  this  line  of  thought,  I  will
understand territory primarily as a technology of power. This may be related to a
modern  notion  of  sovereignty  through  control  of  land,  but  also  to  older
understandings of administration and control of topographical spaces. 
Understanding  territory  as  a  technology  of  power  opens  interesting
questions  on the territorial  characteristics  of  technologies  arguably,  apparently
with a good degree of success, are defiant of territorial constriction. The bitcoin
network  is  a  contemporary  example  of  this,  but  it  is  certainly  not  the  first.
Internet, the network on which Bitcoin relies, has a complicated history with space
or, better said, with the idea of a lack of it. I’ll offer a brief commentary on how
the idea of the internet as a no-place, or as a space unreachable, got entrenched
with traditional state geographies. This internet commentary is relevant because
of two reasons: first, the bitcoin network, like many other protocols and platforms,
is built  on the basic infrastructure of the internet. It  works over it,  and thus is
affected by both its affordances and shortcomings. Second, as much as it is based
on the internet, it is also an attempt to go beyond it. Not only because it offers the
novelty of private digital assets on distributed networks, as I have argued in the
first chapter, but also because blockchains can be read as a reaction to the control
the internet yielded to traditional regulation. As I argued in the previous chapter,
Bitcoin is the partial manifestation of an ideology that sought independence from
centralised  state  controls.  And  while  the  internet  infrastructure  was  always
developed  and  controlled  by  national  authorities  (the  US  in  particular),  the
autarchic ideals  that it  sprouted during its early mediatisation, resurged in the
goals  of  distributed  ledgers.  To  different  extents  in  each  embodiment,
decentralisation, privacy, anonymity, and frictionless exchange were kept as main
goals  in  most  blockchain  phenomena.  From a  territorial  point  of  view,  as  the
internet  increasingly  resembled  an  outline  of  a  Mercator  political  geography,
blockchains tried to reclaim this alternative,  internet-derived idea of space (Toor
2013).
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Cyberbalkanization
The notion of 'cyberspace' as a non-defined or borderless region outside
traditional  ideas  of  land,  state  and  regulatory  institutions  was  a  primordial
characteristic  of  the  Internet  of  the  90s,  both  for  their  savvy  insurrectionists
(Barlow 1996) and for the 'extramedial' (Chun 2008) representation of the then
confused newcomers. The “virtual nonplace”, defined by Wendy Chun as “a place
in which things happened, in which users’ actions separated from their bodies,
and in which local standards became impossible to determine. It thus freed users
from  their  bodies  and  their  locations”  (Chun  2008,  37–38).  If  understood  as
infrastructure (hardware and protocols), Chun considers it unmappable. However,
if understood as high-level script languages, it is understood as  spaceless, since
these languages (e.g. HTML) aggregate objects without a continuity in space (see
Manovich  2001).  To  better  understand  (and  further  complicate)  the  notion of
cyberspace, Chun contrasts “place” and “space”. While the former designates a
finite location, the latter is more of an interval. Based on their etymologies (Place,
platea: broad way; Space, spatium: period), Chun argues that place is more related
to  notions  of  civilization  —of  territory,  as  discussed  before—,  and  space to
freedom or unconquered possibilities. She strengthens these conceptions with the
aid of Michel de Certeau’s, who thought of place as a stable relation, and of space
as those relations in action. The latter is an experienced map, a route. Cyberspace,
Chun  argues,  loses  both  notions:  place  loses  its  stability,  websites  move  and
disappear,  or  are  modified  depending  on  the  visitor.  Cyberspace  is  also  not
routable in the same way that space is: we never really navigate the internet, but
an interface that crosses through it. However, even if we do not navigate packets
of information in the way routers do, we do reformulate our relation with space
within cyberspace: “By moving from URL to URL, we cut the scenery or space
between fixed locations, while at the same time experiencing this ‘gap’ as an often
unbearable space of time, in which we decipher the page that emerges bit by bit
on the screen” (Chun 2008, 47–48).
There is  an obvious reformulation of  space after  the internet.  But  the
popular notions of what was enabled by it were commonly less sophisticated than
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Chun’s  interpretation.  As  mentioned  in  Chapter  One,  the  utopian  tinge  of
cyberspace may be seen as a preservation of the sentiments of political utopias
left by communist ideals (Lessig 2006), even though these are steered towards
quite different economic models. Likewise, the utopian element of cyberspace as a
no-place that was popularized through the 90s and early 2000s resembled more
the “freedom” discourses of the internet manifestos. Not so much as a cognitive
or  ontological  restructuring  process  of  our  notions  of  space,  but  a  claim  for
unconquered  territories,  and  thus  as  new  frontiers  carrying  the  promise  of  a
different  political  and  regulatory  sphere,  untouched  by  previous  regimes’
materiality and law. And while today most of our everyday interaction with the
digital is highly centralised and locatable by default (e.g. Amazon data centres, and
geolocation as a predominant characteristic of most internet services) a rhetoric
associated  with  the  digital  as  immaterial  no-place  remains,  even  if  somewhat
diminished. Extramedially, the 'virtual' and the 'cyber' as terms synonymous with
the no-space debris endure, as one can confirm with the occasional newscaster or
many informal talks. However, the 'end of the virtual' (Rogers 2009) has been sang
from  several  fronts  within  the  academia.  Different  methodologies  have  been
developed  to  map  a  notion  of  space  within  the  Internet,  intelligible  to  social
sciences point of view. And it has been partly because of these mappings that
some  of  the  immateriality  and  spacelessness  has  been  debunked,  or  rather,
reformulated.
Rogers  (2012)  identifies  three  stages  of  the  Internet  with  their  own
political  mapping:  the  early  non-localised  hyperspace,  the  spheres,  and  the
networks. Hyperspace is hardly concerned with the territory but with navigation
(in  the  early  stage  of  virtual  versus  real  opposition  there  is  'no  place'  for  a
territorial notion typically associated with land). Notions of space in the hyperlink
era  are  made  via  possibilities  of  movement.  The  user  clicking  a  link  was  as
concerned of the in-between area of his point of departure and arrival as Han Solo
pressing the hyperspace button on the Millennium Falcon (Lucas 1978). Methods
for  identifying  the  politics  of  the  web  followed  the  links  too:  these  were
understood as acts of association, as Rogers argues. Organisation started tracing
the idea of secular spaces on a former endless cyberspace. Politics of inclusion and
exclusion were identified with the first attempts of hierarchy classification made
by search engines and directories, like Yahoo and Altavista, to mark sites authority
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and reputation. Interesting cracks on the web’s splintered surface were generated
as a response to engines and directories in the form of blogs. By the decade of
2000 the Internet is understood extramedially and in non-empirical studies as a
space  of  debates  with  a  'deliberate  democratic  spirit',  and  an  acknowledged
separation of interests and conversations: the blogosphere, the web sphere, and
the news sphere. However, this separation was much more marked by a lack of
debate (Dean 2002) and the creation of unrelated regions of opinion by the users'
tendency  to  visit  and  encourage  blogs,  chats  and  forums  with  their  own
ideologies. This has been called cyberbalkanization (Sunstein 2009) and, perhaps
more  accurately  political  homophily (Ackland  and  Shorish  2014)  since  I  am
reluctant to identify it as a “natively digital” phenomenon.39 This endures in one
way or another, augmented today by what is popularly known as 'filter bubbles'
(Pariser  2011),  less  related  to  human  political  contingencies  and  more  to
algorithmic-enabled user behaviour control aimed for web markets (Gerlitz and
Helmond 2013).
Parallel  to  Internet's  regionalisation  of  ideologies,  a  more  traditional
territorialisation enabled by technical means and standards was also developed:
users and contents were separated by country codes. Communication between
source and destination, client and server, is now played by regionalised rules: a
French user may be unable to stream a song of a Russian region in the same way
that a Chinese user may not be enabled to read news from other countries. This
second  kind  of  balkanization,  also  called  cybersegmentation (Sassen  2002),
developed in the last decade mainly due to two reasons: language and business
(Goldsmith and Wu 2008). Being a global phenomenon, the Internet is populated
by  a  significant  proportion  of  non-English  speaking  users  (2/3  in  2005).  Thus,
websites intent to address local needs, including the language, in order to offer a
product, i.e., 'Youtube Philippines' has a slightly different offering than 'Youtube
Canada', and its advertisement and popular videos are focused locally. The same
applies to search engines and social networks. A mix between legal considerations
per  country,  language  zones  and  business  as  usual  has  shaped  a  quite
territorialized contemporary Internet. Recently, a third reason forced once again a
visible collision of the Internet and the nation. In 2013, Dilma Rousseff, president
39 Subsequent studies consider it  a natural effect of one or another popular ideology
leveraging on the network (Ackland and Shorish, 2009). For a compendium of studies
of political homophiliy on the Internet see (Maeyer, 2013).
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of Brazil, ordered to strengthen her country's online independence as a response
to  leaks  proving  that  the  National  Security  Agency  (NSA)  had  intercepted  her
personal communications, the state-owned Petrobras oil company's network and
Brazilians users of Google, Facebook and other U.S. companies (Brooks and Bajak
2013).  President Rousseff proposal does not ban users willing to reach content
outside of the country (as the case of China's firewall), but to store locally its data
and to construct a direct underwater optic cable to Europe in order to avoid traffic
necessarily going through U.S. servers.  Territorialization due to surveillance has
not alerted just Brazil; Germany is also trying to keep its citizens Internet and e-
mail  transmission  constrained  within  its  own  landlines  (Birnbaum  2013).
Balkanization of the Internet works on different levels and for different reasons,
but in a lot of cases responds to the nation-state's concerns on the “ideological
control over the circulation of both its citizens and their capital in diaspora” (Barry
2001).  President  Jiang  Zemin  justification  for  the  harshly  criticised  Chinese
censorship grounds explicitly on the protection of their citizens: “From beginning
to end, we must be vigilant against infiltration, subversive activities, and separatist
activities of international and domestic hostile forces” (BBC 1998). This discourse
is not limited to typically firewalled countries, as Cameron discourse to justify the
£800 million investment on intelligence and surveillance to avoid cyber-attacks,
among other 'challenges of today', reveals: “The enemy may be seen or unseen.
So, as the Strategic  Defence and Security Review in 2010 made clear,  it  is  not
massed tanks on the European mainland we need, but the latest in cyber warfare,
unmanned aircraft technology and Special Forces capability (…) the plain fact is
that in the 21st  century,  you cannot defend the realm from the white cliffs of
Dover” (Cameron 2014). There is clearly a huge difference between the UK and
China policies on censoring networks. The latter has outspokenly enabled severe
state controls  for some decades,  to the point  that it  is reasonable to consider
China's digital space not so much a 'censored' Internet, but only a different and
partly separate network altogether (Goldsmith and Wu 2008, chap. 6). An Internet
on  its  own  kind,  with  a  parallel  development  and  its  own  particular  kind  of
spheres. But even considering this divergence, it is important to stress the globally
spread similarities on the defensive discourse that justifies increasing degrees of
digital control.
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Chun  identifies  the  most  idyllic  moment  of  the  Internet  before  its
privatisation, when it was mostly in control of the US government —not without
irony, considering the historical antagonism towards state shown in the manifestos
— a  period  when “commerce  was  forbidden  and  TCP/IP  developed with  little
regard for ‘security,’ since the ‘community’ of users was small and select (...) The
disappearance  of  publicly  owned,  publicly  accessible  spaces  (where  publicly
owned means state owned) and the concurrent emergence of publicly accessible,
privately  owned  spaces  has  driven  the  transformation  of  public/private  to
open/closed” (Chun 2008, 38). The emergence and rapid growth of digitally native
corporations (e.g.  Google, Apple, Amazon, Facebook) changed the landscape of
the internet ecosystem, making most of our spatial interaction in it  crossed by
private platforms. Not only the circulation of information is dependent on private
telecommunication players (such as Network and Internet Service Providers, like
Virgin  or  Verizon),  but  the  interfaces  for  this  infrastructure  are  exponentially
centralised by private corporations.  As an example, three of  the five the most
downloaded apps of the Apple store during 2016 (Eadicicco n.d.) are owned by
the same company:  Messenger,  Instagram, and Facebook (being  Snapchat  and
Pokemon Go the other two). If one considers that Facebook also owns Whatsapp,
the  most  popular  messaging  service  outside  China  with  900  million  users(Sun
2017), and the fact that its main platform reportedly gathers over 2 billion users
(Welch 2017), this corporation alone centralises a great part of the day to day
internet traffic.
Geolocalisation plays a significant role for the enhancement of its services
and the accumulation of data. Not only for social media giants, practically all new
internet  services  exploit  the localization of  the users.  Not  only  as  a necessary
strategy for the basic function of the services (e.g.  Tinder or Uber as location-
based apps), but as exploitable data for analysis or profitable asset (e.g. Snapchat
does not require geolocalization to operate, but its disclosure is a condition to use
the face filters, one of the characteristics that made the service so popular). In this
reading, language, ideology, market, and international security all play their part in
the fragmentation of the web.40 Some of these elements, like security and free
markets, resonate with many of the discourses on Bitcoin's emergence discussed
in  the  first  chapter.  The  actions  and  reactions  of  cyberbalkanization  of  the
40 Unlike Wu and Goldsmith, I do not consider language as an account for regionalisation
since it is, at least in these examples, underpinned to marketing ends. 
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cyberspace are  a continuum of  the struggles  depicted in  the last  chapter,  and
show the evolution of internal contradictions of the libertarian ideals in action.
The new world utopia, the vision of an Internet unreachable and unchartable for
more than its  self-declared regulations (see Chapter  Three),  generated its  own
forms of regionalisation for the sake of business and market fluidity: the Initial
Public  Offerings  (IPO)  of  Facebook,  Google  and  Snap  Inc.  generated  a  lot  of
anticipation by merging the platform business model based on exploitation of data
with more classical Wall Street-style public investments. The contradiction is that
the  business  model  of  the  modern  internet  is  based  on  surveillance.  Perhaps
unforeseen by the internet manifestos sentiment, their claim for anti-surveillance
clashed with the profitability of platform markets. 
It is in this state of affairs that the Bitcoin network appears, carrying the
proposition of a decentralised and frictionless digital exchange, yet also reviving
the  anonymity  and  non-spatial  ambitions  of  the  utopian  internet  moment.
Proposed as a state-independent open protocol, the networks enabled by public
blockchains have the capacity to theoretically operate outside of any territorial
jurisdiction,  and  as  a  community-driven  project,  thus  also  independently  of
corporation-alike  institutions.  Furthermore,  besides  their  non-territorial
capabilities, the blockchains revitalised the promise of exchange communications
working in parallel to complete or partial user privacy. However, as I will show in
the  following  sections,  the  Bitcoin  network  replicates  and  renews  internet
geographical issues, but at the same time participates in novel understandings of
the digital space. 
4.2 The Bitcoin Network
While internet standardisations eventually signalled territorial-state marks
(e.g. the .mx DNS code for websites related to the Mexican territory), or effectively
produced an ecosystem tied to territorial borders, the Bitcoin network successfully
maintains a less clear geolocalisation. However, it remains a phenomenon that can
be localised, that is subject to indirect territorial regulations, and that develops
strategical relations with nation-states. I will first show how the network can be
geographically thought, by building a map of its technical workings, and sort the
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relationships  it  inevitable  generates,  both  organic  and  antagonistically,  with
territorial states. This section attempts to show, through technical means, that the
network  is  decentralised  but  concentrated,  and  thus,  materially  locatable.
However,  in  the  last  section  I  will  also  argue  that  the  kind  of  network  that
blockchains enable are part of a new stage in the history of digital networks and
notions  of  space.  And  that  while  the  Bitcoin  blockchain  generates  symbiotic
relations  with  territorially-defined states,  they  ultimately  adhere  to  a  different
political geography. 
Coinjar,  one  of  the  multiple  Bitcoin  start-ups,  moved  its  headquarters
about 17,000 km, from Melbourne to the London docklands on December 2014.
Although the main reason for the move, according to its CEO, was the 'progressive'
ambience for cryptocurrencies in the London scene and the company's intention
to become global, it was acknowledged that UK's more permissive regulation was
also  a  sounding  motive  (Spencer  2015).  Indeed,  four  months  before,  the
Australian Taxation Office (ATO) published a guide for digital currencies, in which
Bitcoin was considered a barter for users transacting less than $10,000 Australian
dollars, but a commodity for businesses or quantities above, and therefore subject
to a 10% Goods and Services tax when selling or buying it. The metamorphism of
this curious digital object is by itself interesting, since between the new tax and
Coinjar British headquarters a welfare application for the Australian government
included a clause to declare 'cyber currency' assets. The financial categorisation in
which these assets are located resembles a known Borges chimera, for it included
time  shares,  race  horses,  taxi  plates,  greyhounds,  traveler’s  cheques  and
collectables (stamps, art, wine and fishing licenses). For Jason Williams, head of
Australian chapter of the Bitcoin Foundation (Bitcoin Association of Australia) this
outcome was positive because not only the cryptocurrencies are recognised by
the government,  but also acknowledged as a form of wealth (Southurst  2014).
Leaving  aside,  for  the moment,  the peculiarities  of  emerging  cryptocurrencies'
definition and regional regulation, what I find remarkable here is the transoceanic
relocation of  a  finance  company  dedicated  to  transactions  of  a  decentralised
money 'that breaks down barriers'41. On its most basic description, “Bitcoin has no
central servers for transaction processing or storage of funds (…) Bitcoin uses a
distributed public universal database spread through a decentralised peer-to-peer
41 According  to  a  Pete  Williams  (Deloitte  Centre  for  the  Edge)  quote  that  figures  in
Coinjar's website https://www.coinjar.com/  .
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network” (‘Bitcoin Wiki’ 2015). But exactly in what sense is Bitcoin universal? For
even  if  its  universality  claims  are  a  mere  exacerbation  of  its  potential,  and
cryptocurrencies are not universal in a strong sense but distributed, how exactly
are they distributed? Where do they stack and why? Why do companies invested
in  the  promise  of  ubiquity  perceive  benefits  in  moving  from  one  territory  to
another?  Where  are  its  unbroken or  unbreakable  barriers?  And  what  kind  of
agencies mutually interact to define a frontier? For example, how does the lack of
regulation or, on the contrary, the acknowledgment by a government diffuses or
marks down cryptocurrencies' own space? 
These questions rapidly highlight three things I will address: materiality,
space,  and  limits.  Like  many  digital  devices,  a  sharp  image  of  the  object  is
unattainable; but like few of them, it presents itself as a user interactive device
(i.e.  a currency), although there is no fixed interface for it,  there is no website
containing  the  object,  the  only  token  is  a  string  of  numbers.  It  is  possible  to
manage Bitcoin transactions via an ATM, a website, or a terminal emulator, in any
case, there is no standard physical instance of it. This section clarifies the material
notion of cryptocurrencies by providing a selected overview of the infrastructure
of the Bitcoin network.  Towards it,  a map of the network, and its surrounding
material  actors  will  be  charted.  This  leads  me  to  my  second  highlight:  the
necessity to draft a space enabled by the device (or where the device comes to
being).  The  prism  for  this  approach  is  then  first  located  in  the  order  of  the
geographical;  more  specifically,  the  physical  territory  that  the  bitcoin  network
encompasses. 
Nodes and Layers: A Map of the Bitcoin Network
Part  of  what  comprises  Bitcoin  is  a  ‘dedicated  network’  where  every
transaction gets processed, validated and stored, and it is the (technical) condition
of possibility for cryptocurrencies prevalence and success. As a part of a broader
attempt to build a Bitcoin space, an approach to the technical network will show
how the network distributes in the world during a selected period. Addressing the
bitcoin network can show the materiality (the hardware) of its nodes and edges.
Since the network underpins the whole functionality of the device (in any of its
embodiments:  currency,  storage,  etc.),  to  emphasise  this  importance  of  this
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material substrate is also to debunk any representations of Bitcoin as immaterial. I
will  also  directly  question  the  discourse  of  universality  by  showing  the
geographical  specificity  of  the  network’s  machines.  The  bitcoin  network  has
previously been analysed through its transaction dynamics (Kondor et al. 2014;
Baumann and Lischke 2014) and its anonymisation limits (Biryukov, Khovratovich,
and Pustogarov 2014), but there is no geographically-driven study of which I am
aware. A geographical point of view, will allow me to show where the network is
shaped through technical mean since its function relies on the multiplicity of its
nodes. That is, at the level of the network itself.  This will  clarify where exactly
Bitcoin has an extended support. I  will  argue the Bitcoin space, via its physical
network, has clear geo-located limits and death zones, but not necessarily tied to
geopolitical stances. That is, the network has a material geopolitics, but this does
not align straightforwardly with the territorial forms of governance particular to
nation states. Departing from the idea that a decentralised network has no unique
centre or at least no starting point, I will start tracing this network from a machine
(or node in the network) where the software  —which contains the information
protocols to establish a communication with other nodes— is freshly installed. 
When the software (Bitcoin Core) runs, it looks for peers in order to ask
for a database of the rest of the nodes. The Bitcoin Core comes with a list of 'seed
nodes' to query this database. In October 2014, the software code (v.  0.9.0rc1)
had  seven  seed  nodes  which  now  will  be  discussed42.  For  a  brief  procedural
moment,  the  new  node  sees  a  decentralised  but  not  distributed  map  of  the
network.43 Querying exclusively the seed nodes happens only once, afterwards,
queries are made to all the nodes of the latest retrieved database. Since all the
nodes  are  processing  this  operation  constantly,  once  some  nodes  start
communicating  between  each  other,  the  seeds  may  be  ignored  and  their
importance flattens. The system then becomes a distributed network in relation to
queries:  all  nodes  can  communicate  with  each  other  and  share  the  same
information. Despite its ephemeral status, it is interesting to note the geography
of the proto-logical map of the seeds: three nodes are in the west, central and
east side of the US (San Francisco, and the outskirts of Denver and Atlanta); one in
42 One seed node  location is  missing,  the rest  were  obtained  using GeoLite  data  by
MaxMind.  Which  claims  a  reliability  of  81% of  correctly  resolved  IP's  geolocation
within 100 km (https://www.maxmind.com/en/geoip2-city-accuracy  ).
43 On the distinction between distributed and  centralised, see Galloway (2004);  Baran
(1964, chap. 1).
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Canada  (London,  Ontario);  one  in  the  UK  (Ince-in-Makerfield,  right  between
Liverpool  and  Manchester);  and  one  in  China  (Hong  Kong).  This  geography
replicates  to  a certain point  in the health status of  the distributed rest  of  the
network.
Part  of  the  promises  of  cryptocurrencies  is  to  be  globally  available  to
everyone,  the  code  is  open  and  different  clients  can  run  in  almost  any
contemporary computer.  The bitcoin network is,  from an instrumental  point  of
view,  essentially  formed by  its  nodes,  thus  the  mapping  of  these  entities  can
provide  a  good  image  of  its  geography.  However,  not  every  machine  strictly
qualifies as a node. These are any type of machine capable of running a piece of
open source software (i.e. 'Bitcoin Core'), which allows them to receive, send and
storage  information  of  all  the  transactions.  This  network  of  machines  is  what
makes possible the efficient running for Bitcoin transaction of information.
Nodes can be broadly categorised as 'full nodes' and 'lightweight nodes'.
The latter are just clients that send and receive payments without storing the full
blockchain  and  therefore,  participate  on  the  transactions  but  not  on  the
maintenance of the infrastructure. A lightweight participant is the equivalence of a
credit card user making a payment: his resources' information travel on a surface
of which he is not responsible. The credit card has no value on it, if it disappears,
nothing but a piece of plastic is lost. The card’s sole function is to be a secure
authorisation key to make changes to a ledger. The latter is the money. When the
ledger subtracts an amount from one place and adds it to another, money is lost
or gained. But beyond giving its approval, payer and payee take no part in what is
completely a third party standardised administrative action  (de Jong, Tkacz, and
Velasco  2015).  Both  the  ledger  and  the  tracks  where  this  information  transit
belong to different agencies (banks, governments, finance institutions of all kinds),
but not to the card user. In this sense, Bitcoin works a lot like old and ordinary
finance  systems:  a  Bitcoin  user  may lose  his  or  her  phone or  laptop,  but  the
resources are still in the ledger, and as long as he or she keeps a copy of the secret
keys, which are a cryptographically developed form of identification, the satoshis44
can be reclaimed. The lightweight node approves transactions to be made to the
ledger, but neither makes the changes nor helps in distributing the transmission of
transactions.  A  full  node  on  the  other  hand  is  responsible  for  the  relay  and
44 The smallest possible unit of a bitcoin.
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validation  of  blocks  of  transactions,  and  its  resources  provide  storage  and
bandwidth  for  the  network's  upkeep  (‘FAQ  -  Bitcoin’  2015).  Unlike  traditional
registry administration, here the ledger is legion. Every full node contains a 'copy'
of  it  (with  no  original)  and  validate  its  transactions.  They  are  the  structural
skeleton of the network and the condition of possibility for users and transactions,
therefore playing a crucial role in the endurance of the digital phenomenon of
distributed  cryptocurrencies.  Interestingly,  nodes  don't  need  to  be  users  of
cryptocurrencies,  they can help the network without ever receiving or sending
bitcoins  (unlike  the  miners,  nodes  receive  no  economic  stimulus  for  a  severe
machine-demanding job)45. Miners are a kind of node specialised in collecting new
transactions into blocks and require specific hardware and working conditions to
do it; given its particular role in the bitcoin ecosystem, I differentiate them from
regular nodes. The distinctions I am making can be summarised as follows: (1) A
node46 is not necessarily a user of the bitcoin currency, (2) a user (or lightweight
node)  of  the  bitcoin  currency  is  not  necessarily  a  node,  (3)  a  node  is  not
necessarily a miner, but (4) every miner is a node.
It  is  possible  to  set  up  a  bitcoin  server  to  act  as  a  listener  of  other
broadcasting  nodes.  Bitnodes  website,  supported  by  the  Bitcoin  Foundation,
provides an API for one of these kind of servers47, which makes possible to retrieve
a limited amount of  information about the network at  any moment.  With the
intention to achieve an overall observation of the network behaviour, I set up a
machine that continually collects and stores this information from it. In  order
to keep the data as complete as possible, the scripts run in a low-cost, dedicated
'raspberry  pi'48 machine,  that  is  permanently  connected  to  the  Internet.  The
retrieval of information is made by a simple script that makes a request of the
hostname of the server, country code, city, latitude, longitude, time zone, ISP, user
agent,  height,  last  connections,  and  the  protocol  version,  for  every  node
connected to the network. This simple python script retrieves new 'snapshots' of
the whole network every 5  minutes.  New 'snapshot'  data  is  timestamped and
45 The  Blockchain  weights  over  30  Gigabytes  at  this  point,  synchronisation requires
significant bandwidth and energy, considering that it has an effect on the network only
when it is connected.
46 Henceforth, by nodes I will refer to full nodes unless otherwise stated. 
47 The  code  and  instructions  to  set  up  a  forked  server  is  available  at
https://github.com/ayeowch/bitnodes.  The  information  gathered  by  the  API  is,
however, the same as the one gathered by setting up a  personalised version of the
server. 
48 raspberrypi.org.
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stored in a separated json formatted file, for later retrieval. Every snapshot can be
read  as  a  static  moment  of  an  ever-changing  map  of  the  physical  network,
containing  all  the  nodes  locations  conforming  the  network  at  that  moment.
Gathering around 160-190 snapshots per day allows me to zoom in on how the
network changes on a daily basis and over longer durations. Through more python
scripts  I  generated  sets  from  this  data  that  were  not  evident  or  immediately
retrievable through the Bitnodes API.
Using a second python script, for example, I queried and produced sets of
'strong', 'weak' and 'ghost' nodes, being respectively the machines that have been
part of the bitcoin network uninterruptedly, interruptedly, and less than one day,
respectively, during a certain time span. This allows me to propose categories of
commitment  or  interest  directly  related  to  geographical  zones.  Full  nodes  for
keeping the network healthy are becoming more and more scarce, support for the
network has decayed since its  highpoint at  the end of  2013.  There is  even an
incentive  program49 that  provides  a  monthly  amount  of  money  to  nodes  that
accomplish certain criteria to be considered highly healthy peers. Following this
thread, I  observe and classify different degrees of  commitment,  as an indicator
based on continuity: I consider  strong nodes those who are connected at every
moment of the sample (in red, on the following figures), ghosts nodes those who
are connected in less than 10% of the moments in the sample, and 9 levels of
weak nodes, being 'weak9' the nodes present in 90%-99% of the sample, 'weak8'
those present in 80%-89% and so on. Strong and weak nodes are a minority in the
sample network, which is mostly composed by ghosts (fig. 1).  The broader the
sample, the more predominant become the ghosts. As fig. 2 shows, an extended
sample considers 1317 continuous snapshots (around a week of data) from which
a mere 4.3% nodes are strong, a small sum compared to 69.4% of ghosts nodes.
49 Interestingly,  although  this  incentive  is  received  in  bitcoins,  therefore  using  the
network, the amount is not: it is a fixed sum of legal tender. More information at:
https://getaddr.bitnodes.io/nodes/incentive/  .
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A glimpse of an Extended Bitcoin Ecosystem
Gathered  and  distilled  data  on  the  distribution  of  the  nodes  can  be
geographically  displayed  through  the  CartoDB50 platform.  A  map  of  the  small
sample (fig. 3) shows a highly-distributed ghost population, probably composed of
recurrent  users  or  curious  bystanders  of  the  network.  Among  the  weak
distribution, the majority are part of the weaker, which means that most probably
50 © OpenStreetMap contributors © CartoDB attribution (https://cartodb.com/)
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Fig. 1: Distribution of strong, weak and ghost nodes from a random sample of 15
'snapshots' of the network between March and May 2015
Fig. 2: Distribution of strong, weak and ghost nodes from a sample of 1317
'snapshots' of the network from the last week of 2014
are not part of dedicated servers, but eventual users of the Bitcoin Core, who, for
example,  connect  to  the  network  just  to  make  a  transaction but  without  the
intention to continually preserve its infrastructure51. It is feasible to argue that a
significant number of ghost and weak nodes are zombie machines, especially in
geographic areas where low-cost bots are common (Levchenko et al. 2014). Strong
nodes,  on  the  other  hand  are  scarce  but  solid.  Given  the  range  of  time  and
schedule of the sample, it is highly unlikely that they have unwilling operators.
These nodes have been connected uninterruptedly, and thus are, for whichever
reasons, resolute supporters of the network. It is reasonable to assume that many
strong nodes are miners and thus benefit economically from their role.
It  can be observed (fig.  3)52 that  weak and ghosts  usually  encircle  the
strong regions: providing a map of interest where urban areas produce stronger
nodes, encircled predominately by less interested parties in concentric rural areas.
For  example,  London  is  clearly  a  comfortable  niche  for  strong  nodes,  and  its
surrounding suburban areas are populated with weak and ghost nodes. Therefore,
showing an urban and highly localised community of network upholders, and a
stronger commitment to the network situated in the north of Europe. A point of
departure to have a rational reading of the map must obviously consider that a
great percentage of blank areas (e.g.  Russia) are not inhabited or do not have
distributed Internet  access.  Therefore,  blank rural  areas  and highlighted urban
centres are expected.
51 As far as I know, there is no way to know if a node is the public interface of more than
one machine, e.g. a mining rig. Also, nodes may also be hijacked computers, as this is a
common practice both inside and outside the bitcoin network (Litke and Stewart 2014;
Levchenko et al. 2014), and evidently should not be considered as strong supporters.
However,  there  is  no  guaranteed  way  to  identify  hijacked  nodes,  due  to  Bitcoin
protocol restrictions. 
52  This map can be thoroughly explored at: 
https://timeknows.cartodb.com/viz/7b8e0d76-edb2-11e4-a3b1-
0e43f3deba5a/embed_map
115
In their great majority, strong nodes inhabit USA and the north of Europe,
and in a minor scale,  the east  cost  of  Asia.  The bitcoin network replicates the
centrality behaviour of the Internet: the US has also been identified as the core
country in the hyperlinked network (Barnett and Sung 2005, 226), after examining
clusters of communication in top-level country code domain names (ccTLD). Also,
10 of the 13 Internet DNS (Domain Name Servers) root servers are located in the
US, while the other three are in Sweden, the UK and Japan (on this, Rogers notices
how the  Internet  has  always  been  geographical  by  design  [Rogers  2013,  41]).
DNS53 leverage on control and power within the Internet has had its own share of
controversy (Goldsmith and Wu 2008, chap. 3). DNS play an important role for the
bitcoin traffic, if only for the first run of a node in the bitcoin network54; and all its
communications rely on TCP (Transport Control Protocol), most probably routing
over  the  US  like  a  lot  of  the  digital  traffic.  US  infrastructure  centrality  is  also
reflected on the organisations where the Bitcoin network moves. This proves that
the global  network is  in reality  a  very  localised phenomenon,  with a fistful  of
nodes in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. A closer regional look (figs. 4,
5,  and  6)  shows that  most  of  the  strong  nodes  in  Europe  belong  to  the  UK,
Germany,  France  and  the  Netherlands,  but  again,  few  can  be  considered
committed in Spain, Portugal and the whole region of the Balkans.  It shows that
53 The  Domain  Name  System  servers  are  in  charge  of  translating  machine-readable
internet  addresses  (e.g.  www.google.com)  to  Internet  Protocol  addresses (e.g.
216.58.206.142). They work as a directory and reroute traffic according to the domains
and subdomains of the address. 
54 Interestingly,  the first  fork of  the Bitcoin protocol  was Namecoin,  a cryptocurrency
which serves as an alternative decentralised DNS. 
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Fig. 3: Map of strong (red), weak (blues) and ghost (grey) nodes from a random
sample of 15 'moments' of the network between March and May 2015.
unlike other emerging payment and value storage systems like M-pesa (Jack and
Suri 2011), Bitcoin is a phenomenon, whose network support resides in the north.
This distribution replicates and reinforces the so-called Digital Divide Cartogram
(Lovink and Zehle 2005, 110–11), which depicts a map where countries sizes are
inversely proportional to their  Internet usage, showing a world bloated on the
south (with some exceptions). Updated maps that also consider the proportion of
Internet  users  show that  this  digital  divide  remains  (Stephens  2012).  It  is  not
surprising that regions with a high number of Internet users are also hosts of many
strong nodes. However, it is interesting to see that regions with a great percentage
of  Internet  Users  are  not  necessarily  the ones with  the biggest  percentage of
strong nodes (Fig. 7).55 Canada, the Czech Republic, Australia, France, Germany,
Ireland, the Netherlands, Singapore, Sweden and Switzerland show a considerable
number of network users when considering its population of Internet users.
55 Internet Live Statistics ranks the total number of Internet users by country based on
statistical analysis from different sources: the International Telecommunication Union
2015, the World Bank Group, the CIA's World Factbook, and the UN Department of
Economic and Social Affairs (Internet Live Statistics, 2015).
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Fig. 4: Strong nodes in the world
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Fig. 5: Strong nodes in Europe
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Fig. 6: Strong nodes in Asia
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Fig. 7: Percentage (in red) of strong nodes
and percentage (in blue) of Internet users
(ILS), by country.
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Fig. 8: Geography of a Bitcoin Ecosystem, including country
legislation status on Bitcoin (restrictive in red, cautious in
yellow, and permissive green tones), strong nodes (red
points), markets (blue points, sized by market share)
Separate retrieval and distillation processes of the data generated by the
network allowed me to display a visual ecosystem of bitcoin related agencies. The
resultant map shows expected behaviour of the ecosystem, for example, a high
number  of  strong  nodes  and  buoyant  markets  inside  permissive/cautious
legislation niches. But it is in the discontinuities of the stacked agencies where it is
possible to observe the socio-technical guts of the system. Following the fractures,
China becomes evidently the most interesting location in the map: considering its
huge number of Internet users, it has a noticeably low percentage of strong nodes.
To  this  it  adds  up  the  outstanding  share  of  the  market  it  has  in  relation  to
exchanges headquarters (fig. 9).
China is one of the few countries that has enacted harsh regulations on
cryptocurrencies. At the end of 2013 it classified Bitcoin as a “virtual good” and
forbid financial or payment companies to deal with it. It also prohibited third-party
payment processors to deal with cryptocurrencies exchanges. Just a few months
before,  Baidu,  the  search  engine  Chinese  giant,  announced  it  would  accept
bitcoins (‘Chinese Internet Giant Baidu Starts Accepting Bitcoin’ 2013). A few days
after the announcement,  the 'Chinese google' stopped accepting it  (‘Baidu and
China  Telecom  Stop  Accepting  Bitcoin,  Price  Slumps  Again’  2013).  After  this,
BTCChina stopped accepting deposits in Yuan. Almost a year later, at the end of
January 2014, it was accepting the currency again. In March of the same year, it
was  reported  that  some  banks  effectively  shut  down  some  Bitcoin  exchanges
accounts. But despite the discouraging legal environment and the minimal number
of  committed  nodes,  Chines  exchanges  accumulate  the  majority  of  bitcoin
stockpile. This remarkably unbalanced situation depicts the existence of a second
indicator within the network other than the sum of nodes, that is, not so much the
quantity, but the node quality. In theory, every node replicates transactions and
works to build blocks of them, therefore producing bitcoin units56, but in practice,
only  a  few nodes  have  the  capacity  to  produce  bitcoins.  These  nodes  can  be
considered actual  miners,  who use dedicated hardware for  the operation,  and
usually  associate  in  pools  due  to  the  amount  of  computer  power  needed  to
successfully produce new units. Estimations of these pools' capacity of production
—or hashrate within the Blockhain—  show (fig. 10), again, that a handful of pools
56 There  is  a  'reward'  of  25  Bitcoins  per  valid  block  construction,  which  is  the  only
possible way to produce them.
122
operate  the majority  of  the blocks.  What  is  more,  three of  the biggest  pools,
BTCChina, Antpool, and F2pool are operated from China.
 
123
Fig. 9: Location of headquarters by market share
Fig. 10: Percentage of mining pools hashrate distribution from June 18 to June 22,
2015 (screenshot from https://blockchain.info/pools)
 The previous analysis of the map leads to a more readable image on the
weight of the Chinese territory for Bitcoin. Neither nodes, nor miners or markets
are  by  themselves  representations  of  China  as  a  nation,  however,  they  do
represent a crucial agglutination in the Bitcoin ecosystem space. The analysis also
shows an unequal distribution that is  unique of  this  digital  object,  that  of  the
production  as  computer  power  and  distribution  as  currency  exchange.  Other
significant findings may be found by zooming into other zones of the stacked map
layers.
This section made evident two different kinds of limits: one regarding the
network, and the other regarding the method that mapped it. First, the limits or
boundaries  of  the  backbone  geography  of  the  bitcoin  network.  Nodes  can  be
traced  with  a  considerable  amount  of  exactitude  to  show  that,  for  example,
despite being present in 138 countries there is not a single node in Mali, the 40 th
country  in the world by means of  Internet users.  A clear material  map of  the
machines  running  the  network  can  be  charted.  Any  alleged  immateriality  is
underpinned by the fact that exactly one computer in St. Lucia, belonging to a user
who willingly decided to try the Bitcoin-core software, helped to build Bitcoin's
existence, by packing information transactions that travelled through the pipes of
a telecommunication company.  It  is  for  sure  challenging to  trace a world  map
when a 'universal' network centralises itself in five countries. Vitai Gupta, a Bitcoin
enthusiast and critic, stresses the need to develop the use of the cryptocurrency in
developing  countries,  where  it  has  the  possibility  to  be  a  social  meaningful
transformation  and  not  an  extension  of  capitalism  ideologists  (CoinScrum and
Proof of Work: Tools for the Future 2014). This technical approach speaks only for
machines connected to a network and shows that the network takes place, as an
aggregated material medium, in specific location, and is non-existent in others,
thus, is subject to geographical limits.
The  second  kind  of  limit  is  that  using  a  technical  and  geographical
approach to understand the particular notion of space in cryptocurrencies does
offer some insights on how the network operates technically, and an interesting
idea of  its  associated geographical  territory,  but certainly a  'limited'  notion for
making sense of a comprehensive space that goes beyond the infrastructural. It is
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not  possible  to  build  a  political  geography  from  just  this  kind  of  territorial
networks. Some important actors and relations remain unidentified. The tracking
of the physical network does show that cryptocurrencies are phenomena played in
countries  not  directly  correlated  with  their  Internet  inclination,  it  hints  to
communities of interest within certain countries but says nothing on these places'
policies  on the subject.  Nor can the complex  relations between the actors  be
addressed by just looking at the behaviour of physical networks. Thus, the next
section adds political concepts that shed light on how to understand the relation
of  the  blockchain  with  other  actors.  As  in  previous  chapters,  I  pay  particular
attention  to  the  relationship  with  traditional  authoritarian  structures  (i.e.  the
state) and with private platform services, since public blockchains can be thought
in between the two: they exploit the non-territorial arrangements of the latter, but
try  to  partially  replace the authority  model  of  the former.  The matter is  then
directed towards a question of the digital sovereignty of a non-territorial space.
4.3 Non-westphalian Authorities
Digital  Method researcher Richard Rogers’  road of  the Internet,  after its
hyperspaced and spherical momentum, proceeds to networks.  His classification
not only offers adequate methodologies for research, it  also acts as a map for
possibilities of movement, and in this context, of the creation of different 'space
arrangements' or 'topologies' (Rogers 2013, 40). Vectors towards localisation of
centres  in  an  unmapped  space  via links,  delimitation of  discussion  zones  and
discursive possibilities  in spheres, and finally, continuity of controversies  through
networks. The kind of space that is created by network movement is more suitable
for  the displacement  of  the bitcoin  network and the layered complexity of  its
actors  than  any  territorial  approach.  Topology  has  been  identified  (Lury  and
Wakeford 2012b) as an order of spatial and temporal continuity within cultural,
economic and political forms of cultural life. On this reading, topological objects
are not identified based on a structure of fixed or essential properties. On the
contrary, the space is mapped according to its fluidity. Transformations are tracked
as continuity and in doing so a space is charted, not by a previous order of time
and  space.  Here  I  follow  the  idea  that  there  exists  a  tendency  towards  the
125
topological in culture practices: “Culture is increasingly organized in terms of its
capacities for change: tendencies for innovation, for inclusion and exclusion, for
expression emerge (…) as a field of connectedness, that is, of ordering by means of
continuity,  and  not  as  a  structure  based  on  essential  properties”  (Lury  and
Wakeford  2012a,  5).  These practices are  clearly  expressed  in  the  political  and
economic  world in the form of  socio-technical  activities  of  sorting,  calculating,
listing, ranking and in general  in the establishment of  relations by quantitative
comparison  or  measurement.  As  I  have  developed  in  the  first  chapter,  the
strategies of control of the distributed political framework of the Empire brings
new  notions  of  authority  and  sovereignty,  reflected  and  enhanced  in  digital
phenomena like the blockchains. The space were blockchains dwell is too imbued
with a notion of sovereignty provided through its topological performance, and
marked by an implicit confrontation with the territorially-based restrictions of the
state.
Hardt and Negri identify money as the means of control of the Empire that
holds together aristocratic power. The Empire narrative also argues that distinct
powers are associated with different means of control: the monarchic or absolute
power relies on the bomb as an executive capacity of destruction; the aristocratic
power  relies  on  money as  a  tool  to  redistribute  national  monetary  structures
towards commercial entities, highly concentrated in financial centres; and finally,
the democratic power uses ether to articulate sovereignty through communication
systems, to subordinate society to communication (Hardt and Negri 2001, 347). It
is  precisely  money  and  ether57 (information)  that  gets  conflated  with  the
emergence of the blockchain. While the current finance system factually merged
these two aspects of control —money exists primarily in the form of alteration of,
and communication between, financial databases— the blockchain does it  in  a
novel  manner.  As  I  will  argue  in  this  section,  it  de-territorializes  and  re-
territorializes58 the state role on the creation and communication of  money:  it
diminishes the relevance of geographical territories and jurisdictions, and at the
57 Curiously, the token in Ethereum, the most developed blockchain with programmable
capabilities (i.e. “smart contracts”) is also called ether.
58 Although inspired by Deleuze and Guattari concept of de-territorialization (Deleuze et
al.  2009),  I  am not  following their  work.  My use  of  territorialization  is  simpler:  it
denotes  on  one  side  a  lack  of  importance  regarding  earth  topographies  (de-
territorialization), and on the other the attempt to expropriate state functions on the
production and transmission of assets (re-territorialization).
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same time moves the organisational and instrumental means of production to a
different notion of space. 
De-territorialization: Technological Zones
Although blockchains are traceable, they are able to sidestep the necessity
for geographical financial centres of the aristocratic power that Hardt and Negri
identify. The clusters do exist, but in a different order. The previous section located
the registered headquarters of the crypto-market exchanges in 2015, and found
that while examples like Coinjar, which fled Australia to seek the financial freedom
provided by the UK, a  substantial majority  of  exchanges and mining industries
clustered  in  Chinese  territory,  despite  the  harsh  regulation  against  crypto-
markets.59 This  de-territorialization that  the blockchains are  capable,  minimises
the subjection towards states. The surface where the two meet (blockchain-based
projects and state regulations) is not immediate, as states have no direct effects
on the governance or development of the blockchain (see Chapter Five for the
case of Bitcoin development).
The mediation between blockchains as a network technology, and states
as normative jurisdictions is closer to what has been called a technological zone
(Barry  2001;  Barry  2006),  which  preserves  a  topological  landscape,  since  this
communication layer is understood in spatial terms. Barry identifies three kinds of
technological  zones:  metrological  (common  forms  of  measurements),
infrastructural  (common  connection  standards)  and  zones  of  qualification
(practices assessed by common standards). These zones are defined as “a space
within which differences between technical parties, procedures and forms, have
been reduced, or common standards have been established.” (Barry 2006, 239).
They work as buffer zones, and are relevant for this discussion because they are
characterised  for  being  neither  “territorially  bounded  nor  global  in  their
extension” (Barry 2006, 209) but still of political and economic significance. These
kinds of  buffer zones are being consolidated between the legal  realm and the
financial side of the network. They are more likely encouraged and developed by
59 This  remarkable  situation  remains:  in  September  2017  the  Central  Bank  of  China
banned  Initial  Crypto  Offerings  (ICO)  funding  (the  blockchain  version  of  IPO’s),
however, the Chinese miners and crypto-markets are still a considerable majority in
the blockchains ecosystem.
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state managed financial institutions in the face of a possible widespread use of
cryptocurrencies, or, perhaps more probable, sporadic misuses of them.
An example of this standardisation process is the Bitlicense, issued by the
New York State Department of Financial Services to regulate the business use of
cryptocurrencies  since  2015(‘NY  Financial  Regulator  Lawsky  Releases  Final
BitLicense Rules for Bitcoin Firms - WSJ’ n.d.). The license allows Bitcoin related
companies to store, buy, sell, and administer cryptocurrencies. As of January 2017,
only three licenses had been granted, and the new regulation forced companies to
relocate  (e.g.  Bitfinex,  and  Kraken)  (Roberts  n.d.).  Like  with  the  Chinese
government restrictions, the Bitlicense resulted in the relocation of some business
headquarters, but did not affect the overall development of Bitcoin, which keeps
gradually expanding.
Another  way  to  measure  the  limited  effects  of  regulation  on  the
performance of the system or overall adoption is to observe the market price of
Bitcoin  as  a  regulatory  position  is  declared  by  countries.  Bitcoin  represents  a
particular  challenge  for  regulation,  since  even  though  the  hovering  activities
associated  with  the  currency  can  be controlled  through traditional  disciplinary
methods, such as the Bitlicense, the coin itself was designed to be resilient in this
sense, since it is relatively easy to use it through  communication channels (e.g. a
VPN tunnel, or even through the TOR network) despite a formal prohibition. As an
example of this dissociation, I tracked formal statements of different countries60
regarding  digital  currencies  (not  only  bitcoin,  although  it  is  the  most  used
example)  to  observe  if  there  was  a  direct  correlation  with  the  coin  price
fluctuation. Most reactions cluster in the range between October and December
2013, unsurprisingly, this is the moment when the price achieved a record peak
(1151  USD on  the  4th of  November)  up  until  2017,  and  attracted  mainstream
attention.  In  the  statements'  dataset,  few  countries  have  taken  formal  legal
measures: of 43 countries, only Australia, Brazil, China, Germany and New Zealand
have adopted explicit legal responses and from these countries, only China has
forbidden  its  use  in  some  manner.  Most  states  are  rather  cautious,  strongly
advising  precaution  on  the  use  of  digital  currencies  but  without  necessarily
60 Most of this information, so far, comes from the Global Legal Research Directorate
(2014).  However,  a  site  dedicated  to  tracking  cryptocurrencies  legality  around the
world, with considerable additions can be found at http://bitlegal.io/. These rankings
do not always agree with my own classification.
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expressing a negative opinion. This restrained may be tied to the incapacity to
adapt the cryptocurrencies definition to one within the previous legal enclosure of
fiat currencies.  Fig.  11 shows changes in price  a day  before and a day  after a
resolution by  countries.  In  it,  colour  represents  reception of  alternative digital
currencies: red is a strong negative, green a strong positive and blue a neutral or
mixed one.  I  have included only  countries  where  a legal  declaration has  been
made. For instance, a press release of the Bank of Portugal declares, based on a
study of European Central Bank that “users can buy and sell virtual currency with
legal tender and purchase goods and services in the real and virtual world” (The
Law Library of Congress 2016). 
The  biggest  upscale  coincides  with  the  negative  response  of  France,
followed by the positive resolution of the U.S. and the neutral effect of Portugal.
This  apparently  shows  that  the  rise  of  the  price  was  barely  related  with  the
position  of  any  government.  Nevertheless,  the  attention  of  the  media  and
governments on bitcoin at the end of 2013 most probably corresponds with the
rise in price and popularity, regardless of whether the state actors had a neutral,
negative  or  positive  response  to  the  phenomenon.  There  are  uncountable
variables involved in the market fluctuations of the value, but it is reasonable to
expect  that  a  negative  assessment  by  a  normative  authority  representing  a
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Fig. 11: Resolution of countries by Bitcoin price change
country would have a more palpable effect on valuation than what is indicated in
the data. However, what I claim is that while the system is affected by territorial
authorities, its valuation, development, and expansion is not subjected to them in
the same way that fiat or even alternative currencies. 
Relations  between  state,  law  and  financial  institutions,  and  a  new
decentralised transfer system based on cryptography in a public ledger, are the
emergence of a metrological zone. Institutionalised entities certainly deal with a
recent  and confuse device,  and look for  a language to measure or adapt it  to
existing legislation. Barry's concept of technological zones also offer the advantage
of being localised despite its geographical distribution, i.e. a zone formed by a set
of  different  laboratories  working  on  the  same  topic  “is  not  confined  to  any
particular nation or region; but rather it is nonetheless, strongly tied to specific
institutions, persons and devices which have been the object of huge technical
and  financial  investments”  (Barry  2001,  52).  The  zone  is  defined  more  by  its
converging points than its territories, thus, actors can be quite localised despite
geographical  or  border  dispersion.  These  also  include  human  and  non-human
elements. I previously stated that the Bitcoin network is made of communities not
directly associated with state policies. And although Bitcoin’s functionality is not
defined by  territoriality,  its  daily  operation does depend on the administrative
power set by political territories. The price roller-coaster was not defined by the
legal  position  of  key  countries,  but  the  price  peak  may  be  what  alerted
governments to begin paying attention to cryptocurrencies as a possible threat to
the control of capital circulation. This forces them to take a stand on the subject
that  does have an influence on the Bitcoin  space metamorphosis.  The UK still
represents  a  niche  for  autonomous  and  to  a  certain  point  unregulated
development of cryptocurrencies, but that is temporary and most probably will be
modified based on the proliferation of the technology as a currency.  Australia, on
the other hand, is prematurely developing a qualification zone where standards on
the  legal  and  the  financial  are  set  and  assessed  between  un-territorialized
technical  parties  and  state  institutions.  Bitcoin  remains  a  distributed  digital
network outside Australia, but some of the actors of its space become overlapped
in this buffered zone and have to settle on it or, like Coinjar, have been forced to
emigrate. 
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These buffered zones are useful to explain the agreements between an
emerging  topological  phenomenon,  the  blockchain  as  cryptocurrency,  and
established topographical authorities. However, the second kind of relation with
territorial  arrangements,  the  re-territorialization,  considers  the  aspects  of  this
relation that are better described by competition than agreement. The following
final  section  provides  a  theoretical  framework  to  think  about  blockchain
technology as a space that is part of a new kind of sovereignty among the digital.
Re-territorialization: Digital Assemblages and Stack Sovereignty
Barry's technological zones are not necessarily to be conceived as a form of
social structure, but an abstraction capable of making visible a particular social
scenery while contributing to the visibility of its spatial forms. While the concept is
particularly useful  to think about the role of standarisation processes between
two entities, it is less concerned with authority conflicts between the parts. Sassen
(2006)  uses  the  term  'imbrication'  to  talk  about  a  particular  kind  of  relation
between digital and non-digital entities that takes into account power leverage in
the affiliation. Imbrications function as assemblages that shape 'a particular kind
of territoriality'  (Sassen 2006,  326),  through an interdependence of  digital  and
non-digital devices. This dependence, Sassen argues, does not make them hybrids
or irreducible to each other. Nowadays digital markets and political actors do rely
on  each  other  for  their  development:  infrastructure  for  the  digital  markets  is
constructed  via  nations'  allowances  and  private  investment,  day-to-day
functioning is also funded by private networks, states benefit from the efficiency
of  these  markets  to  trade  goods  and  money  in  all  its  forms.  Within  Sassen's
argumentation,  an imbrication is  created here between two finance entities:  a
'supranational electronic market space', which is 'spaceless' in the sense that it is
decentralized  and  therefore  not  necessarily  geolocated;  and  a  financial  centre
space, subject to national law. The second is the nationally embedded part of the
first. The digital and non-digital imbrication between these two spaces act as a
power leverage between global markets and nation-states authority. It consists “of
both the use of that authority for the implementation of regulations and laws that
respond  to  the  interests  of  global  finance,  and  the  renewed  weight  of  that
authority through the ongoing need for financial centres” (Sassen 2006, 338). 
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Sassen  also  notes  that  some  new  technologies  create  'networked
assemblages',  that  enable  new  kind  of  political  actors,  who  by  generating
particular  forms  of  power  build  in  part  the  new  assemblages.  Global  capital
markets, as stated before, gain the power to discipline states by guiding territorial
economic policies. It also strengthened older actors, like trading institutions and
corporations,  but  what  draws  Sassen's  attention  is  that  the  new  actors  are
“capable of engaging the competence, scope, and exclusivity of state authority”
(Sassen  2006,  328).  Sassen  also  notices  that  in  the  case  of  global  markets,
digitalisation is more a tool than a mastermind, regardless of the importance of
technology, the outcome of new forces is driven by finance and not a distinctly
digital logic. That is, it is the finance models that feed the logic of assemblages
such as the derivatives and securities markets, and these happen to be digital.
While  many  of  the  examples  and  uses  of  Blockchain  technology  are
strongly compatible with finance, I argue in the first chapter that a computational
paradigm drives the main reformulations brought by distributed production. The
case of Bitcoin is a good example, since the technology and network are not part
of a private corporation. Its main elements are underpinned by the banners of
openness and common infrastructures,  themselves ideals of the open software
world.  This  does  not  mean  that  private  financial  entities  are  stranger  to  the
technology,  and in  fact  much of  the latest  blockchain  development,  like  other
open software examples, is nurtured by the attempts to integrate this technology
to the ends of the private financial worlds. So, while blockchains are networked
assemblages  grounded  on  a  computational  paradigm,  they  generate  via  their
particular distributed production process, their own powerful actors, like miners
and markets, who benefit financial logic and engage in a competition with state
authorities. The “computational paradigm” is both the automatised production of
unique assets in a distributed network (analysed in the first chapter) and a claim
of a new non-territorial space.
The  claims  for  space,  state  competition,  and  markets  empowerment
merge  in  the  idea  of  “open”,  as  read  by  Hardt  and  Negri.  One  of  the  main
characteristics of the Empire is to portray itself as an open non-place: “Perhaps
the fundamental characteristic of imperial sovereignty is that ‘its space is always
open’ (...) the modern sovereignty that developed in Europe from the sixteenth
century  onward  conceived space as  bounded,  and its  boundaries  were always
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policed by the sovereign administration. Modern sovereignty resides precisely on
the limit. In the imperial conception, by contrast, power finds the logic of its order
always renewed and always re-created in expansion” (Hardt and Negri 2001, 176).
Very much like in the early Roman Empire, the spaceless utopia brought by digital
communications and extended on blockchains, the openness where it dwells is
based  on  a  frontierless expansion,  imperium  sine  fine.  Like  the  cyberspace
imaginary that is always in becoming, which was sold “as an endless space for
individualism and/or capitalism, as an endless freedom frontier” (Chun 2008, 43),
the blockchain space for stateless exchange is utopic for finance markets. It is the
ideal machine inasmuch as it maintains the idea that it has no outside, unlike the
spaces of modernity “thwarted by barriers and exclusions; it  thrives instead by
including  always  more  within  its  sphere”  (Hardt  and  Negri  2001,  190).  The
disappearance  of  the  territory  as  a  technology  of  power  associated  with  the
modern state,  is  the mirror image of  the promise of  frictionless circulation for
markets. The blockchain is then both a spatial and a political economy claim.
Perhaps these dual  characteristic is  best  reflected in the profound role
cryptocurrencies play in the dark market. The illegal digital communities gathered
around projects like the Silk Road, and most recently Alphabay grew with the use
of  cryptocurrencies  (Bitcoin,  in  particular).  The markets  challenge at  the same
time the territorial jurisdiction and the normativity of the state and capitalise on
free circulation,  by using cryptocoins in  deep spaces of  the internet.  Arguably,
these  two  examples  were  located,  seized,  and  the  minds  behind  them where
judged as any other criminal activity performers. However, while they were online,
they exploited the capacity of blockchain technology to challenge state regulation
to circulate assets in a non-territorial space. Also, while these two markets were
halted, many others sprouted in their absence. 
These kinds of markets can efficiently function in great part due to the re-
territorialising  effect  of  blockchain  technology.  By  this  I  mean  the  attempt  to
absorb the state functions of currency regulation of production and exchange. The
distributed, non-human trusted network automatises the production process to
predefined  rules,  regulates  the  efficient  movement  between  parties  with
mathematical certitude, and allows itself to be publicly audited. Even considering
the human factor involved in the development and decision-making of its design,
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the machinery does remain a clever partial substitution for a very basic money
control emulation of modern state scheme of monetary production.
The importance of the computational factor and the generation of a non-
territorial space is better integrated with Benjamin Bratton’s stack model. Posited
as  a  novel  political  geography  framework,  the  Stack  is  also  a  reaction  to  the
constrains of utopia (pre-2008) and dystopia (post-2008) readings of computing
systems: “we need new and better models, because computation already operates
in ways that have surpassed and overflowed the regular cartographies” (Bratton
2016, xviii). Computation is understood not (only) as machinery, but as a planetary
scale infrastructure, not a technology inside a society, but a technological totality
where the social is built. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Bratton
identifies  the  modern  Westphalian  notion  of  space,  the  nation-state,  as  core
jurisdiction, as a design of geopolitics that is the result of planar geography, of a
process  of  “separating  and  containing  sovereign  domains  as  discrete  adjacent
units among a line and horizontal surface” (Bratton 2016, 5). The Stack, however,
disregards  the  planar  and  presents  space  as  a  series  of  interconnected  non-
geographical layers, capable of reconfiguration. Within the Stack, the states as an
authority element do not so much decline, as much as their condition “is qualified
both  by  a  debordering  perforation  and  liquefaction  of  this  system’s  ability  to
maintain a monopoly on political geography, and by an overbordering manifest as
an  unaccountable  proliferation  of  new  lines,  endogenous  frames,  anomalous
segments, medieval returns, informatic interiors, ecological externalities, megacity
states, and more” (Bratton 2016, 6). It would be perhaps more adequate to say
that the state is overflowed by the complexity, velocity, and interconnection of
elements  performing  in  a  planetary-state  computation  model.61 The  Stack
conflates governance and non-territorial space: it is not a representation of the
state, or a reformulation of the state in terms of a machine nor vice versa: Bratton
asserts that machines are governance, the Stack is the machine as a state. 
The way sovereignty is enforced in this non-planar space is through the
control of the borders. The Stack is the accumulation of systems nested into other
systems. This multiplies the boundaries instead of vanishing them. Sovereignty is
61 One of the main examples of Bratton on the indigenous governance of the Stack is
Google, which is defined as a “nonstate actor operating with the force of a state but
unlike  modern  states,  it  is  not  defined  by  a  single  specific  territorial  contiguity”
(Bratton 2016, 10).
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what draws a line between what each system allows, and through software these
gateways are automatised (SCI-Arc Channel 2016). Unlike the Westphalian space,
these lines are not fixed and are in constant mutation, and are even reversible:
“Unrestricted by  the brakes  of  the proper  nomos,  the  absolute  motivation for
capture  extends up and down from molecular  to  atmospheric  scales”,  but not
untethered,  as  “they  congeal  layer  by  layer  into  a  metastructural  order  of  a
different governing order: a machine that is a state held together by deciding the
spaces  of  technical  exceptions as much as  legal  ones” (Bratton 2016,  34).  The
decision on the exceptions, on what belongs and can be integrated into the system
is automatised.
Blockchains fit the stack model. Its core functionality does not require a
geographic  map,  and  they  supply  state  ordering  with  automation.  They  are  a
material  stratum,  and  subject  of  location,  but  they  participate  in  a  different
ordering. While I showed that there is a bidirectional influence between nation-
states and corporations, and cryptocurrencies, the relation is, from the point of
view of the blockchain system, circumstantial and re-placeable. The state exists,
and  interacts  with  the  blockchain  in  technological  zones  and  networked
assemblages,  both  as  regulatory  nemesis  and  enabler  of  jurisdictional
headquarters, it interpellates the blockchain. However, states are non-essential for
the  performance  of  blockchains.  The  Stack  generates  its  own  subjects  and
authority models, based on machines, which, like the blockchain act as automated
“decision-making interfaces” (Bratton 2016, 32). The interaction with the state is
not in the terms of subjection. The Stack’s sovereign and space model does not
depend on territorial arrangements, even thought it is in a constant relation with
them.
The design of the interface, however, is not technologically determined.
Despite heavily outsourcing the control of its borders to the machine’s own logic
presented in Chapter One, the general design of this outsourcing happens within
affectively  and ideologically  charged human-led governance developments.  The
final chapter will observe part of this decision-making actions in Bitcoin, as a case
study  to  show  the  non-deterministic  side  of  the  inner  working  of  blockchain
technology. 
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Chapter 5: Strategies for Governance and Bitcoin's
Scaling Controversy
I  have previously shown the prehistory or techno-political lines of descent that
gather in the emergence of Bitcoin (Chapter Three), and the predominance of an
algorithmic logic in the production and exchange of its assets (Chapter One). The
discussion on the mapping of its network (Chapter Four) also angled toward the
computational aspects of the system, in particular in relation with the governance
of  territorially-based  institutions.  However,  Chapter  Four  also  considered  the
important, though dispensable, relation between the non-westphalian network of
the blockchain and the normative and disciplinary institutions of the state. In this
chapter, I expand on the non-computational elements that build the blockchain,
by  observing  the  influence  of  the  governance  processes  in  the  design  of  the
Bitcoin system. In a way it can be read as a counterweight to the first chapter, but
actually  it  is  more  a  complementary  argument,  insofar  as  it  connects  the
governance and organizational process of production of a software/protocol with
its  outcome,  itself  a  system  oriented  towards  the  non-human  production  (of
assets), control of communications, and even novel governance models.
This  chapter  depicts  strategies  for  governance  in  the  development  of
Bitcoin, and their successes and failures, discerned through the analysis of one
controversy  (block-scaling),  a  protracted  issue  among  the  Bitcoin  community:
developers,  miners,  cryptocurrency  exchanges,  stakeholders,  and  enthusiasts.  I
follow the discussion exclusively among the main developers, from 2013 to one of
its more critical points in 2015, and pay particular attention to two confronted
spokespersons (Mike Hearn and Peter Todd). I  distinguish between three topics
that  are  usually  mixed  in  the  general  controversy  discussion,  but  are  not
interchangeable: scaling the capacity of the blockchain, enhancing the size of the
blocks, and producing a hard-fork of the chain. The purpose of this observation is
to identify the rationale for the disagreement. I will show that this collision is at its
core a contradiction —briefly mentioned in the previous chapter— between the
utopic ends of decentralization and free market, of a historical concern of strong
multilateral privacy and a frictionless competitive system of exchange.
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I will start by commenting on the early discussions of 2013 on block size as
a strategy for scaling the network, and how they relate to the consensus-enabled
governance of the project development. Then I will add the revitalization of the
evolved issues in 2015 that generated the outbreak of the Bitcoin XT fork. A fork is
a common strategy within open source software (OSS),  that allows to sort out
disagreements by generating two (usually competing) software projects from the
same original source code. The Bitcoin XT fork made visible the formation of two
different forces,  with opposing ideas of  the reasons and ends of a project like
Bitcoin. The failure of forking62 also signaled a critical difference between previous
projects and Bitcoin. Thus, I will also argue that the economic nature of the Bitcoin
project repealed, or at the very least reformulated, the forking strategy.
The fourth and final notion of utopia is the imagined governance through
other means. In particular, the use of technology to replace the continually failed
human  interaction  to  produce  agreements,  trust,  contracts,  and  compliance
between parties. Like the paradox depicted in the first chapter, the utopia arch
also signals a tinge of irony here: while the blockchain is posited as an instrument
to overcome organizational failures,  and even as a solution to broader political
issues (i.e the democratic processes monitored by the state), this chapter tells the
story of the organizational failure to develop such an instrument in the first place.
The  words  of  Gregory  Maxwell,  a  Bitcoin  main  developer,  express  this
inconsistency: “I  think governance is incredibly hard and that the development
history of fiat currencies shows that mankind is ill-equip to create a strong and
sound system via human governance-- not through lack of trying,  but because
mankind is  fundamentally not cut out for it:  there is  always some excuse that
makes people feel justified in compromising the property rights of some for the
benefit of (potentially many) others. Bitcoin was specifically created and promoted
to replace that kind of subjectivity with machines, but it can't do it if we go around
undermining it” (minersupportTH).63
62 At the moment of this writing (September 2017) a competing fork similar to Bitcoin XT,
“Bitcoin Cash”, finally got implemented but has not replaced the Core chain.  I  will
briefly comment on the status of this fork at the end of this chapter. 
63 Many of  the references along this  chapter  are  encoded with an abbreviation (e.g.
minersupportTH) of the thread within a forum. A list of Abbreviated References can be
found at the end of this chapter.
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5.1 Strategies for Consensus
The endeavours to bring together the blockchain and democratic processes are a
minority  when  the  gross  of  financial-related  projects  is  considered.  It  is
nonetheless  interesting  that  the  implementation  of  computational  rules  for
negotiation  can  be  thought  for  an  extended spectrum  of  governance  models.
From positions that seek to use it as a tool to replace bureaucratic limitations, thus
instrumentalizing a system without any other major changes (i.e. the “Flux Party”);
to projects that  explore blockchain’s  affordances to  extend the participation in
democratic life, thus distancing themselves from representative models (i.e. “D-
cent”  [Decentralised  Citizens  ENgagement  Technologies  project]);  to
implementations that assume the impossibility of a fair democratic model, thus
proposing  the  use  of  blockchains  as  a  mean  for  oligarchic  governance  and
organization. 
The Flux Party is not interested in proposing policies or making decisions,
but  only  in  enacting  what  their  members  vote  (Siegel  2016).  Their  proposal
replicates the use of the blockchain as a secure exchange network, but instead of
considering the tokens as monetary units, they count them as votes which can be
spent, swapped, or traded for every proposed bill. This seamless direct democracy
system  could  presumably  be  supported  by  a  blockchain,  and  has  the  double
possibility  of being used in a more traditional way (i.e.  by offering a vote to a
trusted party, expert or representative).  On the other hand, D-cent, a program
backed by the European Union, is concerned with developing “the next generation
of  open source,  distributed,  and privacy-aware  tools  for  direct  democracy  and
economic empowerment”(‘D-CENT’ n.d.). D-cent aims to involve participants into
the public sphere by offering a “blockchain toolkit” consisting of complementary
currencies  governance  and  decentralised  trust  management  systems,  both
embodied  in  the  fully  usable  Freecoin,  also  based  in  Bitcoin.  The  use  of
blockchains is, however, only one of many tools and platforms. D-cent is a bigger
project that seeks to bring together grass-root organizations to expand modern
democratic  models.  Finally,  Bitcoinocracy  (http://bitcoinocracy.com,  now  called
Vote Bitcoin) is a simple implementation to vote on propositions regarding Bitcoin.
In  it,  the  votes  are  made  valid  by  using  a  Bitcoin  address,  this  makes  them
unforgeable, but since the creation of wallets is gratuitous, the weight of the vote
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is measured in the quantity that wallet holds. The resulting system allows every
argument  to  be decided by the wealthiest  part  of  the population.  On its  own
Reddit thread the creator (Arsen Gasparyan) justifies the oligarchy set up of its
system: 
I am not sure whether democracy exists in real life. Perhaps it is just a show
made by the rich for the poor (more capital you control - more power you
have over the public opinion and thus voting results). Bitcoinocracy does the
same, but in a transparent and verifiable manner, without spending much
resources  on  democratic  decorations.  I  think  it  is  somewhat  similar  to
shareholder voting in the public  commercial  company. If  you don't own a
company, why would you decide what is better for its shareholders? More
shares you have - higher your influence is  (‘Bitcoinocracy - an Opensource
Project to Facilitate Decentralized Decision Making’ 2015).
Bitcoinocracy, the D-cent project, and the Flux party have distinct strategies to
improve social policies through Bitcoin-based systems. However, the rationale for
the proposals  has a similar  basis.  D-cent assumes that the current (pyramidal)
social organization was developed during the industrial age, but stagnated in the
information age (Sachy 2015). Likewise, Flux party founder Nathan Spataro stated
that representative democracy is a system that bloomed to get rid of monarchies,
but is unfitted for our current connected society (Siegel 2016). Although visibly
different,  these  projects  argue  against  outdated  decision-making  systems,
outdistanced  by  the  technology  that  can  reinvent  them.  For  these  projects,
stagnated governance and decision-making arrangements based on hierarchical,
imposed,  closed,  and  centralized  procedures  are  to  be  replaced  with  their
technically-enabled counterparts.
Bitcoin’s  ultimate  goal  was  not  to  design  a  technical  replacement  for
democracy,  although  it  certainly  inspired  the  previous  projects.  As  the  first
blockchain, it focused on producing a working shared ledger. While it is explicitly a
payment system, and not straightforwardly political, like D-cent and Bitcoinocracy,
it  shares  the  ideology  of  replacing  trust-related  organizational  systems  with
technology.  Returning  to  Maxwell’s  quote,  “it  was  specifically  created  and
promoted  to  replace  that  kind  [human]  of  subjectivity  with  machines”.  The
following pages focus on how a controversial topic —scaling the capacity of the
Bitcoin  network—showed  the  relevance  of  this  very  subjectivity  in  the
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construction of such technical system. The technical decision-making for scaling,
despite  its  fail-safe  strategies  for  internal  governance,  made  evident  two
contrasting political ideologies coexistent in the system.
The controversy was centred on the technical solutions to scale as the
number of transactions of the network grew. On the one hand, a fairly simple
solution was to enhance the capacity of each block in the chain, which is limited
by design to one megabyte of information. I  will  elaborate on why this  simple
technical tweak generated so much resistance. On the other hand, many strategies
to deal with scalability without changing the size of blocks were presented —and
generated their own resistances. Some eventually managed to get implemented,
but not without dividing the Bitcoin community. 
Scalability and Disenchanted Believers
Bitcoin’s public life started in 2016 with another story about its counted days
as a successful experiment, entitled “A Bitcoin Believer’s Crisis of Faith”, published
by the New York Times (Popper 2016). Stories depicting its failure have been a
recurring  phenomenon  along  its  evolution.  The  website  “Bitcoin
Obituaries”(‘Bitcoin Obituaries: Following Bitcoin While It Dies and Rises’ 2016)
lists  articles  that  have  declared  its  death,  and  according  to  the  site  as  of
September 10th 2017, it has already died 159 times. The title of each obituary cites
the original  reference alongside with  bitcoin’s  price  in USD at  the time of  the
publication, as a symbol to counterbalance or even mock the mournful statement.
But unlike the great majority of the listed obituaries, the 2016 New York Times
piece  was  not  an  analysis  made  by  experts  at  the  outskirts  of  the  Bitcoin
ecosystem. This story portrayed the deception and abandonment of Mike Hearn,
one of the main developers and early supporters of the cryptocurrency. Hearn
received his first email from Satoshi Nakamoto in 2009 (ActionTH),  and started
contributing to Bitcoin code at the end of 2010. He became so passionate about it
that he resigned his programmer job at Google to completely dedicate himself to
the  cryptocurrency’s  development.  However,  at  the  moment  of  the  New  York
Times piece Hearn had sold all of his bitcoins and declared the whole project a
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failed experiment. His support faded to the point of asking why anyone would
would care about a payment network that:
 Couldn’t move your existing money
 Had wildly unpredictable fees that were high and rising fast
 Allowed buyers to take back already made payments
 suffering from large backlogs and flaky payments
 controlled by China
 in  which the companies  and people  building  it  were in  open civil  war
(Hearn 2016).64
The list  of  the “disenchanted believer”  (Bogdan 2016)  combines technical  and
political disagreements. Alongside the block-scaling controversy, disagreements on
technical implementations led to severe political disagreements. While Hearn is
not the only manifestation of a discomfort with the decisions made inside Bitcoin’s
core  development,  he  certainly  became  a  public  voice  for  the  block-scaling
controversy. Because of his unique role, he is the narrative backbone to unfold it. 
Scaling the network is  in fact  an old debate, which scaled itself  as the
network was getting closer to its transaction capacity. Mike Hearn started a thread
back in March 2013, called “Soft block size limit reached, action required by YOU”
urging to pay attention to the soft-limit of the block size. Unlike the hard limit of
the Bitcoin blocks, which is unmodifiable without consensual changes to the core,
the soft limit can be set by each miner as long as it is below the hard limit (of one
megabyte).  There  are  different  reasons  for  having  different  limits,  i.e.  smaller
blocks are faster to replicate in the network, and may be useful if bandwidth is
scarce. Hearn’s warning was not a call to modify the protocol or any part of the
Bitcoin code at the time, but an advice to miners to keep the network open to the
demand of transactions.
Bitcoin’s transaction blocks have a limited space to allocate transactions. If
a transaction does not make it into a block, it waits in the “memory pool” to be
64  In bullets in the original.
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integrated  in  the  next  one.  By  the  time  of  the  thread,  the  memory  pool  for
pending transactions was not clearing them fast enough, because the use of the
network was growing. This increase was in great part due to the gambling website
Satoshi  Dice(‘Bitcoin  Dice  -  Satoshi  DICE’  2017),  which  allows  betting  on  the
information produced by the network. These bets contributed to flood the blocks,
thus, the thread advised to ignore transactions involved with Satoshi Dice or to
increase the soft limit to deal with them and be able to unblock other non-betting
transactions. The controversy of this thread was more focused on what posture to
take on Satoshi Dice than on scaling or consensus, however, it shed light on the
divergent stances regarding the later block size discussion. Hearn briefly presents
the consensus on this matter when user “drawingthesun” complains on the limits
of  the network:  “Bitcoin  can't  handle  more  than 1000  transactions  a  second?
There is no way a Bitcoin will have value in 20 years! Why are they so stubborn?
This is the single biggest hole in our Bitcoin fantasy.” (ActionTH). Hearn’s answer is
that developers are not a single unit, and lists some of the most relevant core
developers’ postures:
So, to be clear, ‘the devs’ is not a single unified hive mind :)
I actually want to see the block size limit removed, Bitcoin to scale up, and 
after that sort of thing is done SatoshiDice type sites won't be as much of an
issue anymore. I think Gavin [Andresen] feels the same way, as does sipa 
[Pieter Wuille]. Not sure how Matt [Corallo] feels. 
retep [Peter Todd] doesn't feel that way, however, though he's written some
great posts and useful patches, he hasn't been working on Bitcoin as long as
Gavin or I have.
Luke-Jr has the most extreme view of all of us, he sees SD [SatoshiDice] as 
being abusive and filters out their transactions from his pool [Eligius].
I included the option of filtering SD transactions out in my initial post 
because that's a short-term hack that buys additional time, if for some 
reason expanding the soft limit is not deemed acceptable or is insufficient. I 
don't think that'll be the case though (ActionTH).
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Gavin Andresen, a respected lead developer in the Bitcoin community chosen by
Nakamoto (Simonite 2014)65 reinforced Hearn belief later in the same thread, by
stating that in his opinion, “there is rough consensus that the 1MB block size limit
WILL  be  raised.  It  is  just  a  question  of  when  and  how  much /  how quickly.”
(ActionTH). Andresen seems to think that scaling the blockchain is obvious to most
people involved with Bitcoin’s future, and that only technicalities, like at which
point in time or with what exact method the block size would be raised, are to be
resolved.  In  fact,  few people  would  actually  resist  scaling,  but,  as  I  will  show,
scaling  and  block  enhancing  are  not  perceived  as  synonymous.  Peter  Todd,
another  developer  heavily  invested in  the  project,  and  gradual  rival  of  Hearn,
replied to Andresen that:
To say there is a rough consensus that the 1MB66 block limit will be raised at 
some unspecified time in the future is missing the point. The real issue is, is 
there a consensus that a large fraction of the transaction volume will in the 
future happen off-chain? Given the range of opinions between you and 
Mike [Hearn], who expect transaction fees to stay low enough for all but 
microtransactions, Pieter Wuille, who if I am correct is unsure, and Jeff 
Garzik, and Gregory Maxwell, who are both working on designs for off-chain
transaction systems, I just don't see a consensus (ActionTH).
Finally,  Jeff  Garzik,  another  main  developer  contributing  to  Bitcoin  code  since
2010, adds his opinion to the scaling issue: “In general, I would say there is rough
consensus that the 1MB size limit  probably will change  sometime in the future.
But beyond that, opinions vary wildly. I think there is also a rough consensus that
unlimited  block  size  is  nutters.”  (ActionTH).  Like  many  threads  involving  a  hot
topic, it evolves into a diversity of micro-controversies and eventually fades just
below the 300th  comment. The soft limit was enhanced by default in the 0.9.0
version67 of the software (March 2014).  However,  the lack of  consensus would
become bigger in the future. Another thread, also started by Hearn, and one of
the most discussed in the “Development & Technical Discussion” of the Bitcoin
forums, proposed a way to fund mining in an unlimited block size scenario, i.e.
65 Andresen was the lead developer of Bitcoin Core from 2011 to 2014. He kept working
on the project until the beginning of 2016. In May of that year his Github commit
access  was  revoked  by  the  other  core  developers,  allegedly  on  the  basis  that  his
account had been hacked. 
66 One megabyte (1 000 000 bytes of digital information).
67 https://bitcoin.org/en/release/v0.9.0.
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assurance contracts. The discussion extended not only because the limitations of
the proposed funding technique, but because it set eyes in a scheme that most of
the  main  developers  resisted  to  foresee.  Again,  Peter  Todd  plays  the  main
antagonist role, especially on the consensus of block size:
FWIW [For what it’s worth] currently the majority of the core team 
members, Gregory Maxwell, Jeff Garzik and Pieter Wuille, have all stated 
they are against increasing the blocksize as the solution to the scalability 
problem. Each has different opinions and degrees of course on exactly what 
that position constitutes, but ultimately all of them believe off-chain 
transactions need to be the primary way to make Bitcoin scale. (...) to be 
clear no-one, including myself, thinks the blocksize must never change. 
Rather achieve scalability first through off-chain transactions, and only then 
do you consider increasing the limit (InfiniteTH).
Todd argues against block size scaling because it involves a hard-fork, which, due
to  its  destabilizing  nature,  requires  consensus  from  most  part  of  the  Bitcoin
ecosystem. I’ll  specify  later what a hard-fork consensus means specifically,  and
question the scope of the ecosystem regarding decision making processes. At this
point, consensus should be limited to the developers of the core Bitcoin software.
Being an open source project, the list of developers hovers around 360, but only a
handful  of  them  have  permissions  to  “merge”,  that  is,  to  integrate  proposed
changes  to  the  main  branch  of  code.  Everyone  has  a  voice  (a  sound
implementation proposal),  but only a few have the authorization to enact  the
voice.  New  implementations  need  a  reasonable  number  of  AKCs  (short  for
acknowledgements) from all developers participating in the discussion, but a solid
ACK consensus of the ones with the power to merge. A general “ACK” means that
they agree with the concept and direction of the proposal, but haven’t revised the
code, a “utACK” reveals that they agree with the idea and the code, but haven’t
test its actual functionality. A “tested ACK” is a good to go position, both from an
instrumental  and  a  philosophical  point  of  view.  Finally,  a  “NACK”  position
disagrees either with the idea or its implementation, and is usually supplemented
with some argumentation. It is not unusual to see participants that disagree with
the change, but ACK or utACK depending on the group orientation.68
68 At the moment of this writing, eight people were “collaborators”, -i.e. have the power
to merge- in Bitcoin’s Git repository, but neither Peter Todd, Gregory Maxwell, or Mike
Hearn, the most intense voices of the block controversy, are or were in this list. The
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Being  an  open  source  project,  the  development  is  in  theory  open  to
everyone. This includes not only the coding to maintain the system working and
free of errors, which, like in most open source projects is provided by multiple
volunteers, but also the ideas to improve the system. Everyone can help in the
future design, but all propositions are filtered through a clearly defined policy. The
next section explains the procedure for new suggestions, and how proposals were
distributed among developers. It also signals the first proposal that called for an
expanded block solution for scaling. 
BIP 101: Introduction to Code Improvement Proposals
Like  most  open  projects,  collaboration  issues  in  Bitcoin  can  be  settled  via  Git
protocols  like  the  ones  described  above,  but  due  to  its  delicate  consensus
requirement Bitcoin development also adds a second layer of conventions for new
suggestions. Created by Amir Taaki,69 Bitcoin Improvement Proposal (BIP) followed
the tradition of Internet Engineering Task Force’s  (‘The Tao of IETF: A Novice’s
Guide to the Internet Engineering Task Force’ 2012) open calls for improvement.
BIPs  are  essential  for  changes  are  particularly  controversial  or  that  introduce
changes to core rules of the protocol.
They  are  organized  into  three  categories:  standard,  informational  and
procedural. Standard BIP’s introduce changes to the network protocol, block and
transaction validation,  and  in  general  anything  that  can  affect  interoperability.
Informational BIP’s are concerned with guidelines and design issues. Process BIP’s
propose changes that take place outside of the network protocol.  According to
Taaki’s protocol, before assigning a BIP number to an idea, it has to be previously
discussed in a Bitcoin forum or mailing list. After it has had at least some positive
feedback, it  can be submitted for a BIP. This process saves time on the person
proposing the changes, for if his idea seems particularly difficult to implement or
has no support from the community, there is no point in investing time further
developing it.  BIPs are then, filtered suggestions that earn the possibility to be
thoroughly discussed and implement by whoever is interested in participating. The
collaborators  were  Garzik,  Schnelli,  van  der  Laan,  Dashjr,  Falke,  Wuille  and  Fields;
Nakamoto and Malmi are the only people that abandoned it, and Andersen is the only
one whose permissions got revoked.
69 He also proposed making donations in bitcoin to wikileaks (Popper 2015, 58).
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BIP editor can deny  BIP status only when there is “duplication of effort, disregard
for formatting rules, being too unfocused or too broad, being technically unsound,
not providing proper motivation or addressing backwards compatibility, or not in
keeping with the Bitcoin philosophy” (‘Bitcoin/Bips’ 2016). Except for the last one,
most  reasons for denial  are  technical  and non-controversial,  so any technically
feasible proposal with enough backup can become a BIP draft. Standard track BIPs
include  code  or  a  patch  to  be  applied,  that  is  improved  while  the  BIP  is  still
considered a draft. Once this implementation is complete and accepted by the
community, the status can change to “final”. If for any reason the BIP stagnates,
the  status  is  changed  to  “deferred”.  It  can  be  “rejected”  too,  when  further
discussion proves there are unresolvable problems with the proposal (Taaki n.d.). 
The  block-scaling  debate  lingered  in  dribs  and  drabs  through  different
channels  (mainly  Reddit  and  the  Bitcoin  forums)  through  2014  but  without  a
notorious  presence  outside  the  internal  development  discussions.  Mainstream
media focused more on the steady hand of the coin’s volatility, the follow-up of a
myriad of start-ups trying to exploit Bitcoin blockchain, and the curiosity of the
banks to adopt Blockchain technology in one form or the other. However, in 2015
a series of (failed) BIPs emerged trying to implement scaling solutions that would
more broadly evince the controversy.
The  beginning  of  May  2015  reignited  the  scaling  controversy  among
developers.  On May 4th Andresen posted “Time to roll  out the bigger blocks”
(Andresen 2015c) and “Why increasing the block size is urgent” (Andresen 2015d)
in his personal blog. There he argued for an “ugly but necessary” block scaling
(Andresen 2015b). Andresen’s support for scaling was rapidly noticed by the other
core  developers:  only  two  days  later,  Matt  Corallo  started  a  thread  raising
concerns  about  it  in  the  developers  mailing  list  (Corallo  2015).  The  thread
triggered a substantive discussion between the most active collaborators at the
moment, but especially between Hearn, Todd, Jeff Garzik, Jorge Timón, and “btc
drak”.
Again,  Hearn  fulfils  the  role  of  spokeperson,  as  Andresen has  minimal
participation in this mailing list discussion. He and Andresen are the only strong
advocates to substantially increase the blocks; the others agree to the necessity of
scaling, but not on the forking solution. A day later, Hearn started posting a series
of posts supporting block size increase. In these, he pointed out that the time to
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implement  a  decision  was  getting close,  as  transactions  were  near  to  achieve
100% of the block size, like the soft-fork of 2014. All transactions that don’t make
it into a block get stored in the memory pool, but as they accumulate, the time to
insert them into a block also grows. It is a bloated system, Hearn argues, because
at 80% of capacity, half of the transactions would take as long as 20 minutes and,
alarmingly,  at  100% half  of  the transactions would take more than 6 hours.  A
revision of the figures minimized the numbers to a 2-hour delay at 100%(‘Bitcoin
Traffic Bulletin (Redux)’ 2016).70 What followed were a series of diplomatic BIPs by
several of the main developers, tackling an implementation for the controversy
resolution, and also a seemingly undiplomatic fork lead by Hearn. On June 22,
Gavin Andresen proposed BIP 101, an implementation to upscale the size of the
blocks  to  eight  megabytes  —eight  times  the  current  size— in  2016  and  then
doubling the size every two years until 2036 (Andresen 2015a).  This denotes a
long scope plan to deal with the scaling issue. Only a day later Jeff Garzik proposed
BIP  102,  which  requested  a  one-time  increase  to  two  megabytes  —twice  the
current  size  (Garzik  2015).  An  even  longer  scope plan was  proposed  by  Peter
Wuille about a month later: BIP 103 specifically asked for an increase every 97
days or so,  for a constant 18% growth per year,  until 2063 (Wuille 2015).  “Btc
Drak”,  also a  main  contributor,  added BIP  105 in  August,  the  first  of  dynamic
growth  proposals,  not  subjected  to  arbitrary  scaling,  but  dependent  on  the
behaviour of the market and/or miners. BIP 105 introduced a function for miners
to vote for small increases or decreases every time they created a block (BtcDrak
2015).  It  deflected  all  responsibility  on  block  size  to  miners,  and  relied  on  a
hypothetical  invisible  hand  (Smith  1791)  of  production.  BIP  106  (Chakraborty
2015) was proposed in the same month and also used dynamic scaling, this time
based on the last 2,000 block fillings, i.e. if a majority of those blocks were close to
full,  the  block  size  doubles,  if  on  the  contrary  they  weren’t,  the  block  size  is
halved. Again, the size is controlled by miners, yet mediated by an algorithm. BIP
107  (Sanchez  2015)  was  a  hybrid  version  of  the  previous  proposals.  It  was
proposed on August and supported a two MB increase first, then a four MB and
six MB between it and 2020, thereafter a dynamic increase very similar to BIP 106.
Finally, BIP 109 (Garzik 2016), also proposed by Gavin Andresen in January 2016,
after withdrawing his first proposal (101), offered a more modest increase of two
MB, but with fine-grained rules,  and added precautions to  how these changes
70 As a reference, in December 2015, the average capacity was at 60%.
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could be adopted by miners: a smaller threshold was chosen to be considered a
majority (74% instead of 90%), to avoid the decision to be hijacked by only one of
the biggest pools (Andresen 2016).
Except for BIP 101, these BIPs like many others remain on a draft stage,
mostly because the ideas in them may be re-purposed for future implementations.
For the total 82 BIPs, five have been withdrawn, three deferred, and only one has
been  replaced.  As  shown  in  Fig.  12  (‘Bitcoin/Bips’  2016)  most  of  the  main
developers have proposed changes to the protocol, with different outcomes. It is
clear  that  Andresen  holds  the  bulk  of  the  proposals  —eleven,  plus  one  co-
authored with  Mike  Hearn  (Andresen  and  Hearn  2013)— but  also  that  drafts,
accepted, and withdrawals are fairly distributed among all developers.
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 Fig 12: Alluvial distribution of BIPs status and applicant
Hearn did  not  propose a  BIP  for  block  scaling.  Before,  he  had already
proposed  BIP  31,  BIP  37  (with  Matt  Corallo),  and  BIP  64.  The  first  two  were
accepted, but the last one generated the usual confrontation with Todd: it was
acknowledged and merged, but then reversed, due to a security issue. Instead,
Hearn would later implement this BIP and Andresen’s 101 in a fork called Bitcoin
XT. Forking is a regular activity within open software, and this was far from being
the first  Bitcoin Fork. However,  due to the particular characteristic of  being an
open software with  embedded (and  rapidly  growing)  economical  value,  a  fork
outside  of  the  consensus  sphere  proved  to  be  openly  confrontational  and
generated a break up in two decisive groups.
5.2. Strategies for Dissension: Forking
Forking is a strategy that comes from OSS projects. It is usually limited to open
projects because it involved a direct duplication, and thus nothing under subject
to copyright can be formally forked (Tkacz 2011). Since the initial state of the fork
includes two projects with the same code, followed by changes in each branch,
competition between them is considered a natural part of forking (Raymond n.d.).
As a phenomenon originated from software cultures, forking has been a topic for
many scholar works (e.g. Steven Weber’s “The success of open source”; and Clay
Shirky’s “Here comes everybody”), but it has been mostly discussed within popular
“native” contexts. Nathaniel Tkacz argues that there is no single definition of a
fork, but it is possible to identify its core characteristics in the literature:
Forking primarily involves a split, the duplication of source code or content
and the creation of a new project along with the original. The two projects
proceed in different directions, but, at least initially, both draw on the original
code. As the two projects develop in different directions, at some point it
becomes impossible to exchange code between the projects (Tkacz 2011, 95–
96).
Forking also brings into question the intent of the “forker” and the status of
the wider  “developer  community”  who cannot  be forked in  the technical
sense of duplication (Tkacz 2015, 132).
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To illustrate his points,  Tkacz (2015) critically discusses the 2002 forking of the
Spanish  chapter  of  Wikipedia  into  the  Enciclopedia  Libre  Universal  en  Español
(‘Enciclopedia  Libre  Universal  En  Español’  2017).  After  internal  disagreement
regarding the funding strategies for the Wikipedia project,  the Spanish version
forked its contents and started its own wiki version in Spanish. Tkacz follows the
competition between the two projects in relation to number of contributors and
published  articles,  up  until  2011.  While  at  the  beginning  both  are  in  direct
competition, by the end of this period the Spanish Wikipedia (the original branch)
had  a  significant  advantage  (e.g.  15,706  active  users  compared  to  67  in  the
Enciclopedia Libre fork).71 Tkacz analyses the capacity to fork in the context of
Hirschman’s  “exit”  and  “voice”,  as  options  for  dissidence.  The  first  by
abandonment  and  the  second  as  an  attempt  to  change  practices  of  an
organization (Hirschman 1970). Forking, then, can be read as a way to “respond to
the question of (perceived) organizational failure, deterioration, or discontent in
different ways” (Tkacz 2015, 129). Edgar Enyedy, the leader of the Spanish chapter
of Wikipedia, used forking as a way to both voice his concerns on the “free” status
of the project, which to this date relies on voluntary donations, and to exit when
internal negotiations reached a dead end. 
In the case of the block size controversy, Hearn can be identified as the
“forker”  figure,  since  he  was  the  one  that  trespassed  the  BIP  proposals  to
implement  a  hard  fork.  The  clustering  of  antagonists  is  more  complicated,
considering that most BIPs included their own kind of block scaling, however, it is
clear that most of the “developer community” supported following the consensus
path  and  to  keep  looking  for  options  to  scaling  before  any  implementations.
Andresen is the exception: he was keen to support every direction possible: he
discussed new BIPs, offered their own, and helped coding Bitcoin XT (whose first
version was practically based on his BIP 101) all at the same time. For Andresen,
known within the community as a respected voice, scaling was the problem and
any working solution for it was the correct answer to that problem:
71 Tkacz considers that end of competition is not synonymous with a political failure of
the fork: “The fork demonstrated that the issues at stake were serious enough for
contributors to leave, and it elevated the force of the debate that transpired on the
list, along with its repercussions” (Tkacz 2011).
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I AM considering contributing some version of the bigger blocksize-limit 
hard-fork patch to the Bitcoin-Xt fork (...) and then encouraging merchants 
and exchanges and web wallets and individuals who think it strikes a 
reasonable balance to run it. And then, assuming it became a super-
majority of nodes on the network, encourage miners to roll out a soft-fork 
to start producing bigger blocks and eventually trigger the hard fork. 
Because ultimately consensus comes down to what software people choose
to run (ReigniteTH).
Tkacz  identifies  two main  qualities  to  forking:  its  “constitutive”  nature  and its
function as a “safety net” (Tkacz 2015, 133). The first one is seen as the basic right
or freedom (S. Weber 2004) to fork, embedded in open software projects. Indeed,
Bitcoin  as  an  open  source  project  offers  that  constitutive  right,  and  the  core
software has been forked more than a thousand times: most of these forks exist as
a practical way to commit changes before submitting them for integration into the
main repository, it is fair to assume that many others are orphaned experiments
(the git protocol and the Github website allow to fork a repository with a simple
command line or by pushing one button). 
Similar projects to Bitcoin were generated and ramified from this original
source code to produce competing coins. Dubbed as “altcoins” or “bitcoin-derived
cryptocurrencies”(‘Build-a-Coin  Cryptocurrency  Creator’  2017),  most  of  them
emerged  as  competing  cryptocurrencies  that  behave  differently.  Litecoin,  the
second  largest  cryptocurrency  to  date,  is  an  example  of  a  competing  coin.  It
behaves as a currency, but uses a different hashing algorithm (scrypt, instead of
SHA-256) with the intention of complicating the use of ASICs (see Chapter One) in
the mining process. It also modifies some of the Bitcoin variables, like having a
faster block processing and a maximum of 84 million tokens. Litecoin has its own
code branch, name and blockchain, which distinguish it from the Bitcoin chain. It
does share, however, the financial asset orientation. Thus, it can be considered a
competitor within the cryptocurrencies market but,  it  remains an independent
chain and coexist with Bitcoin and other altcoins.
A few other projects do not even enter in direct competition with Bitcoin,
because they use tokens merely as mediums for other ends (e.g. distributed DNS
servers).  Like  the  competing  coins,  these  blockchain  instantiations  keep  basic
characteristics of any blockchain —a shared registry that conflated its own token
circulation and  production— but  are  not  identified  as  currencies  or  economic
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elements.  Thus,  they  are  neither  competing  chains  nor  competing  coins.
Ethereum(‘Ethereum Project’ 2017) is perhaps the most known example. At times
coined Bitcoin 2.0, Ethereum is not seen as an altcoin or as Bitcoin evolution, but
as an artefact that enhances the original scope of mere circulation by introducing
a programmable and executable aspect to the blockchain. Commonly known as
digital contracts, these are arrangements and rules defined between two or more
parties and deployed in Ethereum’s blockchain. While “ether” function as tokens
to enable the contracts, they are seen more as “activation” tokens than as crypto-
money. Ether does have a monetary value, and like Bitcoin is bought and sold in
relation to fiat markets,  however,  the economical  exchange plays the role of a
mean to the end of generating and executing digital contracts.
However, unlike Litecoin or Ethereum, Bitcoin XT was presented as direct
competitor for the same  chain.  Competing chains are attempts to replicate the
same blockchain in order to replace it. While changes are regularly made to the
code and protocol of the Bitcoin blockchain, the intention to upscale the size limit
in the blocks of transactions, generated the intention to create competing bitcoin
blockchains  to  the  original  chain  (simply  called  “Bitcoin”  or  “Bitcoin  Core”).
Curiously, Bitcoin XT would not even be the first fork using the same blockchain
and mint: Bitcoin LJR (Dashjr n.d.) has been maintained by Luke Dashjr, a main
developer, since 2011. Bitcoin LJR introduces minor changes, and should in theory
be considered a direct competitor of Bitcoin Core. In reality, however, it has played
more the role of a reliable experimental backup and its “false competition” is of
another kind than the controversial Bitcoin XT. Like Dashjr, Hearn had always the
constitutive freedom to fork and start his own project as he is abruptly reminded
by Todd in a heated BIP discussion: 
Of course, the beautiful thing is that we don't need consensus: you can 
always create a Bitcoin Core fork for people who want to volunteer to 
provide decentralized and unauthenticatable services to others if you can't 
get consensus that doing so is a good idea. (...) It'd also make it easier to 
implement things like proof-of-passport to (perhaps) give some assurance 
that your peers for these services aren't sybil attacking you - all things that 
can easily be done in a fork you're leading the development of (Bip64TH).
The purposed changes of the BIP 64 would in fact be eventually added to Bitcoin
XT code, for which creation Hearn appealed to “safety net” function. Forking as
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“the last resort of the disgruntled” (Tkacz 2015) when all communication channels
haven been closed. In an interview with The Guardian Hearn stated: “I feel sad
that it’s  come to this,  but there is  no other way. The Bitcoin Core project has
drifted so far from the principles myself and many others feel are important, that a
fork is the only way to fix things” (Hern 2015). The idea that the Bitcoin XT fork
was the only solution to the whole scaling problem is in great part the reason why
this particular fork generated so much controversy and rejection.
Like  the  LJR  fork,  Bitcoin  XT  competes  for  the  control  of  the  same
blockchain,  but  unlike  LJR  it  aroused the community,  for  two reasons:  First,  it
blossomed  in  the  middle  of  an  existing  controversy,  which  had  been  silently
growing for some years and appealed to the “right” principles of the project. And
second, it was a direct confrontation of the whole idea of consensus. I’ll  come
back  to  the  idea  of  the  “right”  Blockchain  later,  and  focus  now  on  the
confrontation generated by XT. In the context of an increasing mood for changes in
the state of affairs of the Bitcoin ecosystem, and a strict law to implement them
based on consensus, Hearn’s fork was clearly a contentious dissidence. Even that
both consensus and fork are an integral part of open software, the fork must be
read here as the antithesis of consensus. Bitcoin’s  distention is  enabled by the
move of different forces, atomically represented in the BIP’s implementations and
the collaboration to expand the code based on the necessities of the ecosystem
(conformed by quite diverse entities: from irregular contributors to the code, to
CEOs  of  start-ups  involved  with  the  cryptocurrency,  or  lawyers  dealing  with
regulation issues). The necessity to scale, regardless of the block size disruption, is
intentionally  executed  by  Hearn’s  fork.  This  intention  to  distend  triggered  the
already existing opposing forces of the Bitcoin project to the point of break up.
Thus,  it  is  important  to  discern that  the “forker”,  —Hearn,  and Andresen to a
lesser extent— and the opposing “dev community” are but the placeholders of a
sum of vectors. With this in mind, it can be observed that the fork clustered two
groups.
De-Sideing the Blockchain
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From an uninformed perspective and because the debate concentrates around the
word “scaling”, it may appear that the groups are divided by their intentionality, or
lack of, to scale. Indeed, Hearn constantly accused his antagonists to intentionally
block Bitcoin’s growth: “those who don’t want to see Bitcoin scale up as Satoshi
intended have decided to stall the process of doing so” (Hearn 2015). He directly
accused Peter Todd of not wanting Bitcoin to scale up (InfiniteTH), and argued that
the Chinese miners also had infrastructural reasons to oppose to scaling by any
means: 
Why  has  the  capacity  limit  not  been  raised?  Because  the  block  chain  is
controlled by Chinese miners (...) Why are they not allowing it to grow? (...)
the  miners  refuse  to  switch  to  any  competing  product  (...)  and  they’re
terrified of doing anything that might make the news as a “split” and cause
investor  panic  (...)  And the final  reason is  that  the Chinese internet  is  so
broken by their  government’s  firewall  that moving data across the border
barely  works  at  all  (...)  This  gives  them  a  perverse  financial  incentive  to
actually try and stop Bitcoin becoming popular (Hearn 2016).
On a previous post, however, he had included “several major mining pools,
including all  the Chinese pools”  (Hearn 2015)  in  the list  of  entities supporting
raising the block size. The purpose of this post was to justify the creation of Bitcoin
XT (both posts were published in the same day). The list did not directly name
anyone but Gavin Andresen and Jeff Garzik, and included: developers of popular
wallets, many bitcoin exchanges, the two biggest payment processors (presumably
Bitpay was one of them), and users in online forums. The list was partly based in a
previous compilation by Reddit user “Technom4ge”(‘List of Bitcoin Services That
Support/Oppose Increasing Max Block Size’  2016), who gathered statements of
notorious names in the Bitcoin industry. It must be stressed that these clusters
were malleable, and many supported a hard-fork, but with different specificities
and not necessarily the specific version proposed in Bitcoin XT. The latter was,
nonetheless, the only existent implementation at the moment. 
Here it is important to discern between scaling and hard-forking. Far from
Hearn’s claims, no one in the Bitcoin ecosystem publicly supported stagnation, as
it was in everyone’s best interest to extend Bitcoin’s use and capabilities. The real
issue  was  to  what  point  to  scale,  and  by  what  means,  and  this  is  where  the
ecosystem was divided. The cluster represented by most main developers was in
favour of scaling not by enhancing block capacity by hard-forking, but by scaling
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through any other feasible means.  On the other side, the group represented by
Hearn,  had  no  problems  in  changing  block  size  (this  last  option  was,  from  a
technical point of view, as easy as changing a line of code).
At some point during the forum’s threads, Hearn stopped addressing each
member personally and started clustering on Blockstream what he identified as an
opposing force. Blockstream is a Blockchain technology company co-founded by
Gregory Maxwell, Mark Friedenbach, and Adam Back. Maxwell is one of the main
developers,  and  like  Peter  Todd,  a  constant  antagonist  of  Hearn.  Blockstream
develops sidechains (Back et al. 2014) and the  Lightning Network (among other
projects), both intended to ease the transaction load on the core blockchain, and
enable communication between it and other blockchains, while monetizing the
process. The president, Adam Back, is a long-standing figure in the cryptography
community (author of Hashcash, as seen in Chapter Three). He had suggested in
August 2015 an immediate block scaling of two MB, followed by a  four MB in two
years,  and  eight  MB  in  eight  years  (Back  2015),  but  he  also  stressed  the
importance of developing other forms of scaling, like the ones Blockstream would
eventually develop. The company raised 21 million in investments in November
2015  (Rizzo  2014)  and  55  more  in  early  2016  (Vigna  2016).  In  the  reignited
discussions of 2015, Hearn addressed the resources of the company and clustered
his criticism in the organization rather than in specific developers:
the ‘Bitcoin ecosystem’ is not well funded. Blockstream might be, but 
significant numbers of users are running programs developed by tiny 
startups, or volunteers who don't have millions in venture capital to play 
with. (...) What I would like to see from Blockstream is a counter-proposal 
(ReIgniteTH).
Blockstream’s payroll certainly includes Maxwell, Jorge Timón, Mark Friedenbach
and Pieter Wuille, all Bitcoin Core maintainers. The company then would remain a
strong “side” of the controversy even after the failure of Bitcoin XT and Hearn’s
disappearance. The successor of XT would be another failed fork, Bitcoin Classic,
also  supported  by  Gavin  Andresen  and  other  parts  of  the  industry,  which
expressively stands against Blockstream’s influence over Core development. 
Decentralization of Unforkable Money 
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The strongest arguments in favour of size increase (in any of its forms) can be
summarized  as  the  easier  and  more  straightforward  method  for  scaling.  The
reasons to refuse it are less unequivocal. When BitcoinXT’s adoption was being
discussed, Gavin Andresen gathered a list of the main arguments against block size
scaling (Andresen 2015c). Many of them are related to security, stability, efficiency,
and existence of implementations, yet one of them stands out from the rest, and
is  summarized  as:  “More  transactions  means  more  bandwidth  and  CPU  and
storage cost, and more cost means increased centralization because fewer people
will be able to afford that cost.” (Andresen 2015e). The decentralization issue is
particularly  relevant  within  Blockchain  technology,  but  crucial  to  the  Bitcoin
project, as it is by definition the first decentralized network of its kind.
Peter Todd’s repeated concern with the scaling issue is not only related to
instrumentation  ambiguities,  but  with  centralization and  (state  or  corporation)
censorship. Unlike other main developers like Andresen, Wuille or van der Laan,
who tend to avoid confrontation and focus on settling technical disagreements,
Peter Todd would play the role of direct confrontation with Hearn, by focusing on
the  ethics  and  ends  of  blockchained  systems.  As  early  as  February  2013
(InevitableTH),  Todd  argued  that  a  fluctuating  or  unlimited  block  size  would
“inevitably” lead to a centralized system. While his thread used far-flung examples
for the actual fork proposals —blocks of ten megabytes, 100 megabytes and even
one gigabyte in size— is still valid: a miner with better bandwidth has a better
chance to distribute a block trough the network (it can send the same amount of
information to more people), and therefore win the race for integrating his block
on the chain.  A hypothetical  competing miner,  dubbed “David” in Peter Todd’s
argumentation,  who  “lives  in  country  with  a  failing  currency,  and  his  local
government is trying to ban Bitcoin” (InevitablyTH), has a strong disadvantage and
can’t  effectively  win  the  race  to  find  new blocks,  thus,  abandoning  mining  or
joining a pool. The pools, however, would eventually be in the same dilemma, and
only  the  ones  with  infrastructural  advantages  would  remain,  geographically
clustered. This is, effectively, the centralization anxiety of the distributed system,
brought by bigger blocks in the chain.
Infrastructure  deficiencies  were  a  restless  element  for  miners  in  China
since before BIP 101. When Gavin Andresen informally proposed an increase to 20
MB blocks, five of the strongest Chinese mining pools pronounced against it, and
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in  turn  made  a  compromise  for  an  eight  MB  increase,  arguing  that  “Chinese
internet bandwidth infrastructure is not built out to the same level as that of other
countries” and that “Chinese outbound internet bandwidth is  restricted, which
causes increased latency in connections to Europe and the United States” (van
Wirdum 2015).  The signers, Antpool, F2Pool, BTCChina, BW mining, and Huobi,
gathered at the time more than 50% of the hashing power of the whole network.
Hearn, in contrast, is not interested in David’s (or the chinese miners) luck:
“You want to keep the block size limit so Dave can mine off a GPRS connection
forever? Why should I care about Dave? The other miners will make larger blocks
than he can handle and he'll  have to stop mining and switch to an SPV client.
Sucks  to  be  him.”  (InevitableTH).  Even  though Todd does not  claim to  defend
vulnerable miners, he makes it clear that decentralization and security are his and
Bitcoin’s main ends: “I don't have any interest in working on a system that boils
down to a complicated and expensive replacement for PayPal. Decentralization is
the fundamental thing that makes Bitcoin special.” (InevitableTH). The discussion
generated  more  than  500  comments,  extended  for  almost  two  months,  and
aroused the debate.
What is at stake here is that scaling the network has a decentralization
cost, which in theory goes against the fundamentals of Bitcoin. The cost may be
acceptable, since every entity is up for enlarging the system, if  the outcome is
worth it. In this case, the goal is what divides both groups. Jeff Garzik questions
this very issue in the middle of 2015: "Are we trying to build a system that can
handle Paypal volumes? VISA volumes? It's not a snarky or sarcastic question: Are
we building a system to handle all the world's coffees? Is bitcoin's main chain and
network - Layer 1 - going to receive direct connections from 500m mobile phones,
broadcasting transactions?" (ReigniteTH). At stake was not only the capacity of the
network to be a system handling VISA payment volumes, but the motivation to
create such a system. The Bitcoin XT group argues that the system should be a
competitive  payment  network  capable  of  micro-transactions.  The  other  group
argues for  a  pure  core  that  acts as a  ‘settlement network’  (Hagelstrom 2016),
which  depends  on  separated,  and  more  centralized,  payment  networks  (i.e.
sidechains  or  the  Lightning  Network).  The  purity  of  the  core  was  one  of  the
reasons why Hearn’s BIP 64 was in fact controversial:  while it  didn’t  pledge to
make changes to the block size, it was qualified as an unnecessary change to core,
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which  “should  stay  pure  and  focused”  (‘genjix’  Bip64TH),  and  Hearn’s
implementations should be written on more superficial layers of the bitcoin code.
As  I  stated  before,  one  of  the  reasons  why  this  particular  fork  became
controversial was that it questioned the “right” principles of the project, which
ended up signalling to different directions.
The breakup of an internal logic within the project is an expected outcome
for the fork.  As  Tkacz argues,  a  fork  is  the symptom that the controversy  has
reached a limit for internally driven negotiation: “When the possibility of a fork
emerges, the controversy cannot be settled within the current rules of formation”
(Tkacz 2015, 173). This destabilizing effect makes two similar (but not identical)
projects go into competition, but the result of this opposition also has a stabilizing
effect, because it enables a definite form (the winner) of the open project (Tkacz
2015, chap. 5).
While the stabilizing effect should apply to Bitcoin forking, and in theory
to every open project based in Blockchain technology, its money-like behaviour
insulates Bitcoin from other Open Source projects. Unlike the Spanish Wikipedia
(Tkacz  2015),  or  the  Openoffice.org/Libreoffice  fork,  where  the  assets  can  be
replicated and hold their value, the tokens of Bitcoin only have value in one of the
blockchains. Open code can be duplicated, but there is only one blockchain, or at
least, one that preserves a substantial economic value. It is possible to download
and use Openoffice.org or Libreoffice, although the fork took place in 2010, and
the  main  difference  are  the  communities  supporting  it:  on  the  one  hand  a
corporation and on the other a foundation. Although the Enciclopedia Libre en
Español cannot be considered to be in direct competition with Wikipedia anymore
(Tkacz 2015, 147 note 16), it is still active and usable for its intended purposes.
Coexistence after competition does not apply to Bitcoin, and therefore the fork
controversy is different from other open source projects. The reason for this is that
the essence of blockchain technology is to oppose digital counterfeit, specifically
to avoid double spending on transactions without the need of  trusted parties.
Even though it  is prone to errors, like any other system, the formal materiality
(Kirschenbaum 2007) of its pieces differs from other “immaterial illusions”: the
“identification without ambiguity” (Kirschenbaum 2007, 11) is deliberately taken
to a limit. Unforgeable but fluid pieces of data (or strings of symbols) is the raison
d’être and distinctive ontology of blockchains. In the case of Bitcoin, these tokens
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are now embedded with economic value. The assets contained in it, not in the
software per se but in the network running it, are now worth seven billion dollars,
and  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  this  figure  to  grow.  The  value  cannot  be  split
between  the  forks,  assets  that  remain  in  the  defeated  blockchain  become
worthless. Thus, the outcome of the fork represents not only the future of the
project,  an ideology for  or  against  centralization,  the endurance of  a  group of
people, or the restructuration of consensus rules, but also a substantial economic
interest. 
Due to these reasons, the struggle generated notorious resistance, and
Bitcoin XT never reached the status of an official fork. Despite having the support
of part of the industry and an unmeasurable portion of the greater community of
users and enthusiast, it lacked the backing from the biggest miners. At its highest
point, support for Bitcoin XT was expressed by 10% of the nodes in the network,
far  from  the  75%  required  for  its  adoption  (‘Scalability  Debate  Continues  As
Bitcoin  XT  Proposal  Stalls’  2016).  Instead,  the  main  developers  activated  a
technique (Segregated Witness) to free space from each block by getting rid of
non-essential information. Thus, the block size remains to this date at one MB, but
each block can manage more information about the transactions. However, the
group in favour of the block-scaling did see an implementation: in August 2017,
Bitcoin Cash,  the first  chain competing fork was launched(‘Bitcoin Cash’  2017).
Inspired  by  previous  block-scaling  proposals  like  Bitcoin  XT,  Bitcoin  Cash
implements an immediate block size of eight MB. As of August, users are able to
decide on which chain they want to bind their assets. It is reasonable to expect a
non-traditional,  in  terms  of  old-school  forked  open  software,  competition
between these projects in the following months.
The clash not only divided the project into two groups representing “largely
incompatible”(‘Bitcoin Cash’ 2017 F.A.Q)  visions for Bitcoin. It also signalled the
evolution of a contradiction nested in the utopic origins of the project for crypto-
assets. This contradiction was noticed in the previous chapter: on the one hand,
the project  was born from an accumulated concern for  privacy  —in particular
against  state  surveillance—  and  decentralization  of  trust  and  normativity  (as
presented in Chapter Three). On the other hand, the project is also the result of a
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quest for a frictionless exchange system, able to operate independently from the
state  structures.  Both  ends  are  met  and  embodied  in  projects  like  Bitcoin,
however, it is exactly a discussion between which of these ends has ultimately a
higher priority, what branched a somewhat cohesive ideology into two separate
programmes represented by Bitcoin Core and Bitcoin Cash. Competition between
the two projects is also convoluted, in comparison to other OSS examples, by the
particular characteristics of the public blockchain of being at the same time an
open and public digital machine, yet producing private non-duplicable units. The
birth of the blockchain is a cause for reformulation of the notion of forking in OSS,
and the attempt to fork an effect of the historical contradiction of the machine. 
Interestingly,  the  competition  within  the  system  also  showed  the
limitations of the governance that the blockchain system itself is, in part, trying to
avoid. Coming back to Gregory Maxwell words at the beginning of this chapter,
“mankind is ill-equip to create a strong and sound system via human governance
(...) mankind is fundamentally not cut out for it (...) Bitcoin was specifically created
and promoted to replace that kind of subjectivity with machine”. In a way, this
chapter  closes  a  circle  with  the  first  one.  It  connects  the  humanly  settled
production of an idea —the Bitcoin blockchain— embodied in a machine ruled by
the efficient logic of automated computation, whose utmost purpose is to replace
or  outsource  a  process  of  production  and  (tentatively)  of  governance.  This
circularity  is  performative  and  touches  the  social  and  the  technical  without
establishing a decisive causality in between them. The blockchain system performs
in a deterministic manner, it is a working expression of a process of production
almost entirely outsourced to the computational; yet, as I partially have showed in
this chapter, it is itself performed in a non-deterministic way, and its evolution is
marked by the political struggles and limitations of governance.
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Conclusion
This thesis provided a critical overview of blockchain technology by reflecting on
the  historical,  geographical,  and  organizational  characteristics  of  Bitcoin.  Each
approach paid attention to the reconfiguration of power dynamics occurring in
relation to the performance of this technology. The work offered a close study of
the  technical  structure  of  Bitcoin,  and  discussed  it  in  relation  to  notions  of
authority  and  legitimacy.  The  study  showed  that  blockchain  technology
participates and enhances a computational redefinition of the former notions. This
was demonstrated by highlighting the importance of the technical arrangements
participating in the general performance of Bitcoin, and by contrasting them with
the shifting relevance of canonical governmental institutions.
I showed that Bitcoin is a relevant example of how administrative duties
related to the modern state are outsourced to state-independent computational
systems.  What  is  more,  in  the  case  of  Bitcoin,  notions  such  as  authority  and
legitimation  are  not  replaced  by  a  defined  non-state  institution,  such  as  a
technology  corporation.  Instead,  I  argued  that  authority  and  legitimation  are
integrated into the technical system. This shift brings with it not only the use of
technological tools for the composition of more efficient administration services,
but also the generation of new political, spatial, and organizational arrangements
modelled  on  the  computational  ontologies  and  epistemology  of  these  digital
devices.  Each  chapter  paid  special  attention  to  the  former  dimensions  by
developing  four  notions  performed by  the blockchain  technology of  Bitcoin  —
authority,  prehistory,  space,  and  governance.  I  argued  that  these  subjects  are
intertwined  by  four  different  understandings  of  “utopia”  that  evince  internal
contradictions between the rhetoric associated with the blockchain and with its
operation.
The first chapter provided a political theory framework and a discussion
on  the  process  of  mining  to  illustrate  how  authority  is  performed  in  the
blockchain’s system of production. In it, I showed that Bitcoin is a system that has
a particular absence of authority figures. I  expanded this argument by claiming
that while a few different entities tried to legitimize their positions, none of them
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is able to fully claim the system’s management. I then argued that a novel notion
of  authority  is  displaced  towards  the  technical  processes  that  manage  the
production, and that these processes are coded within the systems efficiency and
technical performance. I presented a detailed description of how mining works, as
this  process  represents  a folding  of  the groundbreaking  technical  operation of
blockchains. Mining is in my reading an expression of a superabundance model
present in digital forms and exploited by Bitcoin: the model uses randomness and
intensive calculation to provide stable efficiency.  The latter is  prioritized above
consumption of resources and waste, and becomes the basis on which to provide
an institution-independent notion of countability based on automated production
and exchange.
I  claimed  that  the  lack  of  a  clear  external  authority  and  the
instrumentation of management through efficient computation are core elements
to understand the power rearrangements brought about by this kind of technical
system.  Finally,  I  identified  that  the  specific  technical  configuration  of  the
production process, which closely combines a public network with private tokens,
sheds light on the multiplicity  of  projects gathered around the promise  of  the
blockchain. This particular configuration of production inspires different entities
with dissimilar  goals.  Production in  Bitcoin,  then,  not  only  outsources  political
expressions of power such as authority and legitimation to the machine, but also
feeds  disparate  political  projects  due  to  its  combination of  public  and  private
elements.
The second chapter clarified core notions used throughout the thesis, and
questioned some issues of my own methodology. I also offered an argumentation
for  reading  cryptocurrencies  as  a  medium,  not  only  due  to  their  circulating
properties, but also by taking into account previous academic literature relevant to
my theoretical framework and the goals of my analysis. On this chapter I narrowed
my distinct use of the term “political” in relation to STS literature, and questioned
the problems of thinking about digital objects by depending on digital techniques
to observe them. I stressed the recursive nature of digitally-oriented research, and
the importance of recognizing the changes that come with such recursivity: not
only regarding the instrumental role of the technical tools used to query technical
objects, but also the ontological and epistemological transcoding that takes place
with  such  research  practices.  I  limited  my  thoughts  on  this  topic  to  a  self-
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reflection,  and  a  call  for  an  awareness  of  recursivity.  However,  this  is  a  long
contested issue and much more can be said of it than is examined in this work.
Chapter  three  traced  different  trajectories  to  make  sense  of  the
emergence  of  Bitcoin,  both  as  a  technical  system  and  as  a  political  ideal.  By
making use of Hu’s notion of prehistory —which explores the infrastructural and
metaphorical expansion of media— and an observation of Bitcoin as a confluence
of  different  technologies,  I  presented  three  different  lineages  that  thread  the
emergence  of  the  technical  object,  and  the  multiplication  of  its  uses.  These
trajectories were informed by a foucauldian reading on the material relation of
power  and  technology,  as  well  as  by  Media  Theory  concerns  on  how  power
dynamics  can  be  decoded  from  digital  media.  The  trajectories  divide  three
moments of concern tied to the development of technical components (gears),
discourses,  and  project  deployments  of  which  blockchain  technology  is  made:
secure communications, political manifestos, and creation of crypto-money.
The  first  trajectory  of  secure  communications  expresses  concern  to
develop security communication tools. This trajectory is much more involved with
large-scale geopolitics and military jurisdiction. I stressed the notion of code as
command, as in this trajectory the use of cryptographically techniques is strongly
related to national security and exclusively managed by institutional hierarchies
within the state. The increasing availability of computation and a growing concern
with the US government’s uses and management of cryptographic tools paved the
way  for  a  lineage  that  manifested  with  the  democratization  of  cryptographic
technology.  I  identified  this  second  trajectory  with  strong  political  positions
appended to media and communications technologies. This trajectory read code
not only as a tool, but also as political praxis. The notion of code as command
widened to  be  thought  of  also  as  a  normative  characteristic.  The  antagonistic
position of this lineage saw in code an opportunity to replace an established order
and  to  provide  code  with  a  political  performativity.  This  positioning  informed
plenty  of  the  imaginaries  associated  with  the  internet  of  the  90s,  but  also
prompted the pursuit of replacing state functions with mathematically automated
procedures. A specific replacement of this kind was sought by the third trajectory:
the attempts to create a digital version of money that was not entirely legitimized
by state authority.  This  lineage was characterized with the explicit  intention to
produce natively  digital  financial  assets  (a  digital  version of  cash).  I  presented
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some examples of these attempts and their shortcomings to generate a functional
payment  system,  that  is,  not  only  technically  capable  of  performing  exchange
tasks, but to do it in accordance to the political ideals of secure and free-of third
parties communications. Bitcoin was the system that appeared to comply with the
previous  requirements,  which  was  a  significant  reason  for  its  success  in  the
cryptographic and libertarian communities. I argued that the materialization of the
third trajectory in the Bitcoin system extended the techno-political performativity
of  code,  from  its  command  and  legitimation  associations,  to  the  level  of
production.
This chapter contained a second notion of utopia: an imaginary of ideal
conditions expressed through the intention to build a frictionless exchange system
imbued by  the political.  I  claimed that  the landscape  brought  by  this  utopian
impulse is also partially  responsible for instilling blockchains with a celebratory
rhetoric  on  technology.  I  suggest  that  blockchains  are  popularly  marked  as  a
utopian  machine,  especially  in  relation  to  the  figure  of  the  state,  due  to  the
crossing  of  the  suggested  lineages  in  the  formation  of  Bitcoin.  However,  this
utopian element contained also an early sign of a future crucial struggle in the
development of the Bitcoin project. As shown later in chapter five, the needs for
privacy and decentralization are  not  synonymous with  the demands for  a  free
market space and competition, even though these elements were combined by
the previous trajectories.
If  chapter three sought to  shed light  on the history  of  Bitcoin in time,
chapter four expanded the awareness of the Bitcoin phenomena by providing a
discussion of its spatial arrangements. Through the use of digital methods, this
chapter traced an empirical map of the Bitcoin network for a specific period. It
discussed the relevance of the geopolitical history of the internet to understand
the non-territorial space sought (again) by blockchain distributions. Like the rest of
the thesis, this chapter highlighted the relation between the figure of the state, in
this case in relation to the notion of territory as technology of power. Blockchains
inherit part of the cyberspace idealism on the possibility of using technological
infrastructures to construct new forms of power distribution. The literal notion of
utopia  as  a  both  goal  and  no-place  illustrates  this  desire.  I  challenged  the
assertions that perceive a real distribution brought by blockchain networks. My
research on the geographies of the actual Bitcoin network performance showed
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that this technology is affected by territorial borders and geographical distribution,
and is locatable to some degree.
Mapping the network via digital methods allowed me to trace the limits
and limitations of the Bitcoin discourse on spatiality: the analysis of the gathered
data facilitated some understanding of the migration of certain actors, and the
relevance of  state-nations in the movements of  the Bitcoin ecosystem.  On the
other hand, the blank spaces left from the use of this methodology also made
evident the limitations of trying to thoroughly grasp the blockchain phenomena
from a geographical point of view. Finally, this chapter argued that these kinds of
networks are able to perform independent of such geographies. I found that these
networks  are  a  middle  point  between  the  influence  of  nation-states  and
independent  non-territorial  dispersion  (stacks).  I  made use of  the  concepts  of
standardization zones and imbrications between state and non-state entities to
provide an image of the kind of links that are at play between territorial and non-
territorial distributions.
The final chapter observed issues generated within Bitcoin’s development.
It  played  the  role  of  a  case  study  of  the  internal  governance  Bitcoin’s
development, and sought another way to approach the question of “how” power
relations  are  performed  in  Bitcoin  by  offering  a  close  look  on  the  empirical
governance of the system. The close observation of decision-making processes in
the current configuration of Bitcoin allowed me to identify opposing vectors of
action and their respective rationales. This section was concerned with building a
‘map of agencies’ by closely observing one of the biggest controversies in Bitcoin’s
evolution —the block scaling controversy— through the analysis  of  discussions
and  decision-making  guidelines  of  the  main  developers.  I  identified  that  its
monetary  ontology  clashed  with  basic  open  source  software  guidelines,  thus
complicating conventions of conflict resolution within open development. I argued
that  its  monetary  properties  especially  challenge the  traditional  and key  open
source characteristic of forking.
This chapter indicated that the struggle between privacy and competition
mentioned  in  chapter  Three  played  a  significant  role  in  the  separation  of  a
previously  cohesive  community.  The  discussion  of  the  controversy’s  evolution
made clear that the outcomes expected from the system were not the same for
everyone. This branching depicted not only the intention to fulfil different projects
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through the same technological  means,  and even departing  from an apparent
shared system of beliefs, but in a way it also revealed the failure of attempts to
govern  through  protocols  of  technology.  The  fourth  notion  of  utopia  is  the
particular  expectation  to  replace  the  continually  failed  human  interaction  to
produce agreements, trust, contracts, and compliance between parties through
technological means. The chapter depicted the close and circular relation between
the  production  of  computational  determinative  systems  —aimed  to  improve
human  governance—  and  the  non-deterministic  organizational  processes  that
produce these systems.
This  last  chapter  acts  as  a  leveraging  study  against  the  deterministic
readings inherited from the historical ideologies narrated in the third chapter, and
the outsourcing of production argued in Chapter One. While I do raise a question
on  the  actual  outsourcing  of  an  enacted  notion  of  authority,  from  traditional
political  institutions  to  computing  schemes,  it  is  important  to  stress  that  this
production is surrounded by the social and political subjectivities of its design. The
evolution of the digital object does not happen in isolation: affective and social
controversies steer  the machine that reformulates authority in the production.
The analytical considerations that built Chapter One should be considered under
the  light  of  the  social  arrangements  happening  in  the  fourth  chapter.  The
unresolved antagonism between the first  and fifth chapter  can be read as the
impossibility  of  depriving  politics  of  the  social,  even  with  state-of-the-art
technological arrangements. In this sense, the equilibrium of the protocol is better
tuned  with  the  notion  of  provisional  hegemonies  (Mouffe  2000)  once  the
elements of governance involved in their design and evolution are considered. No
representation  of  the  blockchain  (outside  of  a  narrow  discourse)  exists  as  an
isolated  agency,  but  as  an  entangled  gathering.  The  unique  innovation  of
blockchain technology effectively delegates authority, sovereignty, and trust unto
its system in the form of mining, thus redistributing these notions from normative
and  institutional  entities  towards  computational  schemes.  The  design  and
distribution of this digital object is, however, immersed into sociopolitical spaces a
shown in Chapter Five.
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This thesis offered a critical observation of the blockchain phenomena and
how its  performance rearranges power  structures.  It  contributed to develop  a
political  theory  that  considers  novel  digital  elements  and  is  informed by  their
infrastructures.  This  work  observed  the  Bitcoin  blockchain  from  a  diversity  of
perspectives  to  provide  a  comprehensive  understanding  of  this  phenomenon:
regarding  its  operation,  the  discourses  generated  around  it,  and  the  bridge
between the two.  While I have provided a cohesive map of the power dynamics in
the blockchain,  I  would like  to  think  that  this  work  helps  not  only  to  provide
relevant and original knowledge on the subject, but that it also opens up a new
array  of  inquiries  for  further  discussion.  In  particular,  the  new  (and  multiple)
generation of blockchain-related projects expand the uses and discourses of this
technology,  and  thus  enlarge  a  field  of  ontological  and  epistemological
configurations to be addressed.
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Glossary
Bitcoin
Bitcoin is a digital software/protocol that combines cryptographic techniques with
peer-to-peer technology to enable secure exchange of information without the
necessity  of  a  centralized  authority.  It  was  originally  authored  as  protocol  in
November  2008  and  implemented  as  software  in  January  2009,  by  Satoshi
Nakamoto (a pseudonym representing an unknown individual or group). Being an
open project, many developers have contributed to the evolution of the protocol
rules and software code since then. Bitcoin was envisioned as a direct payment
system  and  has  worked  mainly  as  such.  However,  the  basic  concept  of  a
distributed cryptographic database (generally known as Blockchain or Distributed
Ledger Technology) has been replicated in a multiplicity of projects. As of 2017,
Bitcoin remains the most used cryptocurrency, with a circulation of over 16 million
bitcoins (tokens of account within the Bitcoin system). 
Block
A  block  is  bundle  of  information  of  transactions  made  in  a  blockchain.  A
blockchain  is  designed  so  that  each  new  block  retains  identifying  information
(hash) of the previous block, thus chaining (or stacking) groups of transaction in
such a way that modifying information on a block requires to rebuild all those that
follow. The operation to build new blocks (mining) is computationally demanding
(it requires intensive processing power), thus, the rebuilding of a chain is close to
an impossibility in the system. Each block contains, in addition to the previous
block  information,  a  timestamp,  a  nonce  (a  random  number),  and  a  list  of
transactions.  This  information  is  cryptographically  hashed,  to  generate  a
hexadecimal string, i.e. the block. 
Block-scaling
A significant issue of Bitcoin’s design is its compliance for scaling. Its configuration
up until 2016 was arranged to manage an average of 7 transactions per second
(commercial payment systems like Paypal or Visa can handle as much as 100 and
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4000, respectively). As the demand and use of Bitcoin grew, a call to expand this
limitation  was  progressively  raised.  The  technical  design  of  Bitcoin  allows  to
modify the data size of every block generated (currently a hard limit is set to 1
megabyte), a solution that potentially allows the system to scale without major
technical  restrictions.  However,  this  fix  arguably  jepardizes  its  high  degree  of
decentralization. Thus, the scaling through-blocks-size option generated one of the
major internal controversies within the Bitcoin community (discussed in depth in
the fifth chapter of this thesis). As of 2017, other solutions to scale the number of
transactions  without  compromising  the  block  size  original  limit  have  been
proposed and implemented in Bitcoins original blockchain, while branched chains
have opted for altering the block size.
Blockchain
The blockchain is a distributed ledger of transactions in the form of stacked (or
chained)  blocks.  Each  block  contains  information  of  the  previous  one,  thus
working as a concatenated database.  The database is  not centrally  stored,  but
replicated in all computer nodes belonging to the blockchain network (this can be
private network, or, in the case of the Bitcoin protocol, open to everyone). Each
new block generated by the process of mining is broadcasted to every node on the
network and appended to the chain. If two different blocks are generated at the
same time, the one with the strongest distribution becomes part of the chain. This
means that a single chain has “orphan” ramifications. The highly praised security
of the system relies on this appended technique: counterfeit requires re-mining (a
highly computationally demanding operation) the block containing the modified
transaction, and every subsequent block. This also means that data stored in these
kinds of systems is immutable by design. The enormous computational demand,
highly  scattered  distribution,  immutability  conditions,  and  cryptographically-
secured operations, make blockchain technology a unique technical solution for
storing, executing, and exchanging digital data with a high degree of security and
control.
Cryptocurrency
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One of the most accepted uses of blockchain technology is as payment systems.
Cryptocurrency  is  a  term  comprising  the  blockchain  qualities  of  circulation  of
tokens  through  cryptographically-enabled  techniques.  The  currency  label  is
contested,  but  the  term  was  highly  used  to  refer  to  blockchain-enabled
endeavours,  particularly  in the first  years  of  the technology.  New uses for  the
technology contain the cryptographic and circulatory elements, but are directed
towards uses beyond payment or circulation of financial assets, thus frequently
referred as blockchains or distributed ledger projects.  Bitcoin is  considered the
first cryptocurrency, although projects seeking to secure digital cash or cash-alike
systems through cryptography existed before, with different degrees of success (a
brief  history  of  these  experiments,  and  the  influence  they  had  on  Bitcoin,  is
narrated in the third chapter of this thesis). 
Hash
A hash is a representation (usually in the form of an alphanumerical string) of
data. A cryptographic hash function is a mathematical operation that translate a
data  input  into  a  prearranged  length  data  output.  For  example,  the  natural
language phrase “The quick brown fox jumps over the lazy dog” would become
“DFCG  6HJG  0OPP  Z72JF”  through  a  hash  operation.  This  hypothetical  hash
operation would drastically change the resulting hash if any minor chance is made
to the original phrase, thus hashing techniques prove to be useful to detect any
form of  data  corruption or  identify  a  digital  object  (by  adding,  for  example,  a
timestamp). A major advantage of hashing techniques for cryptography is that the
output is not only illegible, but also that the operation to reverse engineer the
original message is infeasible, and different inputs can’t share the same output.
Thus, data can be compressed and remain identifiable 
Mining
Mining  is  the  operation  to  validate  transactions,  produce  new  tokens,  and
generate blocks within blockchain systems.  Computers (miners)  try to generate
new blocks in a blockchain by appending hashes of  previous blocks,  hashes of
bulks of transactions, timestamps, and random numbers (nonce). The difficulty of
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mining consist in that the output hash has to contain a variable number of zeroes
at  the  beginning.  Since  there  are  random  numbers  in  the  operation,  mining
inevitably involves  multiple trial  and error  generation of  hashes to produce an
output  hash  with  the  required  number  of  preceding  zeros.  The  more
computational  power,  the  more  chances  to  produce  a  valid  hash.  Therefore,
mining  blocks  in  Bitcoin  is  an  energy  and  computational  intensive  operation
(subsequent blockchains modify the variables for mining). Once a block is mined,
the result  is  broadcasted to the network,  and added to the chain,  making the
transactions contained in that block immutable.
PoW
A Proof-of-Work function is a computational technique to provide evidence that
processing time was invested in an operation. It usually consists in generating a
hash that requires a moderately hard computational work. The resultant hash is
easy  to  check  and  thus  serves  as  a  convenient  evidence  of  the  average
computational time/power invested. In Bitcoin and other blockchains, aggregated
operations requiring PoW make the system extremely hard to temper with, yet
easily verifiable.
172
Bibliography
‘About EFF’. 2007. Electronic Frontier Foundation. 10 July 2007. 
https://www.eff.org/about.
Ackland, Robert, and Jamsheed Shorish. 2014. ‘Political Homophily on the Web’. In
Analyzing Social Media Data and Web Networks, 25–46. Palgrave 
Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137276773_2.
Agre, Philip E. 1994. ‘Surveillance and Capture: Two Models of Privacy’. The 
Information Society 10 (2): 101–27. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/01972243.1994.9960162.
Andresen, Gavin. 2015a. ‘BIP 101’. GitHub. 06 2015. 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0101.mediawiki.
———. 2015b. ‘It Must Be Done... but Is Not a Panacea’. Gavin Andresen on 
Svbtle. 4 May 2015. http://gavinandresen.ninja/it-must-be-done-but-is-
not-a-panacea.
———. 2015c. ‘Time to Roll out Bigger Blocks’. Gavin Andresen on Svbtle. 4 May 
2015. http://gavinandresen.ninja/time-to-roll-out-bigger-blocks.
———. 2015d. ‘Why Increasing the Max Block Size Is Urgent’. Gavin Andresen on 
Svbtle. 4 May 2015. http://gavinandresen.ninja/why-increasing-the-max-
block-size-is-urgent.
———. 2015e. ‘Will a 20MB Max Increase Centralization?’ Gavin Andresen on 
Svbtle. 5 May 2015. http://gavinandresen.ninja/does-more-transactions-
necessarily-mean-more-centralized.
———. 2016. ‘A Guided Tour of the 2mb Fork’. Gavin Andresen on Svbtle. 02 2016.
http://gavinandresen.ninja/a-guided-tour-of-the-2mb-fork.
Andresen, Gavin, and Mike Hearn. 2013. ‘BIP 070’. GitHub. 07 2013. 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0070.mediawiki.
Androulaki, Elli, and Ghassan O. Karame. 2014. ‘Hiding Transaction Amounts and 
Balances in Bitcoin’. In Trust and Trustworthy Computing, edited by 
Thorsten Holz and Sotiris Ioannidis, 161–78. Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science 8564. Springer International Publishing. 
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-08593-7_11.
Androulaki, Elli, Ghassan O. Karame, Marc Roeschlin, Tobias Scherer, and Srdjan 
Capkun. 2013. ‘Evaluating User Privacy in Bitcoin’. In Financial 
Cryptography and Data Security, edited by Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, 34–51. 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7859. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-39884-1_4.
Armitage, John. 2006. ‘From Discourse Networks to Cultural Mathematics: An 
Interview with Friedrich A. Kittler’. Theory, Culture & Society 23 (7–8): 17–
38. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276406069880.
Babaioff, Moshe, Shahar Dobzinski, Sigal Oren, and Aviv Zohar. 2012. ‘On Bitcoin 
and Red Balloons’. In Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on 
Electronic Commerce, 56–73. EC ’12. New York, NY, USA: ACM. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/2229012.2229022.
Back, Adam. 2002. ‘Hashcash - A Denial of Service Counter-Measure’. 
Encryptopedia (blog). 2002. http://encryptopedia.org/hashcash/.
———. 2015. ‘Strongly Agree.  My Suggestion 2MB Now, Then 4MB in 2 Years and 
8MB in 4years Then Re-Asses.  (Similar to BIP 
173
102)Https://Twitter.Com/Jgarzik/Status/635857060626718720 …’. 
Microblog. @adam3us (blog). 25 August 2015. 
https://twitter.com/adam3us/status/636410827969421312.
———. n.d. ‘Cypherspace’. Accessed 11 April 2014a. 
http://www.cypherspace.org/.
———. n.d. ‘How Bitcoin Uses Hashcash’. Accessed 11 April 2014b. 
http://www.cypherspace.org/bitcoin/hashcash.html.
Back, Adam, G Maxwell, M Corallo, Mark Friedenbach, and L Dashjr. 2014. 
‘Enabling Blockchain Innovations with Pegged Sidechains’.
Backfeed.cc. 2016. ‘Backfeed | Spreading Consensus’. Backfeed. 2016. 
http://backfeed.cc/.
‘Baidu and China Telecom Stop Accepting Bitcoin, Price Slumps Again’. 2013. 
CoinDesk (blog). 7 December 2013. http://www.coindesk.com/baidu-
stops-bitcoin-price-slumps-again/.
Baran, P. 1964. ‘On Distributed Communications Networks’. IEEE Transactions on 
Communications Systems 12 (1): 1–9. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TCOM.1964.1088883.
Barker, Davi. 2014. ‘The TSA Is Looking for Bitcoin - Daily Anarchist’. Daily 
Anarchist. 2014. http://dailyanarchist.com/2014/02/24/the-tsa-is-looking-
for-bitcoin/.
Barlow, John Perry. 1996. ‘Declaration of Independence for Cyberspace’. 1996. 
http://wac.colostate.edu/rhetnet/barlow/barlow_declaration.html.
Barnett, George A., and Eunjung Sung. 2005. ‘Culture and the Structure of the 
International Hyperlink Network’. Journal of Computer-Mediated 
Communication 11 (1): 217–38. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-
6101.2006.tb00311.x.
Barok, Dušan. 2011. ‘Bitcoin: Censorship-Resistant Currency and Domain System 
for the People’. In Forum American Bar Association.
Barry, Andrew. 2001. Political Machines: Governing a Technological Society. A&C 
Black.
———. 2006. ‘Technological Zones’. European Journal of Social Theory 9 (2): 239–
53. https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431006063343.
Baumann, Annika, and Benjamin Fabianand Matthias Lischke. 2014. ‘Exploring the 
Bitcoin Network’. In . Barcelona.
BBC. 1998. ‘China to Act against “Subversives”’, 18 December 1998, sec. Asia-
Pacific. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/237600.stm.
Beer, David. 2012. ‘Using Social Media Data Aggregators to Do Social Research’. 
Sociological Research Online 17 (3): 10.
Beniger, James R. 1986. The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic 
Origins of the Information Society. Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard 
University Press.
Bergstra, Jan A., and Karl de Leeuw. 2013a. ‘Bitcoin and Beyond: Exclusively 
Informational Monies’. ArXiv:1304.4758 [Cs], April. 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1304.4758.
———. 2013b. ‘Questions Related to Bitcoin and Other Informational Money’. 
ArXiv:1305.5956 [Cs], May. http://arxiv.org/abs/1305.5956.
Bergstra, Jan A., and Peter Weijland. 2014. ‘Bitcoin: A Money-like Informational 
Commodity’. ArXiv:1402.4778 [Cs], February. 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1402.4778.
Berry, David. 2014. ‘Post-Digital Humanities: Computation and Cultural Critique in 
the Arts and Humanities (EDUCAUSE Review) | EDUCAUSE.Edu’. 19 May 
174
2014. https://www.educause.edu/ero/article/post-digital-humanities-
computation-and-cultural-critique-arts-and-humanities.
Birnbaum, Michael. 2013. ‘Germany Looks at Keeping Its Internet, e-Mail Traffic 
inside Its Borders’. The Washington Post, 1 November 2013. 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/germany-looks-at-
keeping-its-internet-e-mail-traffic-inside-its-
borders/2013/10/31/981104fe-424f-11e3-a751-f032898f2dbc_story.html.
Biryukov, Alex, Dmitry Khovratovich, and Ivan Pustogarov. 2014. ‘Deanonymisation
of Clients in Bitcoin P2P Network’. In Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC
Conference on Computer and Communications Security, 15–29. CCS ’14. 
New York, NY, USA: ACM. https://doi.org/10.1145/2660267.2660379.
‘Bitcoin Block Explorer - Blockchain.Info’. n.d. Accessed 7 May 2015. 
https://blockchain.info/.
‘Bitcoin Cash’. n.d. Bitcoin Cash | Home. Accessed 13 September 2017. 
https://www.bitcoincash.org.
‘Bitcoin Dice - Satoshi DICE’. n.d. Accessed 11 September 2017. 
https://satoshidice.com/dice.
‘Bitcoin Difficulty Chart - Chart of Mining Difficulty History’. n.d. CoinDesk (blog). 
Accessed 28 September 2015. http://www.coindesk.com/data/bitcoin-
mining-difficulty-time/.
‘Bitcoin Obituaries: Following Bitcoin While It Dies and Rises’. 2016. 99 Bitcoins 
(blog). 2016. https://99bitcoins.com/bitcoinobituaries/.
‘Bitcoin Traffic Bulletin (Redux)’. n.d. Accessed 2 May 2016. 
http://hashingit.com/analysis/44-bitcoin-traffic-bulletin-redux.
‘Bitcoin Wiki’. n.d. Accessed 18 February 2015. 
http://en.bitcoinwiki.org/Main_Page.
‘Bitcoin/Bips’. n.d. GitHub. Accessed 2 May 2016. https://github.com/bitcoin/bips.
‘Bitcoinocracy - an Opensource Project to Facilitate Decentralized Decision 
Making’. 2015. Reddit. 2015. 
https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/3ef380/bitcoinocracy_an_o
pensource_project_to_facilitate/.
Bitcoin.org. 2015. ‘Bitcoin - Open Source P2P Money’. 2015. 
https://bitcoin.org/en/.
Bjerg, Ole. 2016. ‘How Is Bitcoin Money?’ Theory, Culture & Society 33 (1): 53–72. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276415619015.
Blanchette, Jean-François. 2012. Burdens of Proof: Cryptographic Culture and 
Evidence Law in the Age of Electronic Documents. MIT Press.
Boase, Richard. 2013. ‘Cypherpunks, Bitcoin & the Myth of Satoshi Nakamoto | 
Cybersalon’. 5 November 2013. http://www.cybersalon.org/cypherpunk/.
Bogdan, Diana. 2016. ‘Benevolent Dictators and Disenchanted Believers: Bitcoin 
Core Developers Revisited’. 15 April 2016. 
http://www.coinfox.info/news/reviews/5312-benevolent-dictators-and-
disenchanted-believers-bitcoin-core-developers-revisited.
Bohr, J., and M. Bashir. 2014. ‘Who Uses Bitcoin? An Exploration of the Bitcoin 
Community’. In 2014 Twelfth Annual International Conference on Privacy, 
Security and Trust (PST), 94–101. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/PST.2014.6890928.
Bradley, Arthur. 2011. ‘Originary Technicity: The Theory of Technology from Marx 
to Derrida’.
Bratton, Benjamin H. 2016. The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty. 1 edition. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
175
Brooks, Bradley, and Frank Bajak. 2013. ‘Brazil Looks to Break from US-Centric 
Internet’. The Big Story. 17 September 2013. 
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/brazil-looks-break-us-centric-internet.
BtcDrak. 2015. ‘BIP 105’. GitHub. 08 2015. 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0105.mediawiki.
‘Build-a-Coin Cryptocurrency Creator’. n.d. Accessed 11 September 2017. 
http://build-a-co.in/.
Cameron, David. 2014. ‘Huge Investment in Armed Forces Means a More Secure 
Future for Britain’, 13 July 2014. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/defence/10965217/Huge-
investment-in-Armed-Forces-means-a-more-secure-future-for-
Britain.html.
Chakraborty, Upal. 2015. ‘BIP 106’. GitHub. 08 2015. 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0106.mediawiki.
Chaum, David. 1983. ‘Blind Signatures for Untraceable Payments’. In Advances in 
Cryptology, edited by David Chaum, Ronald L. Rivest, and Alan T. Sherman,
199–203. Springer US. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-
4757-0602-4_18.
———. 1993. ‘Numbers Can Be a Better Form of Cash than Paper’. In Computer 
Security and Industrial Cryptography, 174–78. Lecture Notes in Computer 
Science. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/3-540-
57341-0_61.
‘Chinese Internet Giant Baidu Starts Accepting Bitcoin’. 2013. CoinDesk (blog). 15 
October 2013. http://www.coindesk.com/chinese-internet-giant-baidu-
starts-accepting-bitcoin/.
Chun, Wendy Hui Kyong. 2008. Control and Freedom: Power and Paranoia in the 
Age of Fiber Optics. MIT Press.
———. 2013. Programmed Visions: Software and Memory. Reprint edition. 
Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Code, Lorraine. 2014. ‘Ignorance, Injustice and the Politics of Knowledge’. 
Australian Feminist Studies 29 (80): 148–60. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/08164649.2014.928186.
Coeckelbergh, Prof Dr Mark. 2015. Money Machines: Electronic Financial 
Technologies, Distancing, and Responsibility in Global Finance. Surrey: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited.
CoinScrum and Proof of Work: Tools for the Future. 2014. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=1Ja7HSHqt_Y&feature=youtube_gdata_player.
Corallo, Matt. 2015. ‘[Bitcoin-Development] Block Size Increase’, 6 May 2015. 
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/bitcoin-dev/2015-
May/007869.html.
Courtois, Nicolas T., Marek Grajek, and Rahul Naik. 2014. ‘Optimizing SHA256 in 
Bitcoin Mining’. In Cryptography and Security Systems, edited by Zbigniew 
Kotulski, Bogdan Księżopolski, and Katarzyna Mazur, 131–44. 
Communications in Computer and Information Science 448. Springer 
Berlin Heidelberg. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-662-
44893-9_12.
Cramer, Florian. 2013. ‘What Is “Post-Digital”? | Post-Digital-Research’. 14 
December 2013. http://post-digital.projects.cavi.dk/?p=599.
Cusumano, M, ANDREAS Goeldi, and Dutton. 2013. ‘New Businesses and New 
Business Models’. W. Dutton, The Oxford Handbook of Internet, 239–261.
Dai, Wei. 1998. ‘B-Money’. 1998. http://www.weidai.com/bmoney.txt.
176
Dashjr, Luke. n.d. ‘Bitcoin LJR’. Accessed 2 May 2016. 
http://luke.dashjr.org/programs/bitcoin-ljr/.
‘D-CENT’. n.d. Accessed 1 May 2016. http://dcentproject.eu/.
De Filippi, Primavera. 2015. Commons Governance and Law with Primavera De 
Filippi Interview by Rachel O’Dwyer. 
http://commonstransition.org/commons-centric-law-and-governance-
with-primavera-de-filippi/.
Dean, Jodi. 2002. Publicity’s Secret: How Technoculture Capitalizes on Democracy. 
Cornell University Press.
Deleuze, Gilles. 1992. ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’. October, 3–7.
Delieb, Eric. 1971. Matthew Boulton: Master Silversmith, 1760-1790. New York: 
C.N. Potter; distributed by Crown Publishers.
Diffie, W., and M.E. Hellman. 1976. ‘New Directions in Cryptography’. IEEE 
Transactions on Information Theory 22 (6): 644–54. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/TIT.1976.1055638.
Dourish, Paul. 2014. ‘No SQL: The Shifting Materialities of Database Technology : 
Computational Culture’. Computational Culture, November. 
http://computationalculture.net/article/no-sql-the-shifting-materialities-
of-database-technology.
DuPont, Quinn. n.d. ‘The Politics of Cryptography: Bitcoin and The Ordering 
Machines’. The Journal of Peer Production. Accessed 1 January 2017. 
http://peerproduction.net/issues/issue-4-value-and-currency/peer-
reviewed-articles/the-politics-of-cryptography-bitcoin-and-the-ordering-
machines/.
Eadicicco, Lisa. n.d. ‘These Are the Most Popular IPhone Apps of 2016’. Time. 
Accessed 4 September 2017. http://time.com/4592864/most-popular-
iphone-apps-2016/.
Elden, Stuart. 2013. The Birth of Territory. Chicago ; London: University of Chicago 
Press.
———. 2016. ‘Territory’. In The Wiley-Blackwell Companion to Human Geography, 
edited by John A Agnew and James S Duncan. Vol. 15. John Wiley & Sons.
‘Enciclopedia Libre Universal En Español’. 2017. Enciclopedia Libre Universal En 
Español. 6 June 2017. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20170606024300/http://enciclopedia.us.es/
index.php/Enciclopedia_Libre_Universal_en_Espa%C3%B1ol.
Engels, Friedrich. 1978. ‘On Authority’. In Marx-Engels Reader, 2nd ed., 730–33. 
New York: W. W. Norton and Co.
‘Ethereum Project’. n.d. Accessed 11 September 2017. 
https://www.ethereum.org/.
Faircoin.org. 2016. ‘Faircoin’. 2016. https://fair-coin.org/.
‘FAQ - Bitcoin’. n.d. Accessed 9 January 2015. https://bitcoin.org/en/faq.
Finney, Hal. 2013. ‘Bitcoin and Me’. 19 March 2013. 
http://nakamotoinstitute.org/bitcoin-and-me/.
———. n.d. ‘RPOW - Reusable Proofs of Work’. Accessed 11 April 2014. 
http://www.finney.org/~hal/rpow/.
Fortuna, Julie, Ben Holtz, and Jocelyn Neff. 2013. ‘Evolutionary Structural Analysis 
of the Bitcoin Network’. http://www.cryptolibrary.org/handle/21/655.
Foucault, Michel. 1980a. Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings, 1972-1977. Edited by Colin Gordon. 1st American Ed edition. 
New York: Vintage.
177
———. 1980b. ‘Two Lectures’. In Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings, 1972-1977, edited by Colin Gordon, 1st American Ed 
edition. New York: Vintage.
———. 1982. The Archaeology of Knowledge: And the Discourse on Language. 
New York, NY: Vintage.
———. 2012. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Vintage. Knopf 
Doubleday Publishing Group. https://books.google.co.uk/books?
id=6rfP0H5TSmYC.
‘Free State Project’. n.d. Accessed 21 September 2017. 
https://freestateproject.org/about.
Fuller, Matthew. 2008. Software Studies: A Lexicon. MIT Press.
‘Funding of Network Security with Infinite Block Sizes’. 2013. 2013. 
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=157141.0;all.
Gabrys, Jennifer. 2013. Digital Rubbish: A Natural History of Electronics. Reprint 
edition. University of Michigan Press.
Galloway, Alexander R. 2004. Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization. 
MIT Press.
———. 2006. ‘Language Wants To Be Overlooked: On Software and Ideology’. 
Journal of Visual Culture 5 (3): 315–31. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1470412906070519.
Garside, Juliette. 2015. ‘Philip Zimmermann: King of Encryption Reveals His Fears 
for Privacy’. The Guardian, 25 May 2015, sec. Technology. 
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/25/philip-
zimmermann-king-encryption-reveals-fears-privacy.
Garzik, Jeff. 2015. ‘BIP 102’. GitHub. 06 2015. 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0102.mediawiki.
———. n.d. ‘BIP 109’. GitHub. Accessed 2 May 2016. 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0102.mediawiki.
Gerlitz, Carolin, and Anne Helmond. 2013. ‘The like Economy: Social Buttons and 
the Data-Intensive Web’. New Media & Society 15 (8): 1348–65. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444812472322.
Gloerich, Inte, and Patricia de Vries, eds. 2018. Moneylab Reader 2: Overcoming 
the Hype. Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures.
Goldsmith, Jack, and Tim Wu. 2008. Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a 
Borderless World. New York: Oxford University Press.
Golumbia, David. 2016. The Politics of Bitcoin. University of Minnesota Press. 
https://www.upress.umn.edu/book-division/books/the-politics-of-bitcoin.
Graham, Mark W. 2006. News and Frontier Consciousness in the Late Roman 
Empire. University of Michigan Press.
Greenberg, Andy. 2012. This Machine Kills Secrets: How WikiLeakers, Hacktivists, 
and Cypherpunks Are Freeing the World’s Information. Random House.
Hagelstrom, Martin. 2016. ‘Why Bitcoin’s Block Size Debate Is a Proxy War’. 
CoinDesk (blog). 12 March 2016. http://www.coindesk.com/bitcoin-block-
size-proxy-war/.
Haraway, Donna. 1988. ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism 
and the Privilege of Partial Perspective’. Feminist Studies 14 (3): 575–99. 
https://doi.org/10.2307/3178066.
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. 2001. Empire. Harvard University Press.
———. 2005. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire. Penguin 
Books.
Hayles, N. Katherine. 2005. My Mother Was a Computer: Digital Subjects and 
Literary Texts. First Edition edition. Chicago: University Of Chicago Press.
178
Hearn, Mike. 2015. ‘Why Is Bitcoin Forking?’ Medium. 15 August 2015. 
https://medium.com/faith-and-future/why-is-bitcoin-forking-
d647312d22c1#.4aby02bw1.
———. 2016. ‘The Resolution of the Bitcoin Experiment’. Medium. 14 January 
2016. https://medium.com/@octskyward/the-resolution-of-the-bitcoin-
experiment-dabb30201f7#.v7rjy8ux6.
Hern, Alex. 2015. ‘Bitcoin’s Forked: Chief Scientist Launches Alternative Proposal 
for the Currency’. The Guardian, 17 August 2015, sec. Technology. 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/aug/17/bitcoin-xt-
alternative-cryptocurrency-chief-scientist.
Hiranand, Ravi. 2015. ‘Exploring the Whole Galaxy of “No Man’s Sky”’. CNN. 18 
June 2015. http://www.cnn.com/2015/06/18/tech/no-mans-sky-sean-
murray/index.html.
Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, 
Organizations, and States. Harvard University Press.
‘How Much Electricity Does an American Home Use? - FAQ - U.S. Energy 
Information Administration (EIA)’. n.d. Accessed 28 September 2015. 
http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=97&t=3.
Hu, Tung-Hui. 2016. A Prehistory of the Cloud. Reprint edition. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Huckle, Steve, and Martin White. 2016. ‘Socialism and the Blockchain’. Future 
Internet 8 (4): 49. https://doi.org/10.3390/fi8040049.
Hughes, Eric. 1993. ‘A Cypherpunk’s Manifesto’. 1993. 
http://www.activism.net/cypherpunk/manifesto.html.
Isaac, Benjamin. 1988. ‘The Meaning of the Terms Limes and Limitanei’. The 
Journal of Roman Studies 78: 125–47. https://doi.org/10.2307/301454.
Jack, William, and Tavneet Suri. 2011. ‘Mobile Money: The Economics of M-PESA’. 
Working Paper 16721. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16721.
Jeong, Sarah. 2013. ‘The Bitcoin Protocol as Law, and the Politics of a Stateless 
Currency’. SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2294124. Rochester, NY: Social Science 
Research Network. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2294124.
Jones, Rupert. 2017. ‘Cash No Longer King as Contactless Payments Soar in UK 
Stores’. The Guardian, 12 July 2017, sec. Money. 
http://www.theguardian.com/money/2017/jul/12/cash-contactless-
payments-uk-stores-cards-british-retail-consortium.
Jong, Eduard de. 2014. ‘Cash or Currency: An Overview of Electronic Payment 
Technology’. In . Amsterdam. 
http://networkcultures.org/wpmu/moneylab/2014/03/23/edward-de-
jong-towards-an-open-e-currency-system/.
Jong, Eduard de, Nathaniel Tkacz, and Pablo R. Velasco. 2015. ‘“You Will Live as 
Friends and Count as Enemies”: On Digital Cash and the Media of 
Payment.’ In Moneylab Reader: An Intervention in Digital Economy, edited 
by Geert Lovink, Nathaniel Tkacz, and Patricia de Vries, 258–67. INC 
Reader 10. Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures.
Kahn, David. 1996. The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret 
Communication from Ancient Times to the Internet. Rev Sub edition. New 
York: Scribner.
Kaminski, Jermain, and Peter Gloor. 2014. ‘Nowcasting the Bitcoin Market with 
Twitter Signals’. ArXiv:1406.7577 [Cs], June. 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1406.7577.
179
Kant, Immanuel. 1999. Critique of Pure Reason. Edited by Paul Guyer and Allen W. 
Wood. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
Karlstrøm, Henrik. 2014. ‘Do Libertarians Dream of Electric Coins? The Material 
Embeddedness of Bitcoin’. Distinktion: Scandinavian Journal of Social 
Theory 15 (1): 23–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/1600910X.2013.870083.
Kelly, Kevin. 2011. What Technology Wants. Penguin Books.
Kelty, Christopher. 2005. ‘Geeks, Social Imaginaries, and Recursive Publics’. 
Cultural Anthropology 20 (2): 185–214. 
https://doi.org/10.1525/can.2005.20.2.185.
Kirschenbaum, Matthew. 2007. Mechanisms:  New Media and the Forensic 
Imagination. MIT Press. https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/mechanisms.
Kitchin, Rob. 2014. ‘Thinking Critically About and Researching Algorithms’. SSRN 
Scholarly Paper ID 2515786. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2515786.
Kitchin, Rob, and Martin Dodge. 2011. Code/Space: Software and Everyday Life. 
MIT Press.
Kittler, Friedrich A. 1999. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Translated by Geoffrey 
Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz. 1 edition. Stanford, Calif: Stanford 
University Press.
———. 2008. ‘Code (or, How You Can Write Something Differently)’. In Software 
Studies: A Lexicon, by Matthew Fuller. MIT Press.
Kittler, Friedrich A., and Michael Metteer. 1992. Discourse Networks, 1800/1900. 1 
edition. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press.
Kondor, Dániel, Márton Pósfai, István Csabai, and Gábor Vattay. 2014. ‘Do the Rich 
Get Richer? An Empirical Analysis of the Bitcoin Transaction Network’. 
PLoS ONE 9 (2): e86197. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0086197.
Krämer, Sybille. 2015. Medium, Messenger, Transmission: An Approach to Media 
Philosophy. Amsterdam University Press.
Lamport, Leslie, Robert Shostak, and Marshall Pease. 1982. ‘The Byzantine 
Generals Problem’. ACM Trans. Program. Lang. Syst. 4 (3): 382–401. 
https://doi.org/10.1145/357172.357176.
Lash, Scott. 2007. ‘Power after Hegemony Cultural Studies in Mutation?’ Theory, 
Culture & Society 24 (3): 55–78. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276407075956.
Latour, Bruno. 1996. Aramis, or, The Love of Technology. Harvard University Press.
———. 2007a. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory. 
OUP Oxford.
———. 2007b. ‘Turning Around Politics: A Note on Gerard de Vries’ Paper’. Social 
Studies of Science 37 (5): 811–20. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312707081222.
Law, John, and Evelyn Ruppert. 2013. ‘The Social Life Of Methods: Devices’. 
Journal of Cultural Economy 6 (3): 229–40. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17530350.2013.812042.
Lessig, Lawrence. 2006. Code: And Other Laws of Cyberspace, Version 2.0. 2nd 
Revised ed. edition. New York: Basic Books.
Levchenko, Kirill, Vacha Dave, Stefan Savage, Alex C. Snoeren, Damon McCoy, Chris
Grier, Hitesh Dharmdasani, Sarah Meiklejohn, Danny Yuxing Huang, and 
Nicholas Weaver. 2014. ‘Botcoin: Monetizing Stolen Cycles’. Internet 
Society NDSS 2014. http://www.cryptolibrary.org/handle/21/434.
Levy, Steven. 1996. ‘Crypto Rebels’. In High Noon on the Electronic Frontier: 
Conceptual Issues in Cyberspace, by Peter Ludlow, 185–206. MIT Press.
180
Lightbody, Brian. 2010. Philosophical Genealogy: An Epistemological 
Reconstruction of Nietzsche and Foucault’s Genealogical Method. Peter 
Lang.
‘List of Bitcoin Services That Support/Oppose Increasing Max Block Size’. n.d. 
Reddit. Accessed 2 May 2016. 
https://www.reddit.com/r/Bitcoin/comments/37y8wm/list_of_bitcoin_ser
vices_that_supportoppose/.
Litecoin.org. 2015. ‘Litecoin - Open Source P2P Digital Currency’. 2015. 
https://litecoin.org/.
López, Julio, and Ricardo Dahab. 2000. ‘An Overview of Elliptic Curve 
Cryptography’.
Lovink, Geert, Nathaniel Tkacz, and Patricia de Vries. 2015. Moneylab Reader : An 
Intervention in Digital Economy. Amsterdam: Institute of Network 
Cultures.
Lovink, Geert, and Soenke Zehle. 2005. Incommunicado Reader. Institute of 
Network Cultures.
Lucas, George. 1978. Star Wars: Episode IV - A New Hope. Action, Adventure, 
Fantasy. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0076759/.
Luhmann, Niklas. 1975. Legitimation durch Verfahren. Luchterhand.
Lupton, Deborah. 2014. Digital Sociology. Routledge.
Lury, Celia, and Nina Wakeford. 2012a. ‘Introduction: A Perpetual Inventory’. In 
Inventive Methods: The Happening of the Social, 1–25. Routledge.
———. 2012b. Inventive Methods: The Happening of the Social. Routledge.
Lyotard, Jean-François. 1984. The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. 
University of Minnesota Press.
Mackenzie, Adrian, and Ruth McNally. 2013. ‘Living Multiples: How Large-Scale 
Scientific Data-Mining Pursues Identity and Differences’. Theory, Culture & 
Society 30 (4): 72–91. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276413476558.
Malone, D., and K.J. O’Dwyer. 2014. ‘Bitcoin Mining and Its Energy Footprint’. In , 
280–85. Institution of Engineering and Technology. 
https://doi.org/10.1049/cp.2014.0699.
Manovich, Lev. 2001. The Language of New Media. MIT Press.
Marres, Noortje. 2007. ‘The Issues Deserve More Credit: Pragmatist Contributions 
to the Study of Public Involvement in Controversy’. Social Studies of 
Science 37 (5): 759–80. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312706077367.
———. 2012. ‘The Redistribution of Methods: On Intervention in Digital Social 
Research, Broadly Conceived’. The Sociological Review 60: 139–65. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.2012.02121.x.
———. 2015. ‘Why Map Issues? On Controversy Analysis as a Digital Method’. 
Science, Technology & Human Values, 0162243915574602.
Marres, Noortje, and Esther Weltevrede. 2013. ‘Scraping the Social? Issues in Live 
Social Research’. Journal of Cultural Economy 6 (3): 313–335.
Marx, Karl. 1980. Grundrisse. Translated by David McLellan. 2nd ed. London (etc.): 
Macmillan.
———. 1992. Capital: Volume 1: A Critique of Political Economy. Edited by Ernest 
Mandel. Translated by Ben Fowkes. Reprint edition. London ; New York, 
N.Y: Penguin Classics.
massobs.org.uk. 2015. ‘Mass Observation Project’. 2015. 
http://www.massobs.org.uk/about/mass-observation-project.
Matonis, Jon. n.d. ‘Bitcoin Foundation Launches To Drive Bitcoin’s Advancement’. 
Forbes. Accessed 18 September 2017. 
181
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2012/09/27/bitcoin-
foundation-launches-to-drive-bitcoins-advancement/.
Maurer, Bill. 2014. Closed Loops and Private Gateways: Money, Technology and 
the Public Interest in Payment (MoneyLab). http://vimeo.com/90207123.
Maurer, Bill, Taylor C. Nelms, and Lana Swartz. 2013. ‘“When Perhaps the Real 
Problem Is Money Itself!”: The Practical Materiality of Bitcoin’. Social 
Semiotics 23 (2): 261–77. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10350330.2013.777594.
May, Timothy C. 1994. ‘Cyphernomicon’. 1994. 
http://www.cypherpunks.to/faq/cyphernomicron/cyphernomicon.html.
———. 1996. ‘A Crypto Anarchist Manifesto’. In High Noon on the Electronic 
Frontier: Conceptual Issues in Cyberspace, by Peter Ludlow, 237–40. MIT 
Press.
Meiklejohn, Sarah, Marjori Pomarole, Grant Jordan, Kirill Levchenko, Damon 
McCoy, Geoffrey M. Voelker, and Stefan Savage. 2013. ‘A Fistful of Bitcoins:
Characterizing Payments Among Men with No Names’. In Proceedings of 
the 2013 Conference on Internet Measurement Conference, 127–140. IMC 
’13. New York, NY, USA: ACM. https://doi.org/10.1145/2504730.2504747.
Merkle, Ralph C. 1980. ‘Protocols for Public Key Cryptosystems’. In Null, 122. IEEE.
Mersch, Yves. n.d. ‘ECB: Euro Banknotes – a Means of Payment Recognised 
Worldwide’. Accessed 30 July 2014. 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2014/html/sp140519.en.html
.
Mitchell, William J. 1996. City of Bits: Space, Place, and the Infobahn. Revised ed. 
edition. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
Mittal, Sonal. 2012. ‘Is Bitcoin Money? Bitcoin and Alternate Theories of Money’. 
SSRN Scholarly Paper ID 2434194. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research 
Network. http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2434194.
Moor, Liz, and Emma Uprichard. 2014. ‘The Materiality of Method: The Case of 
the Mass Observation Archive’. Sociological Research Online 19 (3): 10.
Morozov, Evgeny. 2013. To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological 
Solutionism. PublicAffairs.
Moser, M., R. Bohme, and D. Breuker. 2013. ‘An Inquiry into Money Laundering 
Tools in the Bitcoin Ecosystem’. In ECrime Researchers Summit (ECRS), 
2013, 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1109/eCRS.2013.6805780.
Mouffe, Chantal. 2000. ‘Deliberative Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism’. IHS Series. 
December 2000. http://irihs.ihs.ac.at/1312/.
Mu, Eric. 2015. ‘My Life Inside a Remote Chinese Bitcoin Mine’. CoinDesk (blog). 8 
June 2015. http://www.coindesk.com/my-life-inside-a-remote-chinese-
bitcoin-mine/.
Nakamoto, Satoshi. 2008a. ‘CML: Bitcoin P2P e-Cash Paper’. Archive. Cryptography
Mailing List. 2008. https://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography
%40metzdowd.com/msg09959.html.
———. 2008b. ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System’, October. 
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
‘Nasdaq Linq Enables First-Ever Private Securities Issuance Documented With 
Blockchain Technology (NASDAQ:NDAQ)’. n.d. Accessed 16 September 
2016. http://ir.nasdaq.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=948326.
Nassehi, Armin. 2017. ‘Society Throught the Lens of the Digital (Keynote)’. In 
Herrenhausen Conference. Hannover.
Negri, Antonio. 1991. The Savage Anomaly: The Power of Spinoza’s Metaphysics 
and Politics. U of Minnesota Press.
182
‘NY Financial Regulator Lawsky Releases Final BitLicense Rules for Bitcoin Firms - 
WSJ’. n.d. Accessed 5 September 2017. https://www.wsj.com/articles/ny-
financial-regulator-lawsky-releases-final-bitlicense-rules-for-bitcoin-firms-
1433345396.
O’Dwyer, Rachel. 2012. ‘This Is Not a Bit-Pipe: A Political Economy of the Substrate
Network’. Fibreculture Journal 20 (June). 
http://twenty.fibreculturejournal.org/2012/06/18/fcj-138-this-is-not-a-bit-
pipe-a-political-economy-of-the-substrate-network/.
———. 2015. ‘The Revolution Will (Not) Be Decentralised: Blockchains’. Commons 
Transition (blog). 11 June 2015. http://commonstransition.org/the-
revolution-will-not-be-decentralised-blockchains/.
Parikka, Jussi. 2012. What Is Media Archaeology. Polity.
———. 2014. ‘Cultural Techniques of Cognitive Capitalism: Metaprogramming and
the Labour of Code’. Cultural Studies Review 20 (1): 30–52. 
https://doi.org/10.5130/csr.v20i1.3831.
Pariser, Eli. 2011. The Filter Bubble: How the New Personalized Web Is Changing 
What We Read and How We Think. Penguin UK.
Parisi, Luciana. 2013. Contagious Architecture. MIT Press. 
https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/contagious-architecture.
Pasquinelli, Matteo. 2017. ‘Arcana Mathematica Imperii: The Evolution of Western 
Computational Norms’. In Former West, by Maria Hlavajova. Boston, MA: 
MIT Press. 
https://www.academia.edu/26313149/Arcana_Mathematica_Imperii_The
_Evolution_of_Western_Computational_Norms.
Paul, Kari. 2015. ‘Bitcoin Mining in an Abandoned Iowa Grocery Store’. 
Motherboard. 17 July 2015. http://motherboard.vice.com/read/bitcoin-
mining-in-an-abandoned-iowa-grocery-store.
Popper, Nathaniel. 2015. Digital Gold: Bitcoin and the Inside Story of the Misfits 
and Millionaires Trying to Reinvent Money. New York, NY: Harper.
———. 2016. ‘A Bitcoin Believer’s Crisis of Faith’. The New York Times, 14 January 
2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/17/business/dealbook/the-
bitcoin-believer-who-gave-up.html.
Puckett, Jim, and Ted Smith, eds. 2003. Exporting Harm: The High-Tech Trashing of
Asia. Seattle, Wash.: Diane Pub Co.
Raymond, Eric S. 2008. The Cathedral & the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open 
Source by an Accidental Revolutionary. O’Reilly Media, Inc.
———. n.d. ‘Homesteading the Noosphere’. Accessed 11 September 2017. 
http://www.catb.org/~esr/writings/cathedral-bazaar/homesteading/.
Redshaw, Thomas. 2017. ‘Bitcoin beyond Ambivalence: Popular Rationalization 
and Feenberg’s Technical Politics’. Thesis Eleven 138 (1): 46–64. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0725513616689390.
Reid, Fergal, and Martin Harrigan. 2013. ‘An Analysis of Anonymity in the Bitcoin 
System’. In Security and Privacy in Social Networks, edited by Yaniv 
Altshuler, Yuval Elovici, Armin B. Cremers, Nadav Aharony, and Alex 
Pentland, 197–223. Springer New York. 
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-1-4614-4139-7_10.
Rivest, R. L., A. Shamir, and L. Adleman. 1978. ‘A Method for Obtaining Digital 
Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems’. Commun. ACM 21 (2): 120–126.
https://doi.org/10.1145/359340.359342.
Rizzo, Pete. 2014. ‘Blockstream: $21 Million Funding Will Drive Bitcoin 
Development’. CoinDesk (blog). 18 November 2014. 
183
http://www.coindesk.com/blockstream-21-million-funding-will-drive-
bitcoin-development/.
Roberts, Daniel. n.d. ‘Why a Slew of Bitcoin Startups Fled New York’. Fortune. 
Accessed 5 September 2017. http://fortune.com/2015/08/14/bitcoin-
startups-leave-new-york-bitlicense/.
Rogers, Richard. 2009. The End of the Virtual: Digital Methods. Amsterdam: 
Vossiuspers UvA.
———. 2012. ‘Mapping and the Politics of Web Space’. Theory, Culture & Society 
29 (4–5): 193–219. https://doi.org/10.1177/0263276412450926.
———. 2013. Digital Methods. MIT Press.
Ruppert, Evelyn, John Law, and Mike Savage. 2013. ‘Reassembling Social Science 
Methods: The Challenge of Digital Devices’. Theory, Culture & Society 30 
(4): 22–46.
Sachy, Marco. 2015. ‘Blockchain for the Social Good | Nesta’. 10 June 2015. 
http://www.nesta.org.uk/blog/blockchain-social-good.
Sack, Robert David. 1986. Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History. CUP 
Archive.
Sanchez, Washington. 2015. ‘BIP 107’. GitHub. 09 2015. 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0107.mediawiki.
Sassen, Saskia. 2002. ‘Towards a Sociology of Information Technology’. Current 
Sociology 50 (3): 365–88. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392102050003005.
———. 2006. Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages. 
Princeton University Press.
Saxena, Amitabh, Janardan Misra, and Aritra Dhar. 2014. ‘Increasing Anonymity in 
Bitcoin’. In Financial Cryptography and Data Security, edited by Rainer 
Böhme, Michael Brenner, Tyler Moore, and Matthew Smith, 122–39. 
Lecture Notes in Computer Science 8438. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-662-44774-1_9.
‘Scalability Debate Continues As Bitcoin XT Proposal Stalls’. 2016. CoinDesk. 11 
January 2016. https://www.coindesk.com/scalability-debate-bitcoin-xt-
proposal-stalls/.
Scholz, Trebor, and Nathan Schneider. 2017. Ours to Hack and to Own. New York.
SCI-Arc Channel. 2016. Benjamin H. Bratton Interview. 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W8My0aLsIMA.
Scott, Brett. 2014. ‘Visions of a Techno-Leviathan: The Politics of the Bitcoin 
Blockchain’. E-International Relations (blog). 2014. http://www.e-
ir.info/2014/06/01/visions-of-a-techno-leviathan-the-politics-of-the-
bitcoin-blockchain/.
———. 2016a. ‘How Can Cryptocurrency and Blockchain Technology Play a Role in 
Building Social and Solidarity Finance?’ UNRISD Working Paper.
———. 2016b. ‘The War on Cash’. The Long and Short, 19 August 2016. war-on-
cash.html.
Selgin, George. 2015. ‘Synthetic Commodity Money’. Journal of Financial Stability, 
Special Issue: Instead of the Fed: Past and Present Alternatives to the 
Federal Reserve System, 17 (April): 92–99. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2014.07.002.
Shah, D., and Kang Zhang. 2014. ‘Bayesian Regression and Bitcoin’. In 2014 52nd 
Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing 
(Allerton), 409–14. https://doi.org/10.1109/ALLERTON.2014.7028484.
Siegel, Matt. 2016. ‘Upstart Australian Political Party Wants to Use Bitcoin as Basis 
for Governance Style’. 16 February 2016. 
184
http://www.rawstory.com/2016/02/upstart-australian-political-party-
wants-to-use-bitcoin-as-basis-for-governance-style/.
Simonite, Tom. 2014. ‘Meet Gavin Andresen, the Most Powerful Person in the 
World of Bitcoin’. MIT Technology Review. 15 August 2014. 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/527051/the-man-who-really-built-
bitcoin/.
Smith, Adam. 1791. An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations: By Adam Smith, ... J. J. Tourneisen; and J. L. Legrand.
Smyth, Lui. 2014a. ‘The Politics of Bitcoin’. Simulacrum (blog). 7 March 2014. 
https://spacedruiddotcom.wordpress.com/2014/03/07/the-politics-of-
bitcoin/.
———. 2014b. ‘Trust, Organisation, and Community Within Bitcoin’. Simulacrum 
(blog). 2 April 2014. 
https://spacedruiddotcom.wordpress.com/2014/04/02/bitcoin-trust/.
‘Soft Block Size Limit Reached, Action Required by YOU’. 2013. 2013. 
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=149668.0;all.
Southurst, Jon. 2014. ‘Australian Government: Welfare Applicants Must Declare 
Bitcoin Assets’. CoinDesk (blog). 14 November 2014. 
http://www.coindesk.com/australian-government-welfare-applicants-
must-declare-bitcoin-assets/.
Spencer, Leon. 2015. ‘Australia’s CoinJar Moves HQ to UK for “progressive” Bitcoin 
Scene’. ZDNet. 2015. http://www.zdnet.com/article/australias-coinjar-
moves-hq-to-uk-for-progressive-bitcoin-scene/.
Srnicek, Nick. 2016. Platform Capitalism. 1 edition. Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: 
Polity.
Stengers, Isabelle. 2010. Cosmopolitics I. Translated by Robert Bononno. 
Minneapolis: Univ Of Minnesota Press.
Stephens, Monica. 2012. ‘Featured Graphic: Digital Divide: The Geography of 
Internet Access’. Environment and Planning A 44: 1009–1010.
Stokes, Robert. 2012. ‘Virtual Money Laundering: The Case of Bitcoin and the 
Linden Dollar’. Information & Communications Technology Law 21 (3): 
221–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/13600834.2012.744225.
Sun, Leo. 2017. ‘Facebook Inc.’s WhatsApp Hits 900 Million Users: What Now? -’. 
The Motley Fool. 2017. 
https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2015/09/11/facebook-incs-
whatsapp-hits-900-million-users-what.aspx.
Sunstein, Cass R. 2009. Republic.Com 2.0. Princeton University Press.
Surda, Peter. 2012. ‘Economics of Bitcoin Is Bitcoin an Alternative to Fiat 
Currencies and Gold’. http://www.cryptolibrary.org/handle/21/625.
Swartz, Lana. 2017. ‘Blockchain Dreams: Imagining Techno-Economic Alternatives 
After Bitcoin’. In Another Economy Is Possible: Culture and Economy in a 
Time of Crisis, 1 edition. Malden, MA: Polity.
Szabo, Nick. 2002. ‘Shelling Out -- The Origins of Money’. 2002. 
http://szabo.best.vwh.net/shell.html.
———. 2005. ‘Bit Gold’. Unenumerated (blog). December 2005. 
http://unenumerated.blogspot.de/2005/12/bit-gold.html.
———. 2011. ‘Bitcoin, What Took Ye so Long?’ Blog. Unenumerated (blog). 28 May
2011. http://unenumerated.blogspot.co.uk/2011/05/bitcoin-what-took-
ye-so-long.html.
Taaki, Amir. n.d. ‘BIP 001’. GitHub. Accessed 2 May 2016. 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0001.mediawiki.
185
Terranova, Tiziana. 2014. ‘Red Stack Attack! Algorithms, Capital, and the 
Automation of the Common’. Quaderni Di San Precario, February 14.
Terranova, Tiziana, and Andrea Fumagalli. 2015. ‘Financial Capital and the Money 
of the Common: The Case of Commoncoin’. In Moneylab Reader: An 
Intervention in Digital Economy. INC Reader 10. Amsterdam.
The Law Library of Congress. 2016. ‘Regulation of Bitcoin in Selected Jurisdictions 
(Web Updates)’. Web page. September 2016. 
https://loc.gov/law/help/bitcoin-survey/.
‘The Tao of IETF: A Novice’s Guide to the Internet Engineering Task Force’. 2012. 
August 2012. https://www.ietf.org/tao.html.
Tkacz, Nathaniel. 2011. ‘The Politics of Forking Paths’. In Critical Point of View : A 
Wikipedia Reader, edited by Geert Lovink and Nathaniel Tkacz, 94–109. 
Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures. 
http://networkcultures.org/wpmu/portal/publications/inc-
readers/critical-point-of-view-a-wikipedia-reader/.
———. 2015. Wikipedia and the Politics of Openness. University of Chicago Press. 
http://www.press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/W/bo19085555
.html.
Toor, Amar. 2013. ‘Will the Global NSA Backlash Break the Internet?’ The Verge. 8 
November 2013. http://www.theverge.com/2013/11/8/5080554/nsa-
backlash-brazil-germany-raises-fears-of-internet-balkanization.
Vasek, Marie, Micah Thornton, and Tyler Moore. 2014. ‘Empirical Analysis of 
Denial-of-Service Attacks in the Bitcoin Ecosystem’. In Financial 
Cryptography and Data Security, edited by Rainer Böhme, Michael 
Brenner, Tyler Moore, and Matthew Smith, 57–71. Lecture Notes in 
Computer Science 8438. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. 
http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-662-44774-1_5.
Verbücheln, Stephan. 2015. ‘How Perfect Offline Wallets Can Still Leak Bitcoin 
Private Keys’. ArXiv:1501.00447 [Cs], January. 
http://arxiv.org/abs/1501.00447.
Vigna, Paul. 2016. ‘Bitcoin Startup Blockstream Raises $55 Million in Funding 
Round’. Wall Street Journal, 3 February 2016, sec. Markets. 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/bitcoin-startup-blockstream-raises-55-
million-in-funding-round-1454518655.
Vries, Gerard de. 2007. ‘What Is Political in Sub-Politics?: How Aristotle Might Help
STS’. Social Studies of Science 37 (5): 781–809. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0306312706070749.
Wallace, Benjamin. n.d. ‘The Rise and Fall of Bitcoin’. WIRED. Accessed 21 
September 2017. https://www.wired.com/2011/11/mf_bitcoin/.
Wandery, Oscar. 2014. Bitcoin: A Seemingly Rampant Elevator, or Is Someone 
Pushing Its Buttons? : A Case Study on Bitcoin’s Fluctuations in Price and 
Concept. http://www.diva-portal.org/smash/record.jsf?
pid=diva2%3A740506&dswid=-853.
Weber, Max. 1991. ‘Politics as Vocation’. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. 
Psychology Press.
Weber, Steve. 2004. The Success of Open Source. Harvard University Press.
Welch, Chris. 2017. ‘Facebook Crosses 2 Billion Monthly Users’. The Verge. 27 June
2017. https://www.theverge.com/2017/6/27/15880494/facebook-2-
billion-monthly-users-announced.
Wellman, Barry. 2004. ‘The Three Ages of Internet Studies: Ten, Five and Zero 
Years Ago’. New Media & Society 6 (1): 123–29. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1461444804040633.
186
WeUseCoins. 2014. What Is Bitcoin? (V2). https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=Gc2en3nHxA4&feature=youtu.be.
Winner, Langdon. 1980. ‘Do Artifacts Have Politics?’ Daedalus 109 (1): 121–136.
Wirdum, Aaron van. 2015. ‘Chinese Mining Pools Propose Alternative 8 MB Block 
Size’. CoinTelegraph. 16 June 2015. 
http://cointelegraph.com/news/chinese-mining-pools-propose-
alternative-8-mb-block-size.
Wuille, Pieter. 2015. ‘BIP 103’. GitHub. 07 2015. 
https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0103.mediawiki.
Wynn, Jonathan R. 2009. ‘Digital Sociology: Emergent Technologies in the Field 
and the Classroom’. In Sociological Forum, 24:448–456. Wiley Online 
Library., 24:448–456. Wiley Online Library.
187
